Where to for Russia and Ukraine?

THE news and photographs from Ukraine have been astounding.

Russian forces in part of the northeast have been routed. Equipment has been abandoned in the haste to flee.

The monthslong stalemate has shown signs of breaking, even if checkmate remains a distant and unlikely prospect.

Russia has suffered its biggest setback since giving up on its attack on Kyiv and its switch to concentrate east and south.

Although it should be remembered Russia still holds a fifth of Ukraine (including Crimea), the highly motivated home forces have regained enough territory to bolster morale and even spark signs of criticism of President Vladimir Putin in Russia itself.

The Russian forces were not “regrouping”. They were rapidly retreating.

The Ukrainian success is heartening, even for us in distant New Zealand. “Our side” is doing well.

Forgetting the misery of war for the moment, we cheer when the bully’s nose is bloodied and the underdog fights back.

Much as the West might like peace talks and compromise to save face for President Putin and allow for deescalation, Ukraine, understandably, cannot countenance concessions.

It insists not just on the return of territory taken over the past 200 days but also the return of the Donbas region, held by Russian separatists for eight years, as well as Crimea, annexed in 2014.

There are also demands for reparations and warcrime tribunals.

Crucial to Ukraine’s push in the past week, and the several thousand square kilometres taken, have been advanced Western weapons and the targeting of Russian supply depots and lines.

Ukraine is renewing calls for more equipment, while the West responds in measured and gradual ways.

Russia’s chokehold on European gas is at play. So, too, are the nuclear cards held by Mr Putin.

Even the use of small tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would be irrational.

The West would be forced to become more involved in the war, and Russia is next door in fallout range.

But Mr Putin was irrational in the first place to invade.

Desperation can lead to crazy decisions.

In the meantime, Mr Putin has been targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

He could also pull out of the grain deal and further uptheante on restricting gas supplies to Europe as winter approaches.

He could put Russia on a full war footing, abandoning the “special operation” pretence.

But that could come across as further humiliation no matter how he spins it. Russian patience for human losses must be wearing thin. Russian resources are being bled dry.

He could, as he did after the Kyiv attack, redefine how Russian success is defined.

Maybe, it could be limited to “protecting” Russianspeaking eastern provinces and Crimea.

Mr Putin might have been hoping the famously fickle West would respond to a winter of gas shortages and skyhigh prices by limiting its backing for Ukraine.

He might have thought support would degrade over time, especially as battered Ukraine slowly shrunk before Russian attrition.

This recent blue and yellow surge, however, has done far more than recapture some land and several towns. It has renewed faith in Ukrainian capabilities. It has reinvigorated interest and hope for Ukraine around the world. It has again exposed Russian weakness. It also restricts Mr Putin’s options and increases the pressure on him.

Even in autocratic Russia, even when the media and the public narrative are his to dictate, the early signs of criticism of him at home are promising.

Who knows? Maybe his position as supreme leader is not as secure as most believe. Maybe cracks can appear and widen quickly.

Some are describing last week’s gains in Ukraine as a turning point.

While it is too early to make such claims with confidence, the surprise advance bodes well for Ukrainian hopes.

The success is far more than partial territorial recovery.

It is a striking humiliation of imperialist Russia and a symbolic triumph for Ukraine.