Terrorism and technology
The four fundamental freedoms which are the basis of the European Union are non-negotiable.
The fundamental freedoms must be respected in everything that is done — and should not be sacrificed for anything, not even in the fight against terrorism. A balance can and must be struck between freedom and security.
Freedom of speech must be respected when taking measures to take down terrorist content online. Countries such as France and Spain have been at the receiving end of criticism due to their online counter-terrorism measures, which were deemed to be a threat to the freedom of expression.
When presenting the new proposal aiming to ensure that online terrorist content is taken down within one hour, the Commission underlined that it would contain strong safeguards to ensure that only terrorist content is in fact taken down.
The proposal envisages a compliant mechanism that all service providers will have to put in place, so that where context has been removed unjustifiably, the service provider will be required to reinstate it as soon as possible.
Free movement within the EU is also being affected by the reintroduction of internal border controls by some Member
States. The reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen Area is supposed to be a temporary measure of last resort to be used where there is a serious threat to internal security and public order. The current situation where some Member States have had these controls for more than two years is also the result of the migration crisis with some of these controls having initially been introduced as a result of a Council Recommendation finding serious deficiencies at the external border of Greece.
These controls were then extended on the basis of the terrorist threat. In any case, internal border controls need to be well justified and repeated on. A proposal is under negotiation to enable longer periods of internal border controls in the case of a serious threat to public order or internal security — there, too, the challenge is in finding a balance between ensuring that Member States can take the necessary measures for security purposes, and that EU citizens continue to enjoy the benefits of the Schengen area without border controls. This is being done by means of safeguarding in the form of the procedure and requirements for internal border controls to be reintroduced and prolonged.
In February 2016, the European Commission set out an Action Plan against terrorist financing. The Action Plan focuses on two main strands of action, namely tracing terrorists through financial movements, and preventing them from moving funds or other assets, and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targetting their capacity to raise funds.
The objective of legislation aimed at combatting terrorist financing is to provide the legal means to disrupt and cut off the financial sources of terrorists. It should enable authorities to detect and put an end to suspicious financial flows, provide police and law enforcement authorities with information and effective tools for their investigations, and support better cooperation between law enforcement authorities.
Among the measures being worked on at EU level are minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions related to money laundering, closing gates to prevent criminals from exploiting differences between different national rules, common provisions to remove obstacles to cross-border judicial and police cooperation, rules for the mutual recognition of criminal asset freezing and confiscation orders across Member States and improved efficiency with standard documents, rules enabling the use of financial information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences.
With the onset of terrorist attacks in Brussels, it became evident that the Passenger Name Records (PNR) system became a priority for Member States, so much that the EU Directive 2015/681 obliged Member States to implement to use of the PNR for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.
Last month I oversaw the inauguration of the Passenger Name Records (PNR) system together with the Minister for Home Affairs and National Security Michael Farrugia – making Malta one of the first Member States to install it, thanks to EU funding.
PNR data is information provided by passengers and collected by air carriers for enabling reservations and carrying out the check-in process.
This data is precious – and the collection and processing of
PNR data is considered by many states, within and outside the EU, as an important law enforcement tool allowing to prevent, detect, and investigate terrorism and other forms of serious crime.
At the same time, the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes involves the processing of personal data which raises important issues with respect to the fundamental rights to the protection of private life and to the protection of personal data.
This project needs to be seen as part of a broader context of security for Malta and the EU. In the face of persistent security threats, questions ranging from how to effectively counter radicalisation to how best to improve the architecture of EU information systems feature high on the agenda. With the challenge of terrorism in particular, unlikely to diminish in the near future, the EU through the Internal Security Fund continues to consolidate its counter-terrorism capabilities by improving the implementation of existing instruments and applying new approaches to this evolving phenomenon.
Malta, too, through it’s National Programme of the ISF with a total of over €84 million in EU funds, has factored in various measures to counter and prevent crimes of various types. Malta is already highly active in ensuring that the next generation of funds post-2020 will not only be financially adequate, but also viable in terms of actions and interventions which beneficiaries such as the MPF can carry out on the ground.
We are striving to assess the gaps and needs on security whilst also taking into account the challenges and hard work required to implement these funds, safeguard our national interests and also address security requirements emanating from exogenous circumstances.
Experience teaches us that cooperation with the various stakeholders is key to attain success and this is particularly true when it comes to EU funds. This is one such example — a swift and efficient ISF programming of the arising need — and the prompt action of a resourceful and competent beneficiary.
Thus, these consultations will intensify in the coming months and it is crucial that strategies on the way forward are consolidated and that the financing to implement the measures in those strategies are secured for Malta.