Soldiers exposed to tear gas in Napier siege
The Defence Force’s role was to provide police with operational support with police retaining ‘‘full authority’’.
Senior military brass sent an ‘‘important’’ message amid the Napier siege but it was not read for 10 hours.
The incident, as well as another in which unprotected Defence Force staff were exposed to tear gas, is among a list of failures from the deadly day in 2009.
An internal Defence Force report on the siege, which resulted in the death of Senior Constable Len Snee and gunman Jan Molenaar, was released this month under the Official Information Act.
It catalogues a list of failings but concludes that, overall, the Defence Force’s part in the saga ‘‘went smoothly’’ and the mission was a success.
Questions put to the Defence Force to clarify some of the statements in the partiallyredacted report were not answered yesterday and a spokeswoman was unable to say when – or if – they would be answered.
The report highlighted a breakdown in the chain of command and the Defence Force seemingly being barred from speaking at a press conference for fears of ‘‘politicallymotivated questions’’.
The report writer, whose name was redacted, pointed out the key forms of communication between the scene and headquarters during the siege were cellphone and email but email access was ‘‘not continuous’’.
‘‘On one occasion this resulted in an important message from [the commander of Joint Forces] not being received for approx 10 hours from the time of sending.’’
The Defence Force has been asked what the message contained but did not respond.
Under the heading ‘‘equipment’’ is a section, largely redacted, but revealing: ‘‘This resulted in at least one [light armoured vehicle] crew being forced to endure exposure to [tear] gas without any protection’’.
The Defence Force would not elaborate yesterday.
The Defence Force’s public relations unit arranged for the report writer to be the only nonpolice speaker at the postresolution conference but this ‘‘raised the risk of facing politically-motivated questions around LAV’’, the report says.
‘‘Indeed [Defence Force public relations unit] acknowledged the risk of questions around recent ministerial comments about LAV and offered suggested answers.’’
While it does not reveal what the comments were, shortly before the May 2009 siege, then-defence Minister Wayne Mapp signalled the possible off-loading of the force’s $677 million fleet of 105 light armoured vehicles.
The report details how a 24-hour point of contact was established and was ‘‘very valuable as it provided . . . a clear reporting chain’’. ‘‘Unfortunately this chain was not always followed by [personnel] contacting the incident scene from higher HQS although none if this caused major concern.’’
Legal issues also arose with confusion between police and the Defence Force about whether the LAVS could be used to move cars and the Joint Forces commander needed to step in to allow it.
While the Defence Force was unable to answer any questions from Fairfax Media yesterday, Commodore Ross Smith provided a written statement to Alex Hill, who made the information request via the FYI website.
He said the Defence Force’s involvement was approved by the Defence Force chief after consulting with the minister of defence. The Defence Force’s role was to provide police with operational support with police retaining ‘‘full authority’’.