One-third of Jewish-Israelis report stronger belief in God, ‘Post’ poll finds
Israelis have become closer to God and Judaism in the past four months, a survey found.
According to a comprehensive survey conducted by Lazar Research for The Jerusalem Post, 33% of Israelis have reported a strengthened faith in God since the October 7 massacre by Hamas and the subsequent war.
The study, spearheaded by Dr. Menachem Lazar of Lazar Research in collaboration with Panel4All.co.il, an internet respondent panel, aimed to gauge the religious sentiments among Israelis in these turbulent times.
The survey, which was done on February 5-6, drew responses from 512 individuals, providing a representative sample of Israel’s adult Jewish community. With a margin of error capped at 4.3%, the findings offer a glimpse into the nation’s soul-searching journey in the face of adversity.
A stark division in the responses was noted. A significant portion of the population, 33%, affirmed that their belief in a higher power has been fortified; conversely, a small fraction, 8%, felt their faith wane, while the majority, 59%, reported no change in their spiritual stance.
The analysis further delved into demographic nuances, revealing that faith reinforcement was notably more pronounced among traditionalists, with 44% affirming strengthened beliefs compared to 16% of secular respondents. Age also played a critical role, with younger participants more likely to report a bolstered faith.
The practical expressions of the respondents’ strengthened religious faith were primarily prayers (63%), conversations with God (59%), and the recitation of Psalms
(45%). The increase in prayers was especially characteristic of respondents aged 60+ (73%); conversations with God were reported at relatively high rates by secular respondents (64%), Sephardic respondents (65%), and respondents aged 45-60 (60%).
The recitation of Psalms was relatively more characteristic of respondents aged 45-60 (60%) and Ashkenazim (50%). As the age of the respondents increased, they reported more about lighting Shabbat candles following the war – from 20% among those aged 18-29 to 51% among those 60+.
An absolute majority of respondents (75%) said that since October 7, they feel a greater connection to the State of Israel (69%) and the diverse Israeli society (68%). About half of the Israelis surveyed feel more connected to the Jewish people in the Diaspora (53%) and to Jewish tradition (49%).
A greater connection to the people of Israel was characteristic of respondents aged 18-29 (85%) and Mizrahi respondents (81%). An increased connection to Israeli society was characteristic of respondents aged 18-29 (72%) and Sephardic (74%) respondents. A further connection to Jewish tradition was characteristic of respondents aged 18-29 (61%), traditional respondents (65%), and Mizrahi respondents (58%). The majority of ultra-Orthodox respondents (59%) said that since October 7, they feel a greater connection to the State of Israel. This response was more characteristic of Sephardic respondents (74%) compared to 64% of Ashkenazim, among whom 30% said there was no change for them in this respect. An increased connection to the Jewish people in the Diaspora was characteristic of respondents aged 18-29 (62%), traditional respondents (64%), and Sephardic respondents (59%).
The younger the respondents, the more they reported an increase in faith: from 48% among those aged 18-29 to 18% among those 60+. Sephardic Israelis reported a much higher faith increase than Ashkenazim (42% versus 24%, respectively).
The events of October 7 and the subsequent war did not change the way Israelis in general define themselves religiously, except for minor differences. Relatively significant changes were found among two groups: 78% of those previously identified as liberal-religious stayed with this definition but 18% now define themselves as traditional and another 9% as religious. Of those who described themselves as slightly traditional seculars, 84% remained so but 10% now define themselves as traditional.
There are even tunnel areas that the IDF has not touched on at all, especially in Rafah.
If a ceasefire is signed before the IDF invades Rafah, the IDF may not even start destroying the whole additional underground network there.
Within the Rafah problem, the IDF is also stuck on destroying tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, a major source of Hamas’s rearming and financial capabilities.
Cairo has refused Jerusalem’s numerous requests to let it take over the Gaza side of the Philadelphi Corridor to destroy the tunnels, so the IDF has started to discuss with Egypt the possibility of entrusting their destruction to Egypt.
The timing problem itself suggests multiple scenarios.
In one scenario, the IDF signs a ceasefire deal soon with Hamas which could lead to a complete halt in tunnel destruction or at least an extended pause in various areas.
In another scenario, the IDF is able to continue destroying tunnels for some extended period in 2024, but at some point will still need to make arrangements with a global alliance to take control of Gaza – still far short of the estimated years needed to finish the mission.
Top Israeli officials have discussed some kind of hybrid of handing Gaza over to a mix of local groups disconnected from Hamas, a reformed Palestinian Authority, Arab allies like Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Western allies like the US and portions of the EU.
It is possible that this process may be mandated by the UN or may be a separate multilateral effort, but either way, most or all of these authorities would insist, as a condition for their participation, on IDF withdrawal to points outside of Gaza’s cities and towns at some point.
The IDF and the government have made it clear that Israel plans on maintaining some kind of larger security zone along its Gaza border to ensure that there will be no future invasion.
In addition, the IDF and the government have made it clear that they would demand the right of hot pursuit and to preemptively raid Gaza territory to prevent an imminent terror attack.
But without a physical presence in Gaza’s cities as it has now, sources say it could become difficult or impossible to continue the years-long process of destroying the tunnels.
If the new alliance running Gaza would not accept a years-long IDF presence deep inside Gaza cities, the idea would be to negotiate with this alliance to take on the job of finishing destroying the tunnels, say sources.
As a matter of principle, most or all of the members of the global alliance would agree that the tunnels have no civilian value, and only exist to augment the military power of the terror group.
In addition, Israel might be able to convince the alliance to sign on to a time frame, which, if breached, sources say, would allow Israel to re-enter Gaza to destroy tunnels.
IDF sources have repeatedly said that unlike the 2014 Gaza conflict when the IDF merely sought to neutralize portions of tunnels, this time the IDF seeks to destroy all aspects of Hamas’s tunnel network.
After the IDF neutralized portions of Hamas’s tunnel network in 2014, the terror group responded by digging around the cave-ins to reconnect the largely intact disparate tunnels