REASSESSING ROLE IN OLD DEFENCE PACT
The 50-year-old Five Power Defence Arrangements has benefited the armed forces of Malaysia and Singapore
THE Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is now entering its 50th year since its inception on Nov 1, 1971. Formed on the basis of Malaysia and Singapore’s security and defence being indivisible and intertwined with each other, the recent dynamic changes in global security outlook and amid the rise of a new security structure in Southeast Asia have made it relevant for us to relook the existence of the FPDA.
We should ask what more it could offer in contributing towards a resilient defence environment between Malaysia and Singapore, particularly to the improvement of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) as a professional and robust security organisation in the 21st Century.
The FPDA was built upon the basis of a “quasi-pact” that did not guarantee a military intervention, and acts as a loose consultative defence arrangement between its five members — the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.
Its posture is defensive and non-threatening, which is colloquially similar to the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (Seato) championed by the United States (US) in the 1960s, which also did not assert the same binding commitment among signatory members.
FPDA has proven to be very useful, especially for the armed forces of Malaysia and Singapore in keeping up with their need for professional experience acquired through exercises and training to construct sturdy and formidable defence capabilities.
Although the Singapore Armed
Forces (SAF) have been more receptive compared with MAF in finding defence partners outside the British influence, such as the US and Israel, the FPDA has also evolved over the years in finding a useful domain outside the traditional military matters in keeping itself relevant in the region.
Pursuant to that, FPDA has slowly expanded its scope to cover non-traditional threats (NTS), cybersecurity, human assistance disasters relief (HADR) and terrorism.
Although the agreement is pivotal to current security needs of Malaysia and Singapore, with the recent introduction of the new regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia, such as the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and the Asean Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in 2006, there is a clear reminder for a commitment of focus for Malaysia and Singapore in defence and security engagement in this region, as one country can get overstretched with a myriad of involvement in a similar security domain (ARF and ADMM Plus, which covers maritime security, counter-terrorism and HADR).
Moreover Australia and New Zealand are also permanent members in ARF and ADMM Plus, considering their similar
national and geostrategic interests.
It is best for the FPDA to focus on traditional security concerns with regard to armed forces combat readiness, interoperability, and common operating pictures that can assist members in carrying out any military operation if the need arises.
Since gaining independence from the British, Malaysia and Singapore have experienced direct threats, particularly during the Konfrontasi era in the 1960s and Communist influence during the Cold War.
The relatively peaceful period in modern times, however, should not discount any traditional threats in entirety.
The rise of China, for example, or any need for preventive action in anticipation of an outside attack on Malaysia and Singapore needs to be fully dealt with under a common doctrinal and cultural background of the British armed forces that all five members of the pact inherited and continue to adopt.
Through this, the FPDA has always been a credible deterrent force for Malaysia and Singapore, and should continue to be such in future.
Perhaps, on the issues of FPDA projection in the 21st century, it is best for us to ask the UK about its current defence posture outside
Europe, and how far it will be willing to invest in the FPDA as we have seen their reluctance to commit extra financial and military resources in the Far East since withdrawing from the Suez Canal in Egypt and Singapore in 1971, which prompted the formation of the FPDA in the first place.
Although we are very thankful for the UK’s contributions to augmentation programmes under the FPDA ambit, its lack of interest to actively engage Malaysia bilaterally, except on patronageclient relations in defence procurement matters, have prompted Malaysia to look elsewhere, such as Japan and the US, in keeping MAF up to date with its doctrine and challenges of modern warfare.
The UK’s initial role as a facilitator during the formative FPDA years has now been diluted to a similar level of an equal partner in submitting cases to the FPDA Consultative Council (FCC).
This may prove difficult for the UK to impose or influence any new policy direction with regard to Malaysia and Singapore defence and security issues, such as their latest interest in the South China Sea.
The UK, for a start, needs to review its presence and take up the offer of placing military personnel at HQIADS in Butterworth,
Penang, as an indication that it is willing re-engage Malaysia and Singapore under the FPDA ambit.
The biggest unwritten FPDA contribution towards the indivisible security interests of Malaysia and Singapore is its role as the platform for both nations to sit together and discuss disputes and differences.
This was very useful during Tunku Abdul Rahman’s challenging last years in office and the whole of Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s pugnacious premiership.
Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations have always been colourful, with both sides sometimes being difficult to each other.
As such, the issues of military exercise areas or the usage of MAF installations for FPDA activities remain among the most sensitive matters in Malaysia, so as to not create unnecessary attention in the local political scene with regard to the presence of Singapore military personnel.
Currently, Malaysia, as the main host of exercises, is comfortable with the status quo in maintaining the northern peninsular corridor as the area for FPDA military manoeuvres.
Malaysia has not yet considered the suggestion of shifting the exercises to east Malaysia or exceeding the country’s maritime zones.
FPDA members need to respect this or Malaysia would start to invoke options to carry out military engagement outside the FPDA sphere, such as the recent cooperation in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZone) with the US Marines.
The Tiger Strike Exercise and its related activities aim to buildup MAF’s amphibious capability and is part of the omnipresent projection of the security forces’ capability.
Apart from close cooperation with the US, Malaysia is also working closely with the Australia Defence Force (ADF) under the Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Programme (MAJDP) in Sarawak, known as HARRINGGARO.
This present military exercises and engagements outside the peninsula are already sufficient for the MAF in capacity-building and combat readiness as we do not want to be overstretched with extra military engagements.
IN a densely populated city with notoriously high rents, Hong Kong’s musicians are used to playing cramped stages. But few venues are quite as pokey — or unorthodox — as Yuen Hing Lung noodles.
On a recent weekday night a jazz band was in full swing inside the 300-square-foot restaurant, perched on cola crates and using dining tables as music stands. The double bass player was squeezed into the space where the noodles are bubbling away.
There were no live spectators.
So the musicians inside the 47year-old noodle restaurant streamed their gig online, asking for donations in return from the few hundred who logged in.
The get-together was the brainchild of double bassist Justin Siu, who invites various fellow jazz musicians for a gig at the restaurant once every two months.
They have all seen their work evaporate over the last year.
Owner Paul So said he knew musicians were struggling, even more than restaurants, which have had to weather reduced opening hours and multiple lockdowns.
“What I do is simply to offer him the venue and see if it gives him any sparks of creation,” the 61-year-old added, saying Siu is allowed to use the shop for free on the rare days off So takes.
Unlike high-end hotels and jazz bars where he used to perform, Siu said Yuen Hing Lung had a
distinctly traditional vibe.
Most of its decor is exactly the same as it was in the 1970s.
Live-streaming donations bring in a fraction of real paid gigs. But Siu said he’ll take whatever he can get right now.
“We hope that at some point it will become mutually beneficial,” Siu said.
“Ultimately I want to make livestreaming something that can support Hong Kong artistes.”