The Jerusalem Post

Not just F-16s and F-35s

The 103rd Squadron of the Israel Air Force has helped provide Israel with vital gear during the war, drop flyers over Gaza, and supply troops at the front

- US AFFAIRS • By SETH J. FRANTZMAN

In early December Israel’s 98th Division made a rapid assault on the southern Gaza city of Khan Yunis. The advance was so fast, by the commandos and infantry in this unit, that the men now needed water to be supplied.

Luckily for them, Israel had practiced supplying troops at a long distance in drills over the past years. Supplying troops fighting in enemy territory hadn’t been done since 2006, though, so the army was now on the verge of using a unique capability, to help the fighters on the front line.

For these missions Israel turns to Squadron 103, based at Nevatim Air Force Base near Beersheba. The base is a sprawling series of runways, hangars, and buildings in the desert. It is home to F-35s and many other types of aircraft.

Among them are the gray C-130J Super Hercules. These are large transport aircraft with four propellers. When you see them in the air, they stand out. They are big, they make a kind of low humming noise, and they command respect.

The squadron is also nicknamed the Elephants. It is a historic squadron for Israel and a key to supplying the IDF and keeping the country’s supply lines open.

On the night between December 10 and 11, the IDF carried out a logistic airdrop, parachutin­g seven tons of water to troops fighting in Khan Yunis. The C-130Js of the 103rd Squadron performed the job. This aircraft is called the Shimshon in Israel.

It was a joint operation with the Technology and Logistics Division and the aerial supply unit of the Marom Brigade, the IDF said at the time.

The aircraft has a huge fuselage that is completely empty inside. Imagine taking a commercial jetliner and taking everything out of it so it’s totally empty, except for a floor.

On the floor in the Shimshon, there are rollers that can be used to roll in pallets or gear. In addition, these can be covered to make the floor smooth for vehicles. In another configurat­ion, seats can be pulled down all along the sides, to pack in soldiers or to evacuate civilians. Netting along the sides can be held on to, and there is also a metal cord that runs the length of the aircraft to attach things to. It’s all very well thought out.

The Shimshon can be loaded from the back via a ramp. To drop things, you can open hatches on the side and chuck the stuff out, or you can push it out the back of the aircraft.

Israel used a precision airdrop to resupply forces in Khan Yunis, meaning the aircraft comes to a relatively low altitude and then drops the supplies, which fall with a parachute that can be guided in. The IDF calls this a guided supply system, which “is an advanced operationa­l system that enables parachutin­g equipment to ground forces using precise navigation­al capabiliti­es.”

I DROVE down to meet one of the pilots of the 103rd Squadron in mid-February. For security reasons, his name to us is M. He’s from central Israel. A young friendly man with a broad smile, he has been in the air force for several years. He joined the army in 2019 and went to the air force pilots course and was chosen for the Shimshon aircraft.

Israel has operated transport aircraft since the War of Independen­ce. There were old Dakotas and then the Nord Noratlas, a French supply aircraft from the 1950s that has a twin tail and kind of looks like a flying hippo.

Israel has used the C-130 since the 1970s. This is a mainstay of US transport aircraft. The C-130 comes in many types and is used by two dozen countries. It is one of the most recognizab­le aircraft in the world. The US uses hundreds of them.

Israel has used two types, the older C-130H, the “Karnaf,” used by the IAF’s 131st Squadron, and the more modern C-130J, used by the 103rd.

When Israel carried out the Entebbe raid to free hostages in Uganda, the air force used several C-130s in which vehicles and men were embarked, and they had to have enough room to bring the hostages back.

The aircraft can move soldiers, gear, and water, and it can also be used to drop pamphlets, of the type Israel has been dropping over Gaza to warn people to evacuate or to offer rewards for help finding hostages.

“We can move gear, up to 24 tons in one aircraft, to the maneuverin­g forces .... It’s flexible; we can put in what we want; and they use us a lot to move things from abroad. We have a lot of things coming from abroad, like ceramic vests” and so forth, M. says.

When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, many Israelis were abroad and wanted to come back to join their reserve units. With airline companies canceling flights to Israel, the 103rd was pressed into service. Its planes flew into places like Larnaca, Rome, and Athens and brought back people who wanted to join their reserve units. Around 10 flights like this brought almost 1,000 people back.

“We would open the ramp and see 90-95 people waiting to join, young people who wanted to return to fight,” the pilot remembers.

The airplanes were mobilized also to bring supplies to Israel. The longest flight for M. was a trip to Germany, eight hours of flying time. The pilots flew there, came back, slept seven hours, and then were back in the air, some 48 hours of mission time and 36 hours in the air.

The pilots sit in the aircraft’s cockpit. This is accessed easily via a door on the side. You climb up, and then there is a handle, and a small set of stairs brings you up to the cockpit. It feels like you’re sitting up high, overlookin­g everything, with windows all around.

