Multiple failings in Port Hills fire efforts
Both Christchurch Port Hills fires were likely deliberately lit, Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) has revealed.
The blazes started on February 13 in Early Valley Rd, near Halswell. A separate fire on Marleys Hill near the Sign of the Kiwi started that evening, with the two fires merging into one inferno that ravaged 1661 hectares over four days and produced as much energy as four atom bombs.
The fires have been recognised as unprecedented in New Zealand and were the first large-scale blazes on the edge of a major urban area.
Fourteen helicopters and more than 100 fire appliances and water tankers were deployed. Nine homes were lost and five others suffered damage. North Canterbury pilot Steve Askin, a former SAS soldier, was killed when his helicopter crashed.
At a press conference yesterday to release an independent report into the blazes, FENZ regional manager Richard McNamara – who was in charge in the fire response’s latter stages – said the Marleys Hill fire was suspicious and in the hands of the police and that FENZ’s view was that the Early Valley Rd fire was arson.
‘‘The conclusion is that the fire [Early Valley] is classified as undetermined as such, but our view is that it was caused by a deliberately lit fire.’’
All forensic evidence, including an electrical engineering report, had been collected, but he said more information from the public would be helpful.
The review of the fire response by a team led by Alan Goodwin of Australasian Fire and Emergency Services said some of the response was confused and the public poorly informed.
FENZ chief executive Rhys Jones told the conference his organisation had met most of the families whose homes were destroyed in the blazes.
He conceded some houses could have been saved if mistakes had not been made by the firefighting effort. ‘‘Two families in particular we’ve given apologies to. We’re accepting those mistakes and that’s why we brought the families in and apologised.’’
Jones said many mistakes had been made in some ‘‘crucial areas’’, but FENZ had learned valuable lessons. He was confident the new FENZ organisation, which had brought fire emergency services under one umbrella since the blazes, would overcome the mostly systemic problems highlighted by the review.
‘‘This is probably going to happen again, climate change is affecting New Zealand. And although this was the most complex to date, there will be complex fires close to cities and town and we need to adapt and improve our response.’’
McNamara said FENZ was also working with the Canterbury helicopter industry to ensure enough helicopters were on standby to cope with a similar emergency in future. ‘‘It was part of a series of tragic events that all the helicopters in this region were committed to the slips in Kaikoura. In terms of having more aircraft available we are talking to the helicopter companies about how we do that . . . we did have a system in place but we are now updating it.’’
When the fires first started in Early Valley Rd, only two helicopters were immediately available to fight the fires.
McNamara said lessons should have been learned from the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes but weren’t.
‘‘There were times when the information flow from the fire ground to the planning and intelligence section of our incident management team and importantly to the public was not good.
‘‘We have to do better. The ulti- mate failure we will be if we don’t learn these lessons.’’
The independent review found that while firefighters from across the agencies did well, areas of improvement remained.
The review said a lack of planning and consistency led to confusion, with the various agencies working under different plans, command and control structures and legislation.
‘‘The Incident Management Team (IMT) processes were hampered by lack of information and co-ordination, especially in the first few days of the fires. This led to the self-deployment of resources without the knowledge of the IMT,’’ it found.
An action plan formed on Monday night lacked detail and suffered from poor information from the ground and other intelligence. Fire-spread modelling was not used in a timely way and the IMT lacked resources in support positions, it said. The planning and IMT teams lacked ‘‘situational awareness’’.
The operations officer appointed for the duration of the fires stayed in one spot and did not relay the full picture to the IMT leaders. Further confusion was caused by different terminology being used across the fire services and the wider emergency agencies, the review said.
Goodwin also criticised the lack of information given to the affected public.
But he concluded the decision to stand down urban firefighters on the first night of the blaze was the correct decision. ‘‘With the benefit of hindsight some elements could have been done better. Overall the actions of the fire agencies and individuals to keep people safe and combat the fires is to be commended.’’
In a statement Jones said despite best efforts from fire crews, they were unable to protect all of the houses as crews were restricted by water supply, smoke, significant ember transfers and radiant heat.
‘‘The firefighters tried to remain in the street to protect the properties, but when power transmission wires fell onto the road the commander was faced with a difficult decision.’’
More firefighters did not respond quicker because rural firefighting was a highly technical, specialised response. It worked differently to an urban, structured firefighting setting that most people were familiar with, he said.
‘‘While it may have appeared to some members of the public that there were insufficient numbers, the nature of the terrain and the intensity of the fire played a large part in determining the response.’’
The terrain, fuel, and weather meant the fire would be intense and fast-moving, difficult to fight from the ground because of restricted access and water supplies.
‘‘The focus was initially on an aerial attack by helicopters with monsoon buckets identifying hot spots of the fire as this would be more effective. Ground crews set up a series of incident points to protect properties,’’ he said.
‘‘We accept and acknowledge the review’s finding that these decisions were correct operationally, but were not communicated well to the public.’’