UNsupported talks the way forward
The West can hold the whip hand over Russia in Syria should it stand firm, writes Prof William Harris of Dunedin.
THE OBVIOUS qualification to the West’s position in Syria is not Russia but US President Donald Trump’s inclination to please Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Trump is restrained in Syrian affairs only by his Department of Defense.
The fate of the ‘‘deescalation deal’’ in southwest Syria between the US and Russia in 2017, then trashed by Russia and the Syrian regime this year with not even a whimper from Washington, was a bad sign.
Russia has two clear priorities. First and foremost, it wants to wind down its presence while preserving its restored reputation as an effective and indispensable great power in global affairs.
Second, it wants to keep its strategic position south of Turkey and in the core of the Middle East, anchored by a permissive Syrian regime. To achieve these, it needs international legitimation of a genuine Syrian settlement and stabilisation of Syria through massive reconstruction, costing hundreds of billions of dollars.
Both are decisively in the hands of the West, together with Saudi Arabia. In addition, there cannot be a Syrian settlement without bringing over the Sunni Arab opposition. To the extent this is in the hands of nonSyrians, it lies collectively with the West, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
Without a proper settlement, Russia, Iran and Syrian associate President Bashar alAssad must indefinitely hold down Syria by force. Unreconstructed tyranny dependent on foreign occupation promises more war, including jihadist resurgence. Putin knows this and would presumably prefer to cash his chips while the going is good.
Western states should refuse both international legitimacy and economic reconstruction to any Syrian regime that features Bashar alAssad, his cronies, and his security machine. Assad is primarily responsible for the wrecking of Syria in regimedriven military escalations, for the refugee tide, and for the Islamic State phenomenon, which took jihadism to new levels thanks to the momentum and resources Isis derived from Syria’s implosion. He has emerged as the world’s leading war criminal of the early 21st century.
Of course, Putin has no love for Assad, an embarrassment in almost every sense. Nor do the Russians have any serious respect for the Iranian regime, an ally of convenience that has alienated much of the Sunni Arab world. Russia wants to preserve good relations with Iran’s principal Persian Gulf rival, Saudi Arabia. The Russians understand most Sunni Arab Syrians will never accept Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards or Iraniansponsored Shi’a militias from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan that Assad needs to continue ruling Syria.
Nonetheless, Assad provides Putin’s veneer of legitimacy in Syria, and there is currently no alternative head of regime for this purpose.
As for Iran, American and Israeli eagerness for an understanding with Russia against Iran simply encourages Putin to play hard to get. Apart from having Israel and Iran beholden to it as ringmaster of western Syria, Russia seeks to dissolve geopolitical challenges across the north and east. Here Russia, Turkey, and the US all face difficulties among themselves and with others. Turkey and the US have precarious advantages.
In eastern Syria, the USled campaign to eradicate the Islamic State has resulted in strategic leverage for the US and the West. Washington can point to continuing IS activity as legitimising its presence, particularly as everyone else seems to have other priorities.
US reliance on Syrian Kurdish forces has, of course, upset relations with Turkey, but Turkey’s expanded stake in the northwest absorbs its attention for now.
US air power, special forces, and local allies effectively block Assad from much of the oil of eastern Syria as well as threatening Russian mercenaries and Iran’s militias.
Russia is doing its best to destroy the US advantage by persuading Syrian Kurds to reconcile with Assad in exchange for decentralisation. Given the Russian sellout of the Afrin district Kurds to Turkey in early 2018, Russia’s trustworthiness has tanked, but Kurds feel they lack options.
Trump has done damage on behalf of Russia and Assad by sowing doubt about the US staying the course for a decent Syrian settlement. The US Defense Department is trying to hold the line.
As for diplomacy, Russia is floating ‘‘humanitarian repatriation’’ of refugees as the opening gambit in a bid to draw Western countries step by step into financing Syrian reconstruction under Assad.
The West’s function is simply to clean up after Russian and Syrian regime bombing sprees. It is extraordinarily cheeky.
The only way forward is serious implementation of UN Security Council resolution
2254 through the only legitimate pathway, the UNsupported Geneva talks.
Serious implementation means removal from authority of the person most responsible for the whole mess — Bashar alAssad. The demand is realistic because the West has the capability through vetoes on legitimacy and reconstruction to make it realistic.
Russia’s counter is to work on having Trump deliver US evacuation and having Germany service a resurgent Syrian despotism. At the least, one can hope Chancellor Angela Merkel steers clear.