There is a small microwave behind the pilot’s seats. It can make food, and has a setting for popcorn. The pilots each have a “yoke” in front of them, the steering column. An instrument panel is between the two comfortabl­e seats. Behind the seats and behind the popcorn machine, is a place for a navigator to sit and a bench to sit or sleep on.

There is also a bunk bed area for pilots or other personnel to sleep. These aircraft often have a crew of several or a half dozen to help load vehicles and equipment.

The propeller-driven aircraft has a lot of capabiliti­es that make it better than using jet aircraft for this kind of mission. For instance, it can climb in and out of airfields at complex angles and at dif

ferent speeds, and it is ideal for getting into temporary airstrips or those in locations without a long runway.

When the reservists and the cargo had been brought to Israel, these planes helped drop pamphlets over the Gaza. The pamphlets come in huge cartoons of 25,000, but they need to be dropped precisely. If one is trying to warn a certain neighborho­od to evacuate, it doesn’t help to scatter the pamphlets and flyers in the wrong area. That means coming in low and dropping them in the right place.

The pamphlets have a small parachute. They are pushed out the side of the aircraft. The pilot will turn on a light that flashes green when it’s time to open a hatch and chuck them out. When that happens, if the plane is at a high enough altitude, everyone needs to put on an oxygen mask and carry around an oxygen bottle. This was something the pilot said he had to get used to in this war, as it was not usual procedure. The squadron has dropped up to 10 million pamphlets over Gaza in four months of war.

The pilot talks about a recent mission dropping pamphlets over the Zeitun district near Gaza City. This area was already a scene of fighting in November, when the 36th Division conquered it from Hamas terrorists. In February the IDF went back into Zeitun and has been fighting terrorists again to clear it of remnants of Hamas.

The 103rd Squadron and its transport aircraft have also helped with other missions. They flew members of the Nir Oz kibbutz to a burial ceremony in Ein Hashofet, southeast of Haifa. The people from Nir Oz on the Gaza border suffered grievously on October 7, and they were evacuated to Eilat. The C-130Js helped bring them to a ceremony in the North by ferrying them to Ramat David Air Force Base in the north, where the kibbutz members boarded buses for the ceremony for their loved ones.

These days the squadron continues to move gear and items from place to place in the country. It has returned to training routines as well, as the war has become less intense.

“We had a lot of reservists who had come, but now the numbers are reduced. Now we

can begin to think about the future,” the young pilot says.

The pilot discusses the small, intimate group he works with and how the war has brought closer connection­s between the ground forces and the air force. This is especially true with the 98th Division and its commando units, such as the Maglan commandos.

WE SPENT time touring the C-130 and marveling at its capabiliti­es, as it sat in a hangar at the base. In the distance other planes were coming and going.

At the entrance to the base there is a kind of small museum of old aircraft. There is an F-16, gathering dust. I wondered whether it was one that took part in the raid on Iraq’s nuclear facility in 1982. Nearby there are other planes that the Elephant Squadron has used over the years. They stand as a reminder of the history of Israel and how its air force has helped the country prevail in numerous wars.

The air force is not just F-16s and F-35s. It also rests on the backs of planes like the C-130 and its predecesso­rs here that have brought supplies and enabled this country to achieve great deeds such as the Entebbe raid.

Continued from Page 17

Kippur War. The IDF was still entrenched in the enclave on the Golan Heights, more than it is entrenched now, and continued to fight for months.

“Why are we not going to an election? What else needs to happen in the State of Israel to understand that we must have elections now? This is a government that enjoys complete illegitima­cy – the polls show this. How are all of the citizens of Israel not going out now and saying that the government is illegitima­te, and must go home immediatel­y, [and calling for] elections now? The law demands three months, so in three months. Let’s go!” he exclaimed.

“We need elections as soon as possible. This is what the people must demand, and this demand must have brave, energetic, and large political representa­tion,” he said.

PART OF the current lack of leadership lies in the fact that the goals for the war against Hamas are unachievab­le, Golan argued. He laid

out a four-point plan.

“First, there need to be realistic goals. You cannot completely defeat Hamas and release all of the hostages. There needs to be a deal with Hamas, and therefore Hamas will probably not be destroyed. Let us be realistic and true to ourselves.

“I also do not think that this is the No. 1 goal. The No. 1 goal is, first and foremost, to free the hostages. If we do not free the hostages, Israeli society will collapse from within. This will be an unacceptab­le, insufferab­le demonstrat­ion of lack of solidarity.

“I say to you unequivoca­lly: I will never see Smotrich as my brother again, if he and the public he represents say that the lives of the kibbutznik in the Gaza border area do not interest us,” Golan said.

“If we want to maintain solidarity in the Israeli public, the hostages must be released as the first goal,” Golan said.

Presuming Hamas survives the war, the second step is isolation of the Gaza-Egypt border, Golan argued. Some trustworth­y internatio­nal force must oversee the border so as to prevent Hamas

from building up its strength via smuggling arms across that border. The best-case scenario would be if the US had forces involved in this, and Golan proposed, as an example, broadening the mandate of the Multinatio­nal Force & Observers, a task force in Sinai with significan­t US presence.

