Putin ponders the danger of inaction

Vladimir Putin’s last invasion of Ukraine was reactive: a response to a dramatic pro-European revolution in Kyiv in 2014 which the Kremlin viewed as an American assault on Russia’s vital interests.

However, since then, nothing much has changed: the annexation of Crimea is a fait accompli and the conflict in eastern Ukraine is in grim stalemate — as is the 30-year quarrel between Russia and the West over Nato expansion.

So why has Putin suddenly decided that he must risk a major war to up-end the status quo? One reason may be the balance of power. Russia’s military is at its strongest and most capable since the Cold War. Its public finances are also in good order, and Putin may believe he is well-placed to bear the costs of conflict and inevitable sanctions.

The West is, conversely, at a moment of historic economic, military, and political weakness.

One opinion voiced in Moscow is that Joe Biden is likely to be a oneterm US president and will seek to settle quarrels with Russia before he leaves office so he can leave the US better positioned for its coming showdown with a much more serious foe, China.

The UK is preoccupied with domestic dramas, and Nato’s European members are divided — as Biden clumsily admitted, and Emmanuel Macron demonstrated, in separate remarks this week.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is slowly growing stronger. It has rebuilt its army. The low-level conflict since the annexation of Crimea has failed to compel Kyiv to accept peace on Russia’s terms, but has provided its troops with valuable combat experience against Russian-led forces. An even worse prospect from Putin’s point of view would be Ukraine’s domestic defence industry’s ability to develop longrange missiles able to reach far into Russia, giving it a deterrent against his own feared Iskanders.

As some analysts argue: viewed from the Kremlin, the costs of fighting are now dwarfed by the risks of inaction.