The Malta Independent on Sunday
Army Training Memoranda – Malta 1940/41
Even before the beginning of hostilities, on 11 June 1940, the British authorities administering the defence of the Maltese islands were already distributing office copies of documents, the contents of which were not to be communicated to the press both directly and indirectly due to their sensitive nature. These documents made available to the Recruit Training Depot, Malta, laid down the training methods to be used by the Army (British and Maltese) to defend Malta.
It is noted that during wartime Malta, training was not only provided to the military but also to several departments set up at the beginning of hostilities to protect the civilian population. Examples of such entities were the Home Guard and the Special Constabulary. The civilian population were also made aware and trained in civil defence tactics such as in the use of gas masks and anti-gas training methods.
The documents mentioned in this feature refer to Army Training Memoranda issued by the War Office, London for use by the army in Malta. These documents were issued in all war zones and battlefields where British and Commonwealth troops were fighting and were intended for every officer in the British army who was to receive a copy of these monthly Army training Memoranda. They were to be in the officer’s possession by the third week of the month.
If they failed to reach the officer, he was to inform his superior officer. Interestingly, one of the Memoranda bears the written name of Sergeant Crawford on its cover and the rubber stamp is dated 2 April 1941. This was Army Memorandum No. 37 and although issued in 1940, it was received at the Recruitment Training Depot in April 1941.
In his book, Salute to Maltese Infantrymen, C. L. Borg explains that…. “intensive training started immediately in earnest with long route marches, night exercises, weapon training and the hundred and one other things a recruit had to learn. Training was in the hands of Permanent Staff Instructors attached to us from the 1st Battalion the Dorsetshire Regiment on the basis of one instructor per platoon”.
Malta was in the direct line of fire with heavy bombing raids plus the threat of invasion. It is no surprise that these Memoranda were adapted by instructors to the Maltese terrain and how the enemy would try to invade Malta by sea and air. According to, Operation Herkules – Wikipedia, Operation Herkules or as it was termed in Italian, Operazione C3, was an abortive plan for the invasion of Malta during the Second World War.
Through air and sea landings, the Italians and Germans hoped to eliminate Malta as a British air and naval base and secure an uninterrupted flow of supplies across the Mediterranean Sea to Axis forces in Libya and Egypt. Malta, at the time was known as the “thorn in Rommel’s side” and the Axis forces were hoping to “wipe off” Malta from the map by their air attacks, in what was later known as the “most bombed place on earth”.
Extensive preparations were made for the invasion but the success of other Axis operations – including the Battle of Gazala (26 May to 21 June 1942), the Axis capture of Tobruk on 21 June and Operation Aïda, the pursuit of the Allies into Egypt – led to Herkules being postponed and then cancelled in November 1942. Also, during the battle for Crete in 1941, the German paratroopers had suffered heavy losses and the air transport fleet had lost a significant number of aircraft. In total, the Germans had lost about 6,000 men.
The use of these documents was intended for the Recruit Training Depot, Malta. The contents of these Memoranda were based mainly on the lessons of the Great War (1914-18) and among other things explained the following:
• The attacking power of infantry surprise in defence (camouflage)
• Army tanks
• The Bren Gun Protection against air attack
• Code of Signals for infantry platoons
• Training for royal engineers
• Training for Corps of Signals
• Infantry training by competition
Although the focus of army training in Malta was on anti-aircraft gunnery, still infantry training was important. One must keep in mind that the Maltese terrain did not qualify for some of the training tactics explained in these Memoranda, understandably due to the small size of the Islands. Many of the manuals’ contents were by and large still relevant for training purposes, given the Maltese landscape of the time.
According to www.naval-military-press.com, these memoranda on the training of troops, issued by the War Office to every officer in the British Army, reflect the impact of experience. The first memorandum was issued in 1940 and includes sections on such subjects as the Bren light machine gun, how to protect motorised transport from air attack and how to improvise when weapons and equipment are short (as they frequently were). The warning: “Not to be taken into Front Line Trenches” at the beginning of the memo suggests that the top Brass were expecting a replay of the Great War.
The Blitzkrieg proved to be an eye-opener lesso, and subsequent memoranda are full of useful advice on tanks and how to deal with their attacks. By April 1941, the memos had absorbed the first lessons from the desert war in North Africa, particularly the spectacular British success (the first of the war) against the Italians at Sidi Barrani in December 1941.
The following table shows some of the Memoranda with date of issue and date when they were received at the Recruit Training Depot, Malta.
Since these Memoranda were to be in the officer’s possession by the third week of the month due to their importance in use, it is significant to note that the time gap between the date of issue of the Memoranda and the date of receipt at the Recruit Training Depot, Malta varied as the war progressed. For instance, the time lag between the date of receipt to the date of issue up to March 1940 is short.
But, as hostilities against Malta in the form of attacks on convoys intensified in frequency and ferocity, the time lag is lengthier. For example, between July 1940 and December 1940, the last Memoranda was issued in December 1940 but took until 2 April 1941 to arrive.
It is also noted that Memorandum No. 37 is dated 1940, with the month of issue eliminated from the cover. This was purposely done for the receiver of the Memorandum not to make comparisons between the date of issue to the date of receipt. Such comparisons could potentially make the officer arrive at negative morale-lowering conclusions about the delay of arrival of the Memoranda, attributing this to the British war effort taking a twist for the worse.