ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
AS we celebrate the golden jubilee of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) formation in November, the question now is which field should we improve in the agreement for it to continue benefiting Malaysia and Singapore as we step into an uncertain world political future and the rise of China.
As FPDA nations took a stock take in 2018, the aspirations of its charter remain the same.
With the expansion of the FPDA agenda from conventional military matters to cooperation on cybersecurity, counterterrorism, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), FPDA should review its commitment and not cover areas that are already being discussed under the existing regional security platforms, such as the Asean Regional Forum and Asean Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus.
HADR issues, for example, should remain at the margins of military roles. Furthermore, Malaysia has adopted the Term of Reference for the Asean Militaries Ready Group in 2018 to carry out HADR activities among ADMM Plus countries if the need arises, and FPDA should not burden its members with the same processes.
With strong emphasis on the maritime security agenda by
Malaysia and New Zealand in their respective Defence White Papers (DWP), the FPDA needs to toe the line with a concrete Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) programme hedging on the New Zealand and Australian air forces’ impressive inventories of the P8As-Poseidon aircraft in monitoring the movement of vessels and submarines in the Straits of Malacca, and off the east coast of Malaysia.
This will not only contribute to the MDA for Malaysia and Singapore, but also to New Zealand and Australia, since both nations are surrounded by tropical waters and inherent threats of illegal activities from deep-sea Chinese fishermen.
It was duly noted that since the inception of FPDA, there has never been any defence industry-related cooperation that has been established or has benefited member countries.
Since the issue of the MDA and maritime security are at the forefront of most FPDA members, except for the United Kingdom, it is timely for the members to coup their existing strength of their defence industries in launching joint research and development of military assets, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles that can be used to patrol the surrounding waters.
This will not only strengthen FPDA cooperation further, but also have large potential in bringing huge profits for member countries, taking into consideration the strength of the UK and Singapore defence companies, and what their technologies can offer to the success of this endeavour.
The FPDA should start to explore new close cooperation in participating as a single command unit under the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).
In 2010, Malaysia worked closely with Singapore, Australia and New Zealand to actively participate in the reconstruction and rebuilding process of Afghanistan.
The decision was made due to the level of existing familiarity and comfort built among the respective armed forces over many years of FPDA association.
Similar cooperation can be reintroduced as a new programme if the United Nations requires member nations to help in UNPKO operations in conflict areas. By being together in an active operation theatre longer than the duration of an exercise, it will cement cooperation further and act as a testament to the FPDA’s contribution to world security.
Perhaps the biggest difficulties faced by Malaysia in actively participating within the FPDA framework are not the evolving regional security structures that push the FPDA agenda to the fringes of our attention, but the military assets of the Malaysian armed forces, which do not possess high-end conventional warfare capabilities, or at least being on a par with other members.
The FPDA’s biggest contribution to Malaysia thus far is to keep a “straightjacket” procurement policy in deciding the right instruments for our armed forces.
Over the years, Malaysian political leaders broke away from conventional norms of democratic countries in buying Westernmilitary hardware, and has shift defence procurements to eastern bloc countries.
This decision was rampant during prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s years, for personal reasons only known to him
As such, our combat readiness has deteriorated and is low compared with other FPDA members. This posed cooperation challenges when it comes to planning and carrying out military manoeuvres and exercises, and has resulted in Malaysia just becoming a mere observer in FPDA air and sea manoeuvres, even in our own territory.
Having a different platform for our strategic assets puts the armed forces at a disadvantage in interoperability and commonality of operations, with our defence partners that further impacted the long-term strategic plan of capacity building for our armed forces. We have fallen so much behind in having the right air defence assets when we start buying the eastern-built aircraft in the 1990s.
Fortunately, with Australia heading the Headquarters Integrated Area Defence System in Butterworth, the Malaysian poor aerial defence is plugged by an additional squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)-F/A18F and PC3 Orion that were stationed in Butterworth through Op Gateway.
Even though the FPDA could not and should not dictate how we decide our defence procurement programme, by being active in the FPDA’s related exercises, Malaysian armed forces and the Defence Ministry will always be guided by the true north of proven military needs and stop procuring different type of assets outside the FPDA ambit.
This year, Malaysia is expected to host the biggest BERSAMA LIMA exercise under the FPDA banner with 4,000 personnel encompassing tri-services (land, air, and sea) of the five-member countries. The Royal Navy is expected to send the newly christened HMS Queen Elizabeth and
UK Carrier Strike Group for the first time in cognisance of the delicate situation at the South China Sea.
The BERSAMA LIMA has always been the biggest military exercise in this region since the turn of the century, and it requires our best assets for effective participation and maximum test of our combat readiness. However, the mismatch of our available assets is clearly to be seen as the Royal Malaysian Navy and the Royal Malaysian Air Force are still far behind in the modernisation programme.
Although in 2019, Malaysia has laid out a clear plan for defence procurement in the inaugural DWP in line with the stark need as an archipelagic nation, this will take a while for it to become a reality. Moreover, the instability of domestic politics could halt the vision laid out in the DWP and put the defence agenda as the least of the priority concern in terms of budget spending.
For the foreseeable future, the FPDA will continue to perform its original role in its ceaseless contribution to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore. By holding true to the tenets of why it was formed in 1971 and in keeping Malaysia and Singapore secured, the FPDA contributes further to better regional security, which will benefit the rest of the world.
The FPDA has a role to play in ensuring freedom of navigation through the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea of which the objectives set coincide with the Indo-Pacific strategy. Malaysia’s involvement in the FPDA needless to say is better to have than be without.