Terence O’Brien
Finding our way in a minefield ponders pathways through ongoing mess that is Middle East
Forthcoming prime ministerial talks in Australia for Jacinda Ardern will almost definitely include the future of the 2015 New Zealand deployment, alongside Australia, in Iraq of a defence force contingent to train and mentor Iraqi army units for their fight against Jihadi extremism.
The context for that New Zealand involvement in Iraq and for the region more generally has changed since the original decision to commit.
First, the overall threat to Iraq of a radical jihadist (ISIS) caliphate forming a new (and destructive) geographical reality in the region, has been successfully resisted.
That mission accomplished by a coalition of like-minded states (led by the US) is a real achievement, and New Zealand’s training and mentoring effort played a part. But what comes next?
The Iraqi Government is seriously concerned once more by the resurgence of pressures for greater autonomy from its Kurdish population. This is a (longstanding) internal struggle.
Outsiders should sidestep involvement, although in its own broader contest with ISIS the United States is in fact supporting the Kurds. When assessing the future of its commitment, New Zealand should definitely be concerned lest training and mentoring support now will serve to improve Iraqi army capacities to take down the Kurds.
New Zealand defence policymakers, and MFAT, presume ongoing commitments by this country in the Middle East almost as a foregone conclusion. Being part of a coalition of the willing, led by the US, provides proof of good international citizenship.
It is absolutely right that New Zealand continues to share, within its means, in the task of sustaining international peace and stability,
But given that our policymakers have, it seems, also concluded that peace support commitments under the UN no longer suit modern New Zealand (although the reasons have never
In absolute terms the needs of Sudan are just as compelling as those of Iraq. The dangers, however, are real.
been explained in public), involvements with coalitions of the willing become the default option.
Such coalitions reflect, of course, quite understandably, the priorities of the coalition leader(s), and indicate support by participants for the overall policy direction.
Here there some inconveniences for New Zealand. Australia has expressed its hope/ expectation that New Zealand will remain committed to the joint Iraqi project.
As this country’s principal international partner such views cannot be brushed aside. Yet changes to the context within the Middle East must be weighed too in the balance when New Zealand reassesses the case.
New Zealand is, for example, committed to a two-state solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict, but America’s recent recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital severely compromises chances of a two-state solution and US credentials as a peace broker.
Australia is equivocal. It was thanked by the US for abstaining in the UN on a resolution denouncing the US action.
Likewise New Zealand is firmly committed to support of the nuclear deal negotiated between Iran and certain major powers (it piloted the deal through the UN Security Council while in the chair as council president in 2017) but the viability of that deal is now endangered by the prevarication of the present US Administration; American policies now include also encouragement of Saudi Arabia, which is engaged in a gravely inhumane war in Yemen, to confront Iran.
In Syria a contest of wills between Russia and the US as well as conflict involving Jihadist groups, sundry warring factions, the Turkish military, Hizbollah (Iran) and Israel all with differing agendas, complete a picture of monumental regional confusion.
What alternatives might there be for New Zealand involvement within the Middle East? The situation in Sudan, where David Shearer leads the UN effort and is in desperate need of protection from warring elements, is dangerous. A combat trained compact New Zealand contingent to assist with peace support would surely be welcomed and incidentally lend an added New Zealand complexion to that intrepid UN venture.
Defence policy-makers will almost consign such an idea to the ‘‘too hard (and dangerous) basket’’.
Australia has contributed air logistic support and might be persuaded to build some joint effort upon that, and New Zealand has itself previously provided one or two observers.
Other Asia Pacific governments have offered contributions to the 12,000-person UN effort – Indonesia, Vietnam, India, China, South Korea, Fiji, PNG, etc – so an extended New Zealand effort would entail keeping company with others from our region which is most expedient in terms of the New Zealand national strategic interest.
In absolute terms the needs of Sudan are just as compelling as those of Iraq. The dangers, however, are real.
There is scope for tasking New Zealand defence planners at least to examine with others (the UN peacekeeping headquarters and partner governments, particularly Australia) what are the possibilities for re-dedicated peace support involvement in Sudan.
❚ Terence O’Brien is a Centre for Strategic Studies NZ Senior Fellow.