Abortion… the ethics of

sidered that even if life does not start at conception, one must still recognise and acknowledge that there is the potentiality of a new individual human being. This entails treating the foetus with the same respect and granting it the same right you would grant to an adult person; for even though they cannot experience the full rights as yet but are entitled to them in the near future is enough to grant them such rights. Intuitively, this view is attractive because while it does not have the religious connotations tied to it, it recognises what the foetus would become if its existence is not terminated. Nonetheless, both ethically and legally, it is baffling how any rights can be given to anyone who has does not as yet have a claim to them. One does not treat a caterpillar in the same way as one would treat a butterfly, and acorns are not oak trees. It would further require that we also provide the same protection we decide to give to foetuses to sperms and ovum, for they also have the potentiality of creating a new life. This is undesirable, impractical and possibly verging on the nonsense. It could be argued, however, that there is a difference between the embryo, and sperm and ovum for the latter

Those who endorse neither of the views proposed above, base their argument on rights, the right of the women to body integrity to decide what happens to her own body. It is in my belief that these arguments fall short to really have a constructive sense to them. The right to terminate a pregnancy cannot be separated from the view of personhood which must be properly explained. In very simple terms, for a being to be considered a person, that being must hold certain characteristics: rationality and self-awareness. Without these characteristics, a being cannot be considered to have a high moral value and therefore it would be just and right to treat those beings inferiorly to those who have a high moral value. Those who fail the test of personhood do not have any intrinsic value. Society does, however, in some instances provide them with an extrinsic value. This becomes clearer when one considers that the qualities attributed to personhood are developed during childhood and not during pregnancy which could, very uncomfortably speaking, legitimatise infanticide.

Mary Anne Warren suggests that “the needless destruction of a viable infant inevitably deprives some person or persons of a source of great pleasure and satisfaction, perhaps severely impoverishing their life”. Turning the quote on its head, what if the continuation of pregnancy actually impoverishes the life of the future mother? Does the prospective mother have a right to say that that pregnancy does not have an extrinsic value for her?

I am here going to address two different scenarios, a pregnancy due to rape, and a case where a woman has voluntarily indulged in sexual intercourse which results in pregnancy. It is clear that in the case of rape, the woman did not give the unborn person the right to use her body. This could not be said to be the case where the woman wilfully consented to sexual intercourse which resulted in pregnancy. But is it always so? Let’s say that this woman has taken full precautionary measures to eliminate the risks of pregnancy clearly not intending to get pregnant. Wouldn’t this be considered on a par with an unwanted pregnancy as a result of rape? I am not in any way trying to lessen the seriousness of rape but in both instances, the pregnancy remains