Israel-Arab alliances
After the war in Gaza
Israeli foreign policy goals of peace and security have been pursued through establishing diplomatic relations with Arab states, despite normalization being historically regarded as anything but normal by Middle Eastern regimes committed to no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations.
Following the 1979 Camp David Accords with Egypt and the 1994 peace agreement with Jordan, Israel tripled the number of its allies with the 2020 Abraham Accords (AA) with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.
Saudi Arabia was subsequently placed at the top of its wish list. However, Israel’s ongoing war with Hamas threatens these regional efforts. The devastation it inflicts on Gaza leaves Israel diplomatically isolated from its old, new, and potential Arab partners, but this appears to be temporary.
Both Israel and the Gaza Strip are governed by their most extreme leadership to date, each having contributed to the clash. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government was formed amidst his ongoing corruption trial, joining forces with far-Right political parties that granted him a majority while catapulting religious and ultra-nationalist opinions to the forefront of politics. Their controversial judicial reform plans garnered massive opposition and public protests, threatening to cripple Israel’s democracy in 2023. Combined with ambitions of expanding West Bank settlements and revising the status quo on the Temple Mount, tensions with Palestinians soared. A normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia developing under US patronage set off the last alarm. Amid socio-political instabilities, Hamas saw an opportunity to strike.
Hamas, a descendant of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and a proscribed terrorist organization by most Western countries has been governing the Gaza Strip since 2007. Its 1988 founding charter explicitly calls for the annihilation of Israel and Jews, and its massacre on October 7 was deemed by its leadership the beginning of a permanent state of war on all of Israel’s borders.
Egypt and Jordan declared that the displacement of Palestinians is a red line for maintaining relations with Israel, due to both ideological support for intact Palestinian territories and pragmatic reasons. Jihadist terrorism in the Sinai still concerns Cairo, refusing to take in large numbers from
Gaza, fearing an inflow of Hamas. Combating terrorism and containing Hamas has been a joint venture between Egypt and Israel. Maintaining ties with Israel has also made Egypt a top recipient of US military aid. Protecting this status, Cairo draws itself closer to Washington – Israel’s strongest ally – by playing a proactive role in hostage negotiations, ceasefires, and humanitarian engagement in Gaza. After subsequent economic crises following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza is overstretching Egypt’s economy, disrupting tourism and a joint gas project with Israel.
Despite economic incentives, only 11% of Egyptians support ties with Israel. This figure is rapidly decreasing as the war continues, bringing about the first protests in Cairo since the Arab Spring. As President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi maintains a delicate balance, relations would be easier to justify should more Arab states make peace with Israel.
Having a 50% Palestinian demographic and custodianship over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, Jordan’s stance is intimately linked with Palestinian concerns. Days after the war began, Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and floated re-evaluating the 1994 peace treaty. Amman is deeply concerned about a destabilizing refugee influx as ultra-nationalists in the Israeli government try to resurrect the “Jordan is Palestine” narrative and settler attacks against West Bank Palestinians increase.
Yet, in light of Jordan’s economic and security situation, Israel will likely remain a strategic partner in counterterrorism along their 300-mile-long [approx 480 km.] shared border, containing the influence of Iran and radical Islamist groups. Ties with Israel also entail Western cooperation in defense, trade, and tourism for Amman.
Save for the massive displacement of Palestinians in a broader conflict, the chances of these decades-old peace agreements breaking remain slim.
PRESSURE FROM the Arab world to sever ties with Israel has mounted for AA signatories too. Notwithstanding, the UAE condemned Hamas’s attack and stationed its pavilion at COP-28 next to its Israeli counterpart in a bold gesture, in addition to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed meeting Israeli President Isaac Herzog on the sidelines.
Economic interests and politics are separated for Abu Dhabi, and trade with Israel increased by 511% a year into their peace treaty.
The Israel-Hamas war shifted supply chains away from Turkey due to its stance on the conflict, causing even more Israeli businesses to pivot to the UAE. A broader conflict also concerns Abu Dhabi, wary of being dragged into war as in Yemen, which could threaten its non-oil economy. Furthermore, Hamas and other radical groups’ ideologies pose a threat to its vision of coexistence.
Bahrain was the second GCC country to condemn Hamas. While its economic cooperation with Israel has been modest compared to the UAE, Manama benefits from similar advantages through cooperation in security and intelligence. Yet Bahrain’s
leadership faces significant domestic pressure – they even permitted protests. Bahraini officials’ initial statements about recalling diplomats and severing economic ties were later refuted, reinforcing the notion that ambiguity regarding relations with Israel could have been strategic in containing public opinion while preserving the status quo.
Morocco is taking a similar approach, balancing support for Palestinians with territorial and economic interests. The Hamas-Israel war could ignite militancy in the Western Sahara, whose recognition by the US as Moroccan is what motivated Rabat to sign the AA in the first place. Anti-normalization calls from elites are becoming louder. However, Morocco lost over 8% of its GDP in the September earthquake and cannot afford to alienate Israel and the US as economic partners.
Weeks before Hamas’s attack, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) indicated that Saudi normalization with Israel was probable. While circumstances changed, incentives behind an agreement did not.
US security guarantees appeared within reach after Washington displayed its swift response capability in the Mediterranean in October. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 also requires that it keep cordiality with the West in addition to opening up to the East. Mitigating security concerns about Iran and its proxies, Hamas included, is another shared objective. MBS attempted to loosen Tehran’s regional influence by weakening its proxies in Lebanon and Syria, and Israel is contributing to this in Gaza now. Importantly, normalization could present an opportunity for MBS to expedite Palestinian-Israeli peace with influence on both sides, satisfying domestic, regional, and international observers.
Israel’s economy, security capabilities, and technological innovations make it a valuable partner. The notion that the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem enhances this further. Notwithstanding, Israel must maintain its expediency with the same long-term thinking as its Arab allies – present and future.