Lufthansa sees Air Malta’s final departure as opportunity for third daily flight from Frankfurt

Matthias A. Merzhäuser On 31 March, at 7:55 pm, the ‘last flight out’ of an Air Malta jet in Frankfurt took place. It is the first ever interruption or end of a service, if not an era, that had begun in the first week of 1974 when Air Malta had taken up operations with two wet-leased Boeing 720Bs when Frankfurt was one of the very first routes operated, laying the foundation stone for decades of growing tourism and business relations between the two countries.

While here in Malta it was claimed that the route was given up for commercial reasons, this seems to be increasingly unlikely.

In fact, apart from two weekly flights added by German leisure carrier Condor for the summer schedule, it is now Lufthansa – which has clearly higher manpower costs than Air Malta – that is even taking up a third flight frequency, which it seems is particularly aimed at the Maltese market.

The flight, operated by an Air- bus A320 –the same aircraft as usually used by Air Malta – leaves Frankfurt at 8.30 pm and arrives in Malta at 11 pm. The return flight departs Malta at 6.30 am, arriving in Frankfurt at 9.10 am. From May, the fares are ‘low fare’, particularly for the early Malta departure.

Advantages for travellers and Lufthansa

This gives Maltese travellers the opportunity to make the most of their time abroad, while widening the connections potential. It is in particular also necessary to regain the network value for long- haul passengers travelling to Malta who used to be able to connect to the now cancelled Air Malta evening flight which departed Frankfurt at quite similar times.

It can also help business travellers between elsewhere and Malta reduce hotel costs and time spent by making it possible to fly in with the evening flight, deal with the business in Malta the following morning and lunch-time, and take the tea-time flight back to Frankfurt, all by choosing from the three daily Lufthansa connections.

For Lufthansa itself, it also pro- vides a good opportunity to minimise ‘fun-run’ positioning to Malta with respect to flights to Lufthansa Technik Malta – meaning empty runs by aircraft being flown back before or after their regular inspection work is being done in Malta is being reduced, as one has a wider range of flight through which one can shuttle the planes up and down gainfully.

In addition, it is a pre-emptive strike before anyone declares Frankfurt-Malta an “underserved route” to accommodate a subsidised service by a certain low-cost-at-any-cost airline that would take control of the route from Lufthansa’s hands. Air Malta was a long-time codeshare partner, with both carriers profiting from feeding into each other’s flights – be it domestic German, European or intercontinental routes – and mutually broadening the marketing base. Air Malta can still profit from this relationship, at least through Munich.

Reasons behind Air Malta’s withdrawal remain unclear

The commercial reasons quoted for the ending of the route is somewhat doubtful, considering the load factor (number of seats sold of those available) and cargo potential, even more after reading about a very impressive return on the cost of the route in an item in the press.

It might be that Air Malta withdrew from Frankfurt in order to demonstrate its commitment to integrate with the network of Etihad Airways-owned European carriers, in particular Alitalia (through which the investment in Air Malta would have taken place) and Air Berlin, which has now been dismantled into different parts, with Alitalia on the other hand undergoing the umpteenth rationalisation programme. It would have meant that traffic would be transferred via Rome and Milan, for example, rather than Frankfurt, plus getting Frankfurt traffic to transit there rather than going nonstop, thus helping fill Alitalia’s Frankfurt runs, and at the same time committing to German Air Berlin hubs Düsseldorf and Berlin, thus strengthening the relationship with new, would-be group partners.

Or did one perhaps do a favour for a ‘low-cost-at-any-cost airline’ to come on attractive slot times so it can fly from Frankfurt to not just Malta but elsewhere? Sort of, coming to the conclusion that the route makes no commercial sense for Air Malta, meaning that the slots occupied by Air Malta could be freed up, so that they can be given to LCC X, who has now dropped in at Frankfurt as a new airline with lower charges than established carriers – large (like Lufthansa) and small (like Air Malta)?

No one knows, and it is all just speculation, but it is very clear that the route does have a business element. Neither does it make any sense to boast of Malta as a financial services centre, while Frankfurt is the core continental EU one, and Brexit could make profit for both Frankfurt and Malta, meaning potentially more traffic rather than less.

Clearly the removal of such a strategic route does not add asset value to Air Malta as a going concern for its strategic potential. Yet, at least for connecting traffic from within Germany as well as some other routes, the improvements on the Munich, Zurich and Vienna routes help counter some of the losses of connectivity value that Air Malta represents. However, it makes marketing on both the direct sales and particularly MICE and tour operator levels more difficult, with just one airport served (apart from the twice-weekly Düsseldorf and once-weekly Berlin flights – not necessarily their fault with the capacity thrown into the market by lowcost parallel flights) – or costs thus need to be spread over fewer seats and routes.

It is good that the gap was quickly filled by a global network carrier and not a point-topoint low-cost-at-any-cost airline which would maybe have provided ‘arrivals’ but required heavy subsidies while not catering for any connectivity from markets beyond that point (already within Germany, but also think of Scandinavia and intercontinental markets), which is also important for Malta’s tourism ethnic, business and guest worker travel, or cargo capacity required for the general economy.

At least Air Malta’s traditional relationship with Lufthansa leaves a bit of hope for an eventual return of Air Malta to one of its root routes – in some way or other that the future might hold. As I have been saying for a number of years, it is crucial that Air Malta remains “too big to be allowed to fail”, meaning that maintaining an appropriate market share and occupying strategic routes as well as tactical routes, are essential for securing its existence.

Tel Aviv transit potential

On a positive note, Air Malta is finally converting the charter route from Tel Aviv into a scheduled service. Certainly, the main focus is on point-to-point traffic, but while there is a lot of competition in the core euro markets, Air Malta should definitely look at marketing connections from the Sicilian market for this destination too. Clearly, for this market MIA can be a good hub alternative to Rome and other airports due to it being compact and efficient and, from the geographical point of view, changing planes in Malta is more logical anyway.