Is New Zealand buying into strife?
Our low levels of risk from events in the Middle East may be about to escalate. Next week, Prime Minister John Key is expected to outline our response to the threat posed to international stability by the Islamic State organisation. The speech is likely to signal: The contribution of SAS special forces personnel ( and/ or other troops) New Zealand is likely to give the American-led coalition.
What measures will be enacted to safeguard against threats posed by New Zealand jihadists returning home after fighting in Syria and Iraq.
Any new surveillance powers will probably be part of Key’s long-promised plan to ‘‘ reform’’ the Security Intelligence Service.
New Zealand will also soon learn the fate of our underdog bid for a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council.
Over the past decade, New Zealand has not needed to worry overly about becoming a target for the sort of retribution that terrorist groups have carried out on British and American soil, and against British or American citizens they’ve kidnapped.
Under the Clark Government, New Zealand declined to be part of the 2003 Iraq invasion.
In Afghanistan, our role had an explicit United Nations mandate.
By using the United Nations’ position as a benchmark, Clark minimised the risk to New Zealanders from retaliatory action, and did no harm to her job prospects at the United Nations, either.
This relatively independent foreign policy – codified in Derek Quigley’s Defence Beyond 2000 report – seems set for a revision.
The Key Government appears far more likely to decide ‘‘independently’’ to agree to what our traditional allies ask of us.
Reportedly, Key has asserted that committing SAS units or other forces against the Islamic State organisation would not ‘‘significantly’’ increase the risks to New Zealand.
This claim would have been more reassuring if in the very next breath, he hadn’t added that the prospect didn’t bother him unduly, anyway.
‘‘If you weren’t prepared to do anything solely on the basis of that [increased risk], then you actually start losing your independent foreign policy because by definition you’re saying that the actions of terrorists will stop you standing up to those terrorists,’’ Key said.
Intentionally or not, this sounds like ‘‘ standing up to those terrorists’’ has become a macho imperative, while rational risk calculation has virtually gone out the window.
Meanwhile, our coalition partners have only the shakiest idea of what a successful response to Islamic State might require.
The United States has been conducting an air campaign that its military chiefs openly concede is insufficient, while the White House has stressed that the United States will not be putting its own ground troops in harm’s way.
But someone else’s? else’s?
Our other coalition partners are making their contributions against Islamic State highly conditional.
Some are willing to fight inside Iraq, but not inside Syria. Some will carry out air strikes, but won’t commit ground troops.
A buffer zone for refugees is being advocated by some, but not by others.
Does New Zealand plan to contribute in Iraq or Syria, or both? To what ends, and for how long?
Key believes no ‘‘ significant’’ risk to New Zealand will eventuate. Over time, I guess we’ll learn the accuracy of that assessment.
Anyone