SECURITY-SENSITIVE TECH

Innovative technologies are causing massive changes — which can be likened to a revolution — not only in the economy as a whole but also in the security eld. Every country is intensifying public-private cooperation in developing leading technological solutions. For example, arti cial intelligence, quantum technology, and biotechnology, among others, could serve as game changers requiring the transformation of national security strategy and tactical formulation.

Further, technological breakthroughs in space, cyber and electromagnetic waves have led to the emergence of new theaters of warfare. ey are fundamentally altering the norms of improving capabilities in the traditional military domains of land, air, and sea to ensure security in speci ed geographical areas of responsibility.

Put another way, what we are now witnessing can be said to be a situation in which “security has extended itself into economic and technological areas.” e rst factor behind such a transition is the advent of innovative technologies such as AI and quantum technology capable of converting the ways nation-states, including their military a airs, are run and their people live their lives.

In the past, military technologies were transferred to the private sector for civilian use, as in the case of the internet. However, it is now overwhelmingly critical for armed forces to divert civilian technologies for military purposes. As a result, the ongoing change in the industrial landscape has become an increasingly vital aspect that cannot be overlooked.

Winning or losing in cyber warfare and other new forms of war depends on whether a country maintains its superiority in innovative technology. So, it is strategically imperative to retain enhanced technological self-reliance without depending on other countries for security-sensitive technologies that can be diverted for military use. is viewpoint should be re ected mainly in a country’s industrial policies.

ere has been a marked increase in the potentiality and importance of applying civilian technologies to the defense ecosystem. Technologies that can be used for military applications exist in the network of government research and development institutions and the private sector. How such technologies should be safeguarded from being leaked or stolen is a matter of urgency that should be seriously addressed.

Let me now turn to the situation surrounding security-sensitive technologies and information. e threat of cyber-attacks is growing, be it an attack targeting a government entity or a private-sector one.

Japan’s core technologies that support its industrial competitiveness are constantly subject to attempts by unknown persons or groups to gain illegal access and steal them by all means.

e United States and China have been strengthening their respective economic security policies, giving rise to the decoupling of technologies and information between the two countries.

Nevertheless, international collaboration is underway elsewhere to develop new technologies.

When employees of Japanese private-sector companies need to access information provided by their foreign partners, those employees may be required to gain security clearances.

A failure to obtain security clearances could impede information exchanges and advances in cooperation essential for international development projects. e more Japan, its allies, and like-minded nations undertake joint projects to develop leading technologies to ensure economic security and the more rigidly they keep technologies and information protected, the more likely the issue of failed security clearances is to embarrass all parties concerned visibly.

Establishing an adequate security clearance assessment platform is indispensable to promote international cooperation, while safeguarding classi ed technologies and information from a security standpoint is essential.

In Japan, the Law on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets serves as the base for a statutory rule regarding security clearance assessment.

is law is meant to guard against the leaking of “specially designated secrets” that could jeopardize Japan’s national security. e heads of the relevant administrative organs of the government, among others, are empowered to designate speci c secrets concerning defense, diplomacy, prevention of speci ed harmful activities — counterintelligence — and prevention of terrorist activities. Penalties include imprisonment of up to 10 years.

is law also governs those specially designated secrets provided to eligible private-sector contractors. is means that the law is also applied to enterprises in the private sector. To handle the designated secrets, employees of each eligible corporation need to undergo a security clearance assessment.

However, we have a large variety of secrets to be protected. ey include:

1. Technologies and information the government o ers to share with the private sector.

2. Technologies and information about international joint development.

3. Advanced technologies private-sector rms have developed independently.

REASONS FOR LAW REVISION

e Law on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets aims to primarily protect such secrets held by government organs. erefore, it has no architecture to cover all secrets in private-sector companies’ possession.

But, given that the government gets involved in numerous research and development projects in the private sector, there is much need to protect a wide range of secrets the government transfers to the private sector and information related to international joint development by designating them as “specially designated secrets.” To that end, the existing law should be revised to have a set of criteria to designate certain types of information as “specially designated secrets” and require persons, public and private alike, to go through security clearance to be authorized to handle such secrets.

What also worries me is that the current list of heads of the government’s administrative organs empowered by this law to designate speci ed secrets excludes certain cabinet ministers.

e education, science, and technology minister and the agriculture, forestry, and sheries minister, for example, are excluded from the list. Japan should not allow any leakage of classi

ed security-related information due to

Kitamura joined the National Police Agency in 1980 after graduating from the University of Tokyo. He became director of Cabinet Intelligence in 2011 and served as secretary general of the National Security Secretariat from September 2019 to July 2021.