To abort military action
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s tough talk on March 17 of possible military action against North Korea’s nuclear threats raised concerns about the prospect of a second Korean War. He said Washington is not going to engage the North at this point. But neither is the U.S. going to take a military strike before it tries several other steps first.
Recounting Tillerson’s main points should be useful in figuring out what decisions the Trump administration will make on North Korea at the end of its policy review. It is likely that a new policy will allow room for mid-course readjustment as events unfold.The U.S. secretary said in Seoul:
“We are exploring a new range of diplomatic, security and economic measures. All of the options are on the table ... we do not want things to get to a military conflict. If they elevate the threat of their weapons program to a level that we believe requires action, that option is on the table. But we are hopeful that, by taking these steps — and we have many, many steps we can take before we get to that point — we hope that that will persuade North Korea to take a different course of action.”
In Beijing, Tillerson said the next day, “... things have reached a rather dangerous level. And we (he and the Chinese foreign minister) committed ourselves to do everything we can to prevent any type of conflict from breaking out, and we view there are a number of steps that we can take that are in front of us.”
The range of options Tillerson mentioned was widely reported by the American press. Of them all, the option of a preventive strike is the worst and the most dangerous. If carried out, it will likely start a war that nobody would want to see happen.
While a preemptive strike aims to destroy enemy missiles before they are launched — based on credible information that they are about to attack — a preventive strike is to eliminate the North Korean nuclear arsenal, including the weapons and their manufacturing facilities and storages.
The Obama administration in its late period considered a preventive surgical strike but dropped it after an assessment of the consequences: North Korean retaliation, horrible casualty tolls and devastating damage to the Korean economy.
Obama also ordered a cyber attack, known as a “left of launch” malware technique that disrupts and disables missile launches. However, there is no evidence to ascribe a high rate of the North’s missile failures in recent months to the U.S. cyber attack. In cyber warfare, North Korea, China and Russia will try to do the same against the U.S. and its allies. A cyber attack should be subject to a ban by an international convention, as is the case with chemical weapons.
A recent simulation study estimated about 5 million people would die in a renewed conflict in Korea. The next Korean president, who will be in office in early May, will certainly oppose such a dangerous first strike. Instead, he is expected to seek a peaceful resolution of the North Korean issue, as did his two liberal predecessors.
A preventive strike may be able to take out the known nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and destroy the known missile launch sites, but there are many unidentified underground targets. Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist at Stanford University, advocates dialogue and engagement to avoid “a nuclear catastrophe” in Korea. Several other respected U.S. experts share Hecker’s view.
Thae Young-ho, a former DPRK deputy ambassador to Britain, who defected to the South, is convinced that “Kim Jong-un would retaliate any preemptive strike with everything he has, including nuclear weapons, like a maniac.” His warning should be no surprise to anyone who understands North Korea. Other options under consideration include: redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, nuclear weapons development by South Korea and Japan, a “left of launch” cyber attack”, enhancement of deterrent (including the THAAD deployment that has started), tougher sanctions against secondary targets doing business with the North, a decapitation operation of the North Korean leadership, regime change by information programs or by force, more pressure on China, and more international pressure against Pyongyang’s provocations and its abysmal human rights record.
Most of these options are not new. Some other options are controversial or ineffective. Engagement is also on the table. In support of the highest value of life, I encourage engagement for peace and oppose a preventive strike against North Korea. What’s your take?