A challenge to Asean’s ‘mousedeer diplomacy’
Indonesia is trying to reassert its Indo-Pacific concept, which is more inclusive than the US-led strategic manoeuvre and puts Asean at the centre. But how realistic is it?
THE term “Indo-Pacific” has increasingly become the code for confrontation or a pushback against China – but can Indonesia rescue the concept on behalf of Asean and regional inclusivity?
In the United States, Australia, Japan and India, much is being said right now about the “IndoPacific”. Used as a strategic concept, forum or regional community, the term is often framed as a way of diluting the dominance of China.
Indonesia, which has been developing its own Indo-Pacific concept for well over a decade, is currently trying to regain control of it. Its leaders speak of an “Indo-Pacific treaty”, an “Indo-Pacific regional architecture” and an “Indo-Pacific cooperation umbrella” – and insist it will be inclusive, and not aimed at containing China.
Former foreign minister Dr Marty Natalegawa seeks a “dynamic equilibrium” involving the different regional powers; he and other Indonesians believe Asean can be at the core of the IndoPacific, maintaining that equilibrium. The Indonesian formulations are in some ways attractive – and eloquently stated – but are they realistic? There are a number of challenges.
First, the Indo-Pacific idea is already deeply entangled with US-led strategic manoeuvring. The “Indo-Pacific” is highlighted in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, and the “Pacific Command” is now the “Indo-Pacific Command”. The Indo-Pacific has also often been linked to the so-called Quadrilateral or Quad, a club of countries (Australia, India, Japan and the US) which share a common commitment to democratic values, and have expressed a cautious interest in security cooperation.
Indonesia is wise to try to reassert the more inclusive Indo-Pacific concept – wise in the sense that Asean has always been inclusive, uncomfortable with security alliances (most South-East Asian countries resisted joining the US-led South-East Asia Treaty Organisation six decades ago) and opposed to ideology-based associations. However, at this point, Jakarta will find it hard to put its stamp on the term “Indo-Pacific”; as a “branding” exercise, the effort to counter China has the upper hand. Many in Asia – even those wary of China’s South China Sea ambitions – baulk at the term, given its anti-China orientation.
A further challenge for the IndoPacific idea has to do with its question of identity and lack of emotive appeal – something which is taken seriously in much of Asia. This challenge may not be immediately apparent to analysts who focus mainly on the practical or functional advantages of regional architecture – such as cooperation on trans-border matters like health or policing.
Assuming that Asean somehow manages to agree to some form of Indo-Pacific architecture, the next problem would be maintaining a strong measure of Asean leadership or centrality.
Dr Natalegawa has suggested that an Indo-Pacific treaty could be based on Asean principles. Whether the major powers agree to this is another matter. Even if they do, the new Indo-Pacific body, in most formulations, is still likely to be in some sense independent of the current “Asean Plus” architecture, one that is based on the Asean “hub and spokes” structure and is the foundation of such regional institutions as the East Asia Summit, Asean Plus Three and the Asean Regional Forum.
In this independent Indo-Pacific configuration, Asean members would be hard pressed to compete with the bigger states in northeast Asia, India or the US.
Since 1967, Asean – despite international criticism of its cautious, consensus-seeking processes – has been remarkable in maintaining a degree of leadership in the region. Promoting dialogue between far larger, and competing, nations – it has contributed to regional peace, and at the same time asserted the agency of weaker states.
Asean’s diplomatic ingenuity is aptly captured in the tales of the wily mousedeer ( pelandok jenaka) in old Malay literature from SouthEast Asia. Mousedeer diplomacy has long enabled South-East Asians to survive and thrive among the much bigger beasts in the jungle. It is still used today on behalf of what retired diplomat Bilahari Kausikan has described as South-East Asia’s long-term quest for “autonomy” and “maximal room to manoeuvre”.
Separately, what tends to be overlooked is that Asean’s centrality in the regional commons has also had the positive effect of allowing the question of which major power should rightly lead in the broad Asian/Asia-Pacific region to be set aside. If an Indo-Pacific architecture were to supplant the Asean “hub and spokes” system, the issue of regional leadership is likely to move quickly and starkly to the fore.
A further challenge for the IndoPacific idea has to do with its question of identity and lack of emotive appeal – something which is taken seriously in much of Asia. This challenge may not be immediately apparent to analysts who focus mainly on the practical or functional advantages of regional architecture – such as cooperation on trans-border matters like health or policing.
The building of the organic idea of “Asia” has taken place over a century or more, beginning in India and Japan. The concept of “South-East Asia” is more recent and is an ongoing effort, with increasing attention being given to promoting a “people-centred Asean”. The idea of the “AsiaPacific” has been even more difficult than “Asia” to promote. As Indonesian analyst Jusuf Wanandi notes: “Indo-Pacific” excludes the word “Asia”, which covers “the most important part of the region”. “Indo-Pacific”, in fact, seems to have no emotive substance whatsoever for the people of the countries concerned. This may be unimportant if it is understood as no more than a strategic framework, but when there is talk of “Indo-Pacific regional architecture”, the deficiency matters.
A final consideration concerns the deeper change that seems to be under way in Asia – and the capacity of regional institutions to deal with this. The region is experiencing not just a shift in power from the US to China, but also a structural change in rules, values and aspirations.
The idea of a homogenising globalisation now seems remote – partly, of course, because of the Trumpian preference for patriotism over globalism. But that is not all. Older Asian traditions of hierarchical relations are shadowing inter-state politics; religious changes are promoting new concepts of community and obligation, especially in Indonesia. In some ways, it might be argued, the present Asean-based institutions might possess a special talent for handling the complexity of the post-globalisation era.
Indonesia itself has been a leader in the promotion of Asean’s patient diplomacy – and certainly values “autonomy” and maximum room to manoeuvre. Dr Natalegawa has been arguing for greater “transformative leadership” from Asean – but a move away from “Asean-Plus” to an “Indo-Pacific” architecture may be transformative in dangerous ways. — The Straits Times/Asia News Network
Professor Anthony Milner is currently with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. Astanah Abdul Aziz is an official in the Foreign Ministry of Malaysia. The article reflects her personal views and is not a statement of the Malaysian government’s position.