From the Economist
cent in 2000. Until recently, the Chinese were getting richer so fast that most of them had better things to worry about than how they were governed. But today China faces a set of threats that an official journal describes as ‘‘ interlocked like dog’s teeth’’.
The poor chafe at inequality, corruption, environmental ruin and land- grabs by officials.
The middle class fret about contaminated food and many protect their savings by sending money abroad and signing up for foreign passports. The rich and powerful fight over the economy’s vast wealth.
Scholars at a recent government conference summed it up well: China i s ‘‘ unstable at the grassroots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top’’.
Once, the party could bottle up dissent. But ordinary people today protest in public. They write books on previously taboo subjects and comment on everything through China’s vibrant new social media.
If China’s leaders mishandle the discontent, one senior economist warned in a secret report, it could cause ‘‘ a chain reaction that results in social turmoil or violent revolution’’.
Departing Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has more than once called China’s development ‘‘ unbalanced, unco- ordinated and unsustainable’’. Last week Qiushi, the party’s main theoretical journal, called on the Government to ‘‘ press ahead with restructuring of the political system’’.
Xi portrays himself as a man of the people and the party still says it represents the masses, but it i s not the meritocracy that some Western observers claim. Those without connections are often stuck at the bottom of the pile.
Having long since lost ideological legitimacy, and with slower growth sapping its economic legitimacy, the party needs a new claim on the loyalty of China’s citizens.
Xi could start by giving a little more power to the people. Rural land, now collectively owned, should be privatised and given to the peasants; the judicial system should offer people an answer to their grievances; the household- registration, or hukou, system should be phased out to allow families of rural migrants access to properly funded health care and education in cities.
At the same time, he should start to loosen the party’s grip. China’s cosseted state- owned banks should be exposed to the rigours of competition; financial markets should respond to economic signals, not official controls; a free press would be a vital ally against corruption.
Such a path would be too much for those on the Chinese ‘‘ left’’, who look scornfully at the West and insist on the Communist Party’s claim — its duty, even — to keep the monopoly of power. Even many on the liberal
Xi will try to combine economic growth with political stability.
‘‘ right’’ would contemplate nothing more radical than Singapore- style one- party dominance. But Xi should go much further.
To restore his citizens’ faith in government, he also needs to venture deep into political reform.
That might sound implausible, but in the 1980s no less a man than Deng spoke of China having a directly elected central leadership after 2050 — and he cannot have imagined the transformation that his country would go on to enjoy. Zhu Rongji, Wen’s predecessor, said competitive elections should be extended to higher levels, ‘‘ the sooner the better’’.
Although the party has since made political change harder by restricting the growth of civil society, those who think it is impossible could look to Taiwan, which went through something similar, albeit under the anticommunist Kuomintang.
Ultimately, it can be hoped, political reform would make the party answerable to the courts and, as the purest expression of this, free political prisoners. It would scrap partymembership requirements for official positions and abolish party committees in ministries. It would curb the power of the propaganda department to impose censorship and scrap the central military commission, which commits the army to defend the party, not just the country.
No doubt Xi would balk at that. Even so, a great man would be bold. Independent candidates should be encouraged to stand for people’s congresses, the local parliaments that operate at all levels of government, and they should have the freedom to let voters know what they think.
The Chinese Communist Party has a powerful story to tell. Despite its many faults, it has created wealth and hope that an older generation would have found unimaginable. Bold reform would create a surge of goodwill towards the party from ordinary folk.
Xi comes at a crucial moment for China, when hardliners still deny the need for political change and insist the state can put down dissent with force. For everyone else, too, Xi’s choice will weigh heavily. The world has much more to fear from a weak, unstable China than a strong one.