The make-up of our conundrum
The best description of the situation we currently find ourselves in undoubtedly deserves the term “conundrum.” I am referring to the choices our government must make with regard to the release of the 136 hostages, both alive and dead, which is one of the two declared goals of our war against Hamas. A “total victory” over Hamas, in the words of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is the second goal.
In the current situation, there appears to be an inherent clash between these two goals, unless Israel somehow manages to find, detain, or kill Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, before the negotiations on the release of the hostages are concluded one way or another.
However, on the Israeli side, there is no consensus on whether such a clash really exists. There are still many decision-makers and commentators who believe that the more physical pressure that the Israeli forces exert on Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the better the chances of reaching a satisfactory agreement over the hostages.
Those who disagree with the latter position argue that the best deal Israel can hope for these days is, in exchange for all the hostages, the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners (many of them with blood on their hands and life sentences, or captives from the current war) and a row of ceasefires that would be much longer than what our security forces are inclined to find acceptable.
However, they add, time is running out, and the cruel decision that will have to be made is whether Israel is willing to risk the lives of the hostages by taking its time, in the hope of a change in circumstances and/or a “better” deal, or simply accept whatever is offered.
One of the peculiarities of the current situation is that the debate is taking place even though no one really knows the exact terms of the deal. This is because, so far, we have no indication what Sinwar’s response is to the Israeli reaction to the original Hamas proposal, which included many conditions that are totally unacceptable to Israel, such as a complete cessation of the war and a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. We do not even know the number and categories of Palestinian prisoners that Israel would be required to deliver in exchange for each hostage released.
One of the problems in the current Israeli decision-making process is Netanyahu’s position. The impression one gets is that in Netanyahu’s opinion, a total victory over the Hamas is a superior goal to the release of all the hostages, and that what has changed his rhetoric on the issue, most of the time, is the aggressive campaign launched by the families of the hostages for their immediate release, which he believes to be harmful to the general Israeli cause.
Furthermore, Netanyahu’s primary motivation appears to be preserving his 64-member all-Right majority, which includes Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who are opposed to placing the fate of the hostages before the goal of destroying the Hamas. In addition, their followers include at least some who view the current situation as an unexpected and welcome bonanza that will enhance the arrival of the geula (Redemption) that will result in massive Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip.
For some of them, the lives of the hostages and of the soldiers killed in the fighting are a price worth paying for the sake of the Redemption, while any compromise negotiated with Hamas that, inter alia, might stand in the way of the Redemption is despicable.
THESE DAYS, Netanyahu is also concerned with proving that he is totally blameless on the issue of the “misconception” that brought about October 7. The bon ton these days is that all, or at least most of, the security forces believed until October 7 that Hamas could be pacified through the pouring of money (Qatari and others) into the Gaza Strip, and that the sophisticated barriers constructed by the IDF around the Gaza Strip were impenetrable.
The relevant heads of the security forces have all taken responsibility for this misconception and its catastrophic consequences. Only Netanyahu has refused to take responsibility, arguing that he always maintained that Israel must destroy Hamas, not mollycoddle it, and that the reason he could not realize this goal before October 7 was the fact that both the security forces and public opinion rejected it.
Most commentators appear to believe that the real reason Netanyahu chose to be relatively soft with the terrorist organization was because he sought to weaken the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah by this means and that he has always been inclined to avoid full-scale wars.
However, Netanyahu seems to be going to great lengths to find written proof in the state archives that the commentators are wrong and that he has advocated – both publicly and in inner discussions within the various governmental policy-making forums, as well as in consultations with the security forces – that Israel should seek to destroy Hamas by all possible means.
Whether or not he will be successful in this endeavor is yet to be seen. Public sources do not seem to verify Netanyahu’s claim, which he presented very clearly toward the end of a lengthy interview he gave last Tuesday to neo-conservative British journalist and author Douglas Murray.
Interestingly, in the massive autobiography he published on the eve of the last Israeli general elections in November 2022, Netanyahu did not say a word on this subject, even though, since 2014 (eight years of which Netanyahu served as prime minister), Qatar has delivered to Hamas well over a billion dollars – with Israel’s approval. Since November 2018, some of the money, in cash, has been physically delivered in suitcases to the Gaza Strip – once again, with Israel’s tacit consent.
At any rate, right at the end of his interview with Murray, Netanyahu pointed out enthusiastically that despite his failure over the years to get approval for his (alleged) goal of destroying Hamas, this is the officially declared goal today. At this point in the interview, the hostages were not mentioned, probably more a slip of the mind than deliberate disregard, but nevertheless a fact.
The 64,000-dollar question is whether, with all the current talk about a deal for releasing the hostages, it will actually materialize, and if it will, on what terms. At least on the surface, it appears that Israel has a greater interest in its materialization in the more immediate future, while for Hamas, what is more important is the price it will manage to extract for the release of the hostages.
What Israel has to gain from a deal are the lives of the 100 or so hostages who are still alive and the avoidance of yet another layer of estrangement and division within Israeli society. What Hamas has to gain is possibly its own survival in the Gaza Strip, which clashes with Israel’s main war goal.
One thing is certain: The next few weeks will be nerve-wracking. My hope is that a deal will be worked out, despite the high price we would have to pay.
The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher and has extensively published journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book, Israel’s Knesset Members – A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job, was published by Routledge.