Why doing what works too often doesn’t
Bill English drew on much cherry-picked or nonexistent evidence, writes Jess Berentson-Shaw.
OPINION: The bell has tolled and the end of a long career in politics has come to an end for Bill English, a man who started his career in Treasury in the 1980s and, in many ways, never left the values of that department at that time behind.
For policymakers, English is an interesting case study in the ‘‘doing policy that works’’ school of thought.
Throughout his spell as both finance and prime minister, he constantly talked about doing ‘‘what works’’.
He appeared deeply passionate at times about making a difference, especially to what he saw were our most challenged families. Yet, ironically, he often drew on evidence that was weak, cherry-picked, or non-existent.
The most recent example is the boot-camp policy that was revived before the 2017 election, while the most significant example was his social investment plan.
It appeared, however, that he genuinely believed in the evidence he discussed, and was very pro both data and proof.
In many ways, his legacy in this area will be his boosting of the profile of integrated data infrastructure (a combined data base of government-collected data). This is a good thing, as it will be a powerful source of information about how government and the people it serves is doing.
But the problem, as it often is with people who deeply value ‘‘what works’’, is that what works, cost-effectiveness and value for money become the value in itself.
The social investment model, as it then was, lacked a clear vision from the start, and focused instead on the modelling of cost transfer between government services.
As a policy in itself there was ironically no evidence that Kiwistyle social investment would work best. Nor was there a built-in plan to assess its effectiveness as a social and economic policy.
Where was the evidence this would ‘‘work’’ better than, say, Working For Families or a reintroduction of a family benefit?
Instead of starting with what matters to all New Zealanders – what outcomes matter to the families at the centre of the policy, and letting the evidence fall from there – he appeared to start with an implicit assumption that focusing on individual solutions and behaviour change are best, especially when combined with intense family intervention.
This is despite scientists throughout the world showing this to be the least impactful, least enduring, and most effortful way to improve outcomes for those who are not thriving. The downstream impact of the assumptions held by Bill English (and indeed any of us) is the selection of evidence that suits that value set.
Unfortunately in this case it resulted in policy design that will not improve outcomes for all people, and notably the people who need governments to do better.
In many ways it was not untrue when English said we are doing ‘‘what works’’. Rather, it was simply that ‘‘what works’’ had a very narrow meaning, based on some implicit and very personal assumptions about what matters, to whom and why.
The ‘‘what works’’, evidence, value for money, cost-effectiveness analysis is only a tool to achieve what matters. Make it THE thing that matters, and it will not work for people.
It is a shame that this was something Bill English could not get his head around despite his intentions. It remains to be seen if the new Government can do better.