‘Fish rots from the head down’
Trust and corruption
YOU LIVE in a society where everybody steals. Do you choose to steal? The probability that you will be caught is low because the police are very busy chasing other thieves, and, even if you do get caught, the chances of your being punished severely for a crime that is so common are low. Therefore, you too steal.
By contrast, if you live in a society where theft is rare, the chances of your being caught and punished are high, so you choose not to steal.
This scenario, laid out by Paolo Mauro, can be applied to Jamaica and other societies as we attempt to understand corruption, trust in institutions, and the rule of law.
Trust produces an honest political system. It promotes economic growth. Corruption destroys more than the economy of a country. It tears apart the moral fibre of the society, diminishes respect for the law, and ultimately, our faith in others. When elites exploit the State for their own gain, the public comes to accept theft as a part of daily life. Corrupt leaders breed distrust throughout a society and reflects the Chinese expression: “The fish rots from the head down.”
If corruption is believed to be widespread among government leaders, and there is a culture of limited accountability (very few charges, prosecution and conviction to date), then this speaks to possible weakness in institutions and government officials who make and implement policy, suggesting that they are not acting in the public’s interest. And thus, they cannot be counted on to create, implement and enforce policies to induce the police and other lower-level bureaucrats to avoid corruption.
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Widespread corruption in a society is often the result of weak institutions. Thus, what factors create weak institutions? As Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson postulate, political institutions determine economic institutions because political institutions determine who holds power, and those who hold power are the ones who define the economic rules of the game. Reason being: those who hold power cannot credibly commit to how they will use, and/or abuse, their power once they have it. It seems that the tendency is for them to choose institutions that are more likely to benefit themselves, rather than the country as a whole.
As it relates to political institutions, corruption hinders the development of political parties because the high premium of controlling offices resulting from corruption yields political machines that are rent-seeking, instead of political parties that are preference-integrating and trustenhancing.