New Straits Times

PEACE FOR KOREAN PENINSULA?

While the US-North Korea Summit is considered an accomplish­ment, there cannot be great expectatio­ns of what it will achieve

- harris@isis.org.my The writer is a researcher at the Institute of Strategic and Internatio­nal Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

AT 9am tomorrow at the Capella Hotel on Singapore’s Sentosa Island, United States President Donald Trump will be the first sitting US president to meet with the supreme leader of North Korea. This would be unheard of a year ago, where no one would have thought a US-North Korea Summit possible.

The reasons for this change could be because Trump’s pressure campaign had paid off, or Kim Jong-un has completed his nuclear weapons and missile programme, or somewhere in between.

If indeed Jong-un has completed his nuclear weapons and missile programme, the US would have to address North Korea’s breakthrou­gh in missile technology — this could mean that the entire continenta­l US is within range of a strike. For the North Koreans, this new diplomatic outreach is predicated on developing its economic agenda now that it has acquired its “powerful treasured sword”, and satisfied its primary security needs.

While the summit is considered an accomplish­ment, there cannot be great expectatio­ns of what it would achieve.

On the one hand, North Korea would not denucleari­se without adequate security guarantees, and sanctions being lifted, and on the other, the US does not appear to have the appetite for anything other than a quick solution.

Besides, and almost as important is the difference in the manner and pace of denucleari­sation envisioned by the US and North Korea. As it stands, the US insists that North Korea undertake a complete, verifiable, irreversib­le denucleari­sation of its nuclear arsenal, a manner aligned with all five United Nations Security Council Resolution­s on North Korean nuclear proliferat­ion since 2006.

Relatedly, US Defence Secretary James Mattis had stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue that, “North Korea will receive relief only when it demonstrat­es verifiable and irreversib­le steps to denucleari­sation”. But to what extent would these “verifiable and irreversib­le steps towards denucleari­sation” have to be demonstrat­ed before the US provides relief?

Verifiabil­ity would require North Korea to disclose the sensitive locations of its nuclear and missile facilities to internatio­nal observers, and irreversib­ility would mean the nuclear facilities would be made almost impossible to restart in the future.

It is hard to imagine that North

Korea would unilateral­ly take these steps, and lose its primary means of defending itself without anything in return.

Besides, by now, Jong-un would have fully appreciate­d the leverage afforded by his completed nuclear weapons and missile programme, which in turn, serves to guarantee North Korean’s security and regime stability — his two foremost interests.

North Korea actually refers to denucleari­sation in terms of the entire Korean peninsula. What this means is that in exchange for North Korea relinquish­ing its nuclear weapons and missile programme, South Korea would have to withdraw from the US’ nuclear umbrella.

In addition to that, guarantees would also have to be made by the US that North Korean denucleari­sation will not result in regime change, nor its security threatened. This would most likely mean the withdrawal of US troops stationed in South Korea, as well as the cessation of the annual US-South Korea military exercises.

If North Korea were to get its way, denucleari­sation would most likely be a drawn out, phase-by-phase affair.

This would involve reciprocal measures such as the loosening of sanctions, obtaining economic aid, and receiving security guarantees from the US in return for a phased denucleari­sation on its part.

Complicati­ng discussion­s further would be the mutual distrust between both sides — with the current White House administra­tion’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehens­ive Plan of Action with Iran, and North Korea’s well documented history of backtracki­ng from agreements.

The fact of the matter is that Pyongyang’s diplomatic outreach has already resulted in two inter-Korean Summits with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in, whose administra­tion is being perceived as overly optimistic in embracing the North’s conciliato­ry position.

More importantl­y, Jong-un has met with China’s President Xi Jinping twice in Beijing and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Pyongyang, shoring up relations with key allies prior to the US-North Korea Summit.

While the US-North Korea Summit will add another layer of dialogue that could perhaps move the status quo forward, expectatio­ns for it to result in a denucleari­sation plan are unrealisti­c.

With that, peace on the Korean peninsula will probably remain a far-flung goal despite appearing to be the “flavour of the day”.

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