AN ALLIANCE IS UNLIKELY
Both Russia and China have made it clear that neither is interested in such a relationship, writes
THE Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), which is President Vladimir Putin’s main platform to engage with major economic players in the Asia-Pacific, seeks to attract investment and strengthen the underdeveloped Russian Far East’s (RFE) links with the world’s fastest growing region.
Putin met his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Vladivostok earlier this month, while Chinese troops took part for the first time in the Vostok-2018 military exercise. During their meeting, both leaders pledged to work together to deal with current issues. An increasingly unpredictable geopolitical climate made the partnership between Moscow and Beijing more important, Xi was quoted as saying during talks with Putin.
Xi also advocated that both countries team up against protectionism, which Putin echoed. They agreed to work on boosting trade and to conduct more bilateral transactions in the ruble and the yuan, rather than the greenback. Putin also told reporters that Moscow and Beijing would continue working jointly towards de-escalation and a political settlement on the Korean Peninsula.
During his address at the EEF, on Sep 12, Xi pledged to help Russia develop the RFE, surely music to Putin’s ears.
Meanwhile, the Vostok-2018 exercise, which saw the participation of 3,200 troops and 30 aircraft from China, is nothing new — large-scale military exercises take place annually in Russia’s vast landscape. Last year, a similar exercise took place in the country’s western regions, in a clear signal to Nato with which Russia’s relations have been tense, after the Crimean and Ukrainian crises of 2014 and Nato’s consequent military build-up in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe.
For several reasons, both presidents’ meeting at the EEF and Vostok-2018 do not portend a Russo-Chinese alliance.
First, both sides have made it clear many times that neither is interested in an alliance relationship. In Russia’s case, it certainly would not want to become the de facto junior partner in a relationship. A chequered history with China during which Tsarist Russia was one of the foreign powers which acquired Chinese territory, cannot have been forgotten by either side.
Second, while Russia’s trade with China is increasing, it is still far from the year 2020 target of US$200 billion (RM826.9 billion). This figure was cited in a 2018 report on bilateral relations by the prestigious Russia International Affairs Council; the Financial Times quoted Putin as saying it totalled US$87 billion in 2017 and is expected to reach US$100 billion this year.
On the other hand, China’s total trade with the United States is more diversified and in 2017 amounted to US$635.3 billion. Hence, for China, the US is the more important trade partner compared to Russia, despite the current US-China trade war.
Third, for Russia, the US is the “main opponent” in so far as the US represents what is perceived as the major threat to its domestic stability and Russia’s status as a great power. Economic and trade issues are not in contention between the two countries.
Russia’s total trade with the US in 2017 totalled less than US$24 billion, with the balance in Russia’s favour to the tune of only US$10 billion. While China, too, perceives the US as a challenge to its historic role in Asia, currently, economic and trade issues top the agenda of differences between the two countries.
While Putin and Russian leaders have openly praised President Donald Trump, China does not share this positive view — any alliance between Russia and China would assume that both sides share a similar view of the main opponent’s leader and his policies.
Finally, Vostok-2018, ironically, indicates some level of mistrust — it seems that Russia might be seeking to signal not only to the US but primarily China that it is capable of dealing with any military threat to its large and sparsely-populated RFE and Siberian regions. Vostok-2018 is the largest exercise since 1981, with a small number of Chinese troops participating in it.
The participation of Chinese units is a way of directly showing the Russian armed forces’ prowess in the RFE and Siberia. Further, there is a history of bad blood, including armed clashes on their common border in 1969. Finally, unlike in the halcyon days of Sino-Soviet “friendship”, China today is economically ahead of Russia.
However, the focus of Russia’s Asia policy is China, as well as Japan and South Korea, whose leaders were also present at the EEF.
That is expected given Russia’s long history of relations with these countries, their relative geographic proximity to Russia and above all, their economic and political standing in the Asia-Pacific and the world. Hence, they could meaningfully contribute to the development of the RFE.
Asean, therefore, must be realistic about its expectations in developing its relations with Russia. Should Putin attend the East Asia Summit in November in Singapore, it would certainly provide a boost to Russia-Asean relations. But whether it would lead to a substantive outcome remains to be seen.
While Putin and Russian leaders have openly praised President Donald Trump, China does not share this positive view — any alliance between Russia and China would assume that both sides share a similar view of the main opponent’s leader and his policies.
The writer is a senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. A former diplomat, he served three tours in the Singapore embassy in Moscow.