The US and Nato

Congressional testimony by Donald Trump’s national security nominees last week suggested that his administration would not seek to dismantle the alliances that have undergirded the West – and US global leadership – since 1945. ‘‘If we did not have Nato today, we would need to create it,’’ said defence secretary nominee James Mattis. The US treaty commitment to defend European allies, said secretary of state nominee Rex Tillerson, is ‘‘inviolable’’.

It is still not clear, however, that Mr Trump agrees. In an interview with the Times, he recalled his claim last year that Nato was ‘‘obsolete’’ because it did not fight terrorism (though it does) and because many members did not meet its defense spending guidelines. He then went on to say that ‘‘it doesn’t matter’’ whether the European Union exists, predicted more countries will leave it and placed German Chancellor Angela Merkel on par with Russian President Vladimir Putin in meriting his trust.

Ms Merkel played down the statements, and maybe she’s right: perhaps Mr Trump’s words — he also said ‘‘Nato is very important to me’’ — should not be taken seriously. Yet if the president-elect’s intention was to undermine the transatlantic alliance, encourage the end of the EU and tear down Ms Merkel as she begins a reelection campaign — an agenda identical to Mr Putin’s — he could hardly have been more effective.