Showdown in the sand
A new study of the Battle of El Alamein shoots down some long-held myths.
Time was, every New Zealander had heard of the Battle of El Alamein. Roads and some people were named after it, and the battle was boosted as the first major Allied victory of World War II. Then a reaction set in. New Zealand became less military-minded, the battle was forgotten and there was even a smug book written arguing that New Zealand should never have been involved in the war in the first place.
Subtitled “El Alamein and the Turning Point for World War II”, The Battle for North Africa is a great antidote to such historical amnesia. As a military historian, Professor Glyn Harper is non-partisan. He analyses the battle, move by move, like a great game of chess. He awards praise or blame, as it is deserved, to both Axis and Allied forces.
After Field Marshal Archibald Wavell defeated Marshal Rodolfo Graziani’s Italians, Britain’s North African campaign developed in three phases. In July 1942, the first Battle of El Alamein was a messy series of dogfights in which neither side gained much advantage, but at least Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was unable to press further into Egypt. In August came the Battle of Alam Halfa, Rommel’s major offensive. He hoped to push through to Cairo, but was again halted.
In both these battles, British and Commonwealth forces were on the defensive and poorly led. Without excessive criticism, Harper shows how much the British generals Claude Auchinleck and Neil Ritchie mismanaged things. He also shows how bad morale was on the Allied side, in contrast with the confidence German troops had in their leadership.
Only in October 1942, in the 12-day slog known as the second Battle of El Alamein, did the British Eighth Army go on the offensive and shatter the Afrika Korps, Panzerarmee and their Italian allies. From this point, Axis forces in North Africa were a shadow of their former selves and were driven back into Tunisia for the coup de grâce.
Harper is excellent at destroying long-held myths. Despite popular British stereotypes, in the final battle Italians (who sometimes made up most of Rommel’s forces) fought as doggedly as Germans and sustained huge losses. Harper is also good at explaining matters of logistics and supplies. Without RAF control of the Mediterranean, Rommel would not have been starved of necessary materiel. British forces usually outnumbered Axis forces, but British tanks were badly designed, poorly deployed and no match for panzers. Only when the Eighth Army acquired US Grant and Sherman tanks did they begin to make progress. As for the reputations of commanders Bernard Montgomery and Rommel, Harper deals with both judiciously and evenhandedly.
A big virtue of the book is that Harper does not overstate the Anzac role at El Alamein, although Kiwis and Aussies get much mention. It is no myth that Rommel referred to Anzacs as the “elite” of British infantry and was always wary of taking them on in frontal assaults.
As a military historian, Glyn Harper is nonpartisan. He analyses the battle, move by move, like a great game of chess.