The 1966 Military Coup
Most of the ministers’ houses were then guarded by party stalwarts (ruffians) or personal bodyguards who were brought in from the ministers’ constituencies to protect them from possible attacks by thugs from the opposing parties. To be precise, the parties allied to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) which lost the 1964 Federal Election as well as the 1965 Western Regional election had in desperation embarked on arson, murders, etc in what was termed euphemistically “Operation Welie” - spraying opponents with petrol (gasoline) and setting them on fire. Because of the activities of these thugs, parts of the West and Lagos (outside Ikoyi) were not safe. It was therefore not surprising to find ministers’ houses heavily barricaded by thugs armed with bows and arrows, cutlasses (pangas), daneguris (Flintlock) and other dangerous weapons. I was turned away by these armed guards but there was one minister whose house was not so protected and his single night watchman allowed me to enter the minister’s house. The minister, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who was awake, came down rosary in hand, to meet me in the sitting (living) room. He confessed that when he heard my voice, he thought the end had come and was, as it were, saying his last rites (by himself) and had in fact bade his family farewell. It was astonishing, despite his fears, the minister was calm, cool, and collected, and being a good Muslim had resigned himself to whatever fate had reserved for him. My assessment of this particular minister was that, a man made of such sterner stuff than that of an average Nigerian would surely have an important role to play in the affairs of the nation after the current turmoil was over, when the question was put to him that in the absence of the president of the republic, the minister of defence who was next in line of succession to the kidnapped prime minister, would he like to assume control, he replied no. When asked why, he stated that in the Northern Peoples’ Congress hierarchy at the federal level, Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcherima was next to the minister of defence and was therefore the proper person to assume such control. He should be approached but as stated earlier, this and other NPC, NNDP and NCNC ministers were in hiding, or as some claimed, simply did not make themselves available for the transaction of government business at this crucial moment of the nation’s history.
Incidentally, when one of the ministers, Waziri Ibrahim, was later told that a call was made at his house to sound him on the possibility of assuming executive control of the federation, he promptly replied that he would have gladly accepted, and cursed his night guard for refusing me entry to his house on the fateful night. In retrospect, I now confess that, my attempt to seek someone to exercise executive authority, though genuine and made with the best of intentions and in the interest of the nation, was to say the least foolhardy. Any attempt to seize power at this moment, would have ended in disaster for all the persons concerned with the project and for the nation. It could have advanced the date of commencement of the Nigerian Civil War or at least engulfed the tiny Nigerian Army in fratricidal shoot-out which might have destroyed it and possibly the nation. In his biography, Beckoned to Serve, Shagari recounted his encounter with me narrated above.
Why did I risk my life by embarking on nocturnal visits to dangerous venues – soldiers’ and politicians’ residences which were prime targets for coup plotters? In the first place, I did not know then that during the period of the execution of military coup, soldiers do not care a hoot for anybody’s life, friend or foe. Hence, my attempt to visit my former schoolmates’ houses, thinking that the worst that could happen to me was to be placed under house arrest but not killed by them, school-tie connection being even stronger than blood relationship. I was also convinced, that though the Northern army officers were in the habit of glibly talking of staging a military coup to oust the hated politicians; they would have no cause to kill anybody. I had also an inkling at least one of my classmates would have given me a hint of what was afoot. I did not visit officers from other parts of the country simply because I had minimal or no social contact with them. In any case most army officers were then residing in Apapa area which, was too far from Ikoyi for me to visit. My other classmate, Col. Kur Mohammed, who was living there, was not visited by me despite my closeness to him.
The visit to NPC ministers’ houses was undertaken to seek someone to assume executive authority when there was vacuum at the federal level, and since their party was in power, it was only natural that a successor should come from amongst their ranks, even if the change of baton of power was done in accordance with the provision of the 1963 Westminster-type Nigerian Constitution, though the president could as he did, in 1965, refuse to appoint anyone as prime minister.
After my wanderings, I returned home to prepare for the office. When I got to the office at about 9a.m., the place was full of armed soldiers as was the case at all key points, such as the House of Parliament, which was now almost empty as most members who had by now learnt of what was happening did not turn up for the session of the house. Those who did, were turned away by fierce looking soldiers on guard duty at the parliament buildings. From the Ministry of Defence at Marina, I was driven to the residence of the prime minister where amongst other officers, I met Lt Col. (as he then was) Yakubu Gowon in full battle dress leading a convoy of armoured vehicles manned by fierce looking soldiers. We briefly discussed the situation and he assured me that loyal troops would crush the rebellion and flush out the coup plotters and executors. He was as good as his word, at least as far as the Lagos area was concerned. The commissioner of police, Lagos Territory, as well as other top ranking Nigerians (politicians excluded) were also around the prime minister’s residence at King George’s Road, Onikan, and all of us were talking or rather murmuring about the current situation in the country.
From the prime minister’s house, 1 drove to the Police Force Operations Room where 1 met among others the Acting Inspector General of Police, commissioner of police; special branch, commissioner of police; Lagos territory and some senior army officers. A combined task force comprising police, military and civilians was immediately formed to deal with the grave situation. Significantly, the GOC of the army was not present but rumours had it that he had gone to the Ikeja Army Cantonment to alert the troops there and seek their cooperation in crushing the rebellion. He turned up at the Police Headquarters Operations Room a few hours later possibly after 1 p.m. By that time, thanks to the extraordinary efficiency of the police special branch, the Security Task Force had been furnished with the names of important persons, civilians and military, killed throughout the country during the insurrection. Among these were the Premier of the North, Sir Ahmadu Bello, that of the West, Chief Samuel Akintola, Brigadiers Maimalari and Ademulegun, Cols. Kur Muhammed and Shodeinde; Lt. Cols. Largema, Pam and Unegbe, among others. The kidnapped prime minister and minister of finance were also presumed dead, but their bodies were not yet found. The pattern of the killings had confirmed more than anything else, the sectional nature of the coup d’etat
For the majority of those killed were northerners, with a few southern officers known to be favourably disposed to their northern comrade-in-arms.
Later in the day, an attempt was made to assemble ministers for a cabinet meeting but only a few turned up for obvious reasons, fear for their dear lives. Later, some of the senior ministers came to the Police Headquarters and were briefed on the situation. Several became alarmed and refused to turn up for a second meeting at which the then British high commissioner was also in attendance. At that meeting, a request for military assistance was made to the British through their high commissioner who did not commit himself but promised to pass on the request to his home government.
As the reports of more casualties of the insurrection were received in the headquarters and the search for the prime minister’s body continued, the GOC, Ironsi, sought and obtained full authority from the minister of state for the army, on behalf of his cabinet - colleagues to take whatever steps he considered necessary to deal with the rebellion. The letter of authority was drafted by the then secretary to the prime minister and the federal cabinet, S.D. Wey. From that