What Baghdadi’s death has changed
The killing of its leader is a huge blow to Islamic State. But the best we can hope for is that its rebuild will be slow, writes Greg Barton.
‘Avery bad man’’ has been killed and ``the world is now a much safer place’’. The sentiment behind US President Donald Trump’s announcement of the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr alBaghdadi is difficult to argue with.
Baghdadi was certainly a very bad man. And under his decade-long leadership of the Islamic State (IS) movement, many thousands of people in the Middle East and around the world suffered terrible brutality or death.
Common sense would suggest the world is indeed a safer place with Baghdadi’s passing. Unfortunately, however, there is no guarantee this will prove to be true in practice.
The 18-year ``Global War on Terror’’ in the wake of the September 11 attacks – the international military campaign to fight al-Qaeda, and then IS – has been almost entirely reactive and tactical. It has lacked any consistent strategic purpose, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, the Philippines or anywhere else.
The strongest military coalitions the world has ever seen have fought the largest and most powerful terror networks that have ever existed. And this has led, directly and indirectly, to hundreds of thousands of lives lost, trillions of dollars spent, and remarkably little progress overall.
The special forces raids targeting Baghdadi, in
Idlib, and his deputy, Abul-Hasan al-Muhajir, in Aleppo, were undoubtedly significant achievements representing tactical victories of great consequence.
IS has been dealt an enormous blow. But just how long its impact will last is not clear. The lessons of the past two decades make it clear this will certainly not have been a fatal blow.
The IS insurgency, both on the ground in Iraq and Syria, and around the world, was rebuilding strength before these strikes and will not be stopped in its tracks by losing its two most senior public leaders.
Baghdadi as IS leader
Baghdadi may not be irreplaceable, but in many respects he was uniquely suited to the times in which he led. He oversaw the rebuilding of IS from its previous low point a decade ago.
He played a key role in expanding into Syria, replenishing the leadership ranks, leading a blitzkrieg across northern Iraq, conquering Mosul and declaring a caliphate. In the eyes of his support base, his credibility as an Islamic scholar and religious leader will not easily be matched.
He was not a particularly charismatic leader and was certainly, as a brutal, fundamentalist loner, not truly inspirational. But he played his role effectively, backed by the largely unseen ranks of former Iraqi intelligence officers and military commanders who form the
The 18-year ‘‘Global War on Terror’’ . . . has lacked any consistent strategic purpose, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq . . . or anywhere else.