Speak truth, but think first

research fellow in history, Victoria University of Wellington

Gerald Hensley (Stark choice between principles and interests, May 4) points cogently to a tension between the oftproclaimed moral basis of New Zealand’s foreign policy, its wish to ‘‘speak truth to power’’, and its economic ties with, indeed dependence on, China.

He identifies ways in which China’s diplomacy has become more assertive and nationalist, particularly since Xi Jinping assumed the leadership in 2012.

In respect of the democracy protests in Hong Kong, Hensley foresees that the mainland ‘‘will at some point feel compelled to crack down and use force’’. This will be a ‘‘tipping point’’ when New Zealand will face a ‘‘stark choice between our national principles and our national interests’’.

The dilemma is real, but there are elements in Hensley’s analysis which repay further attention.

First, he concedes that the international community, New Zealand included, recognises that Hong Kong is part of China.

But the article acknowledges only in passing – ‘‘it will at some point feel compelled to . . .’’ – that through months of protest, China has not yet resorted to military force in Hong Kong. I don’t for a minute think that this tells of some historic conversion to electoral democracy or freedom of speech, but it does indicate caution as Beijing seeks to reconcile its values (which may not be ours) and its interests.

Second, it is true that many facets of China’s conduct in world affairs are unattractive – the hectoring tone, the megaphone diplomacy, the hostage strategies (consider Canada). But beyond its own territorial limits (and yes, the exact limits, especially in the South China Sea, are contested, but that’s a different point), China’s power projection is modest, not expansive. The contrast is marked not just with the global military footprint of the United States, but even with those of Britain and France.

Third, while New Zealand has economic dependence on China, dealings with many other countries also present hard choices between interests and principles. India’s clampdown in Kashmir last August was not condemned by New Zealand but, when Malaysia criticised, India withheld palm oil contracts.

Indonesia is a key Asean partner for New Zealand, but rejects criticism of its rule in West Papua. Saudi Arabia supplies oil to New Zealand despite public outrage at its brutal murder of dissident intellectual Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018. That both India and Indonesia are electoral democracies and Saudi Arabia a key US ally in the Middle East adds to the complexity.

What to do? I will canvas two ways forward. One, New Zealand can speak truth to power in company with other truth tellers.

You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to recognise that, in the present climate, this will in the first instance mean the US and allies Australia, Britain and Canada. While this may be described as speaking truth to power, to China it will look like power speaking to power. The more so, given the current Washington orthodoxy that China and the US are strategic rivals – a rivalry which is about power as much as values.

Two, New Zealand can speak truth to power using global channels through which democracy, human rights and human security are advanced. This means turning to international instruments, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, to which, as to most others, China is a signatory.

It can be said that such endeavours are empty, unless able to be enforced in some way. But that back-up needs global, not just alliance, legitimacy. That means it must be attuned to the way legacies of colonialism and imperialism shape much of the world’s view of democracy and human rights (New Zealand’s own constitution resting ‘‘on a treaty’’, as Hensley puts it, can be instructive). And it means being prepared for the long haul.

If New Zealand is to speak truth to China, voices in East and Southeast Asia should be listened to carefully. The record of democracy and human rights across the region is patchy, but there are accomplishments alongside the setbacks (it is ironic but heartening that Taiwan is one).

East Asian countries face a geopolitical setting between China and the US with parallels to New Zealand’s. And their decision makers and civil society actors have thought long and hard about dealing with China.

So yes, let’s expect New Zealand ministers, diplomats, the public, to speak up about Hong Kong, when the occasion arises. But they should do so after having carefully thought through all the elements that are in play.

Malcolm McKinnon is the author of Independence and foreign policy: New Zealand in the world since 1935; and New Zealand and Asean: a history.