Reviving arms control in Europe
European security, to the surprise of many, is under threat once again.
Even before the Ukraine conflict began in 2014, there were growing signs of a brewing confrontation between rival blocs. This new confrontation, however, is not defined by antagonism between communism and capitalism, but by a dispute over social and political order – a dispute about freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights – as well as by a struggle for geopolitical spheres of influence.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea violated international law and called into question the very foundations of Europe’s security architecture. Moreover, the nature of conflict, as Ukraine has demonstrated, has changed dramatically. So-called hybrid warfare and non-state actors are playing ever-greater roles.
New technologies – offensive cyber capabilities, armed drones, robots, and electronic, laser, and standoff weapons – carry new dangers. New combat scenarios – smaller units, higher fighting power, faster deployment – are not covered by today’s existing armscontrol regimes. The danger of a new arms race looms large.
Ever since the Harmel Report, which redefined Nato strategy back in 1967, the West has followed a two-track approach to its relations with Russia: deterrence and detente.
Nato renewed its commitment to this dual strategy at its Warsaw Summit earlier this northern summer. We adopted the necessary measures to provide military reassurance, and at the same time reaffirmed our political responsibility for co-operative security in Europe.
This dual approach is subject to an inherent difficulty: deterrence is real and visible to everyone; but detente must also be real and visible if it is to play its part. Whenever this policy balance is lost, misperceptions arise, and little remains to counteract the risk of escalation.
To mitigate this risk, we should advance a concrete goal: the relaunch of arms control in Europe as a tried and tested means of riskreduction, transparency, and confidence-building between Russia and the West.
Arms-control agreements, history has demonstrated, are not the result of existing trust – they are a means to build trust where it has been lost. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear confrontation. Soon after the crisis – when the United States-soviet relationship was at an all-time low – both superpowers decided that it was time to work across the divide, through small and concrete steps.
Today, new and deep rifts have opened up between Russia and the West, and I fear we will not be able to close them in the near future, however hard we try.
No-one should underestimate the challenges we face in this regard, especially given manifold crises – in eastern Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere – at a time when we are not immune from renewed escalation or further setbacks.
Only one thing is certain: If we don’t try, peace in Europe and beyond will be tenuous. So we should heed the lesson of detente: however deep the rifts, we must try to build bridges.
True, Russia has violated basic principles of peace – territorial integrity, free choice of alliances, and recognition of international law – that are non-negotiable for us in the West. But we must likewise be united in seeking to avoid an upward spiral of antagonism and confrontation.
In the West, as in Russia, our world seems increasingly dangerous. Islamist terrorism, savage conflicts in the Middle East, failing states, and the refugee crisis imply risks for all Europe. Security capabilities on both sides are stretched to the limit. Nobody wins and everyone loses if we exhaust ourselves in a new arms race.
By re-launching arms control we can make a tangible offer of cooperation to all those who want to shoulder responsibility for Europe’s security. It is time to try the impossible.
Frank-walter Steinmeier is Germany’s Foreign Minister.