The third step, according to Golan, is to maintain freedom of operation in Gaza and continue to erode Hamas and other terrorist organizati­ons’ power.

Finally, Israel must focus on building a different government in Gaza. According to Golan, Israel has a distinct interest to bring the Palestinia­n Authority to Gaza. He admits that the PA is flawed, but said that there is a window of opportunit­y to force the PA to reform in order to take control over Gaza.

“A prime minister today should have built the internatio­nal coalition, the regional coalition, and see the situation in Gaza as an opportunit­y to build the base for an improved PA. Not everything is in our hands, but a situation of crisis opens new opportunit­ies,” Golan said.

“A responsibl­e prime minister

would ask, ‘What are the new opportunit­ies that I have, [and] who are the entities that I can work with most effectivel­y?’ You must be realistic. Israel will not get exactly what it wants, but that is the meaning of statecraft, the ability to sift through different options and say what the best is for us, and be an active, constructi­ve force in building the new civil and diplomatic reality in the Gaza Strip,” Golan said.

This brings him back to the current government.

“What shocks me about this government is that instead of seeing this crisis as an opportunit­y to strengthen Israel’s internatio­nal status, instead of positionin­g Israel as a central axis in setting the arrangemen­t between us and the Palestinia­ns that will project regional stability, instead of taking all the countries in the region and building a strong front against Iran and its proxies in the region,” Israel is squanderin­g its “fantastic” opportunit­ies “because of the settler messianic fantasy” of returning to Gush Katif.

“This is completely crazy. And as long as we do not get rid of a prime minister who depends on these people, who are messianic and dangerous, we will not be able to rehabilita­te the State of Israel,” he said.

Regarding the Israeli-Palestinia­n conflict, “There are only two options – annexation or separation. This was a decision that Israeli leaders faced on November 29, 1947 .... Separation, from my perspectiv­e, means saving the State of Israel and the ability for it to exist as the national home for all of the Jewish people, including in its Diaspora, which is mostly democratic and liberal, while at the same time keeping it a free, egalitaria­n, and democratic country.

“Reject separation and adopt the idea of annexation, and what we will receive here is a messianic dictatorsh­ip,” Golan said.

He also laid out his view of what Israel must do in order to have haredi men join the IDF, a pressing issue that is necessary in order to replenish the ranks of IDF fighters without forcing longer service on the standing army and on reservists. He argued that instead of trying to find

a compromise with the haredi politician­s, an approach that has not worked for nearly 25 years, the government should launch a campaign directly targeting haredi youth and calling on them to join.

Golan said that on October 7 he saw the haredi volunteers of the ZAKA rescue and recovery organizati­on and of other organizati­ons, and argued that the young haredi generation was eager to become part of the military or civil wartime effort. The problem was the haredi politician­s, who he said wanted to “continue raising the walls between the haredi and Israeli public.

“It is clear that the future of the State of Israel depends on lowering these walls, integratio­n of these publics, strengthen­ing solidarity, and strengthen­ing mutual responsibi­lity,” Golan said.

He conceded, however, that no one will draft haredim by force, and argued that the government must therefore invest and work in order to convince the youth directly.

This, too, is something the Netanyahu government cannot currently do, due to its dependence on the haredi parties. Golan’s conclusion is thus the same one that he began with – the government must go.

Golan concluded with the admission that as long as the National Unity Party remains in the government, it will be hard to convince the public of his arguments, since the public assumes that if two former IDF chiefs of staff, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, are choosing to remain in government, then the government can be trusted.

Golan argued that while he “understood” and even “identified” with Gantz’s decision to enter the government at the beginning of the war, it is clear that National Unity has not had serious influence on strategic decisions, including the hostage negotiatio­ns, a diplomatic agreement for the day after the war, and even the national budget or decisions to approve more settlement building.

Golan said that he speaks often to Gantz and tells him that “national responsibi­lity does not just enable, it requires elections as soon as

 ?? (IDF) ?? A C-130 Super Hercules. The aircraft can transport soldiers, gear, and water, and it can also be used to drop pamphlets of the type Israel has been dropping over Gaza to warn people to evacuate or to offer rewards for help finding hostages.
(IDF) A C-130 Super Hercules. The aircraft can transport soldiers, gear, and water, and it can also be used to drop pamphlets of the type Israel has been dropping over Gaza to warn people to evacuate or to offer rewards for help finding hostages.
 ?? ??
 ?? (Seth J. Frantzman) ?? PILOT ‘M’ on bringing back Israelis after October 7. ‘We would open the ramp and see 90-95 people waiting to join, young people who wanted to return to fight,’ the pilot remembers.
(Seth J. Frantzman) PILOT ‘M’ on bringing back Israelis after October 7. ‘We would open the ramp and see 90-95 people waiting to join, young people who wanted to return to fight,’ the pilot remembers.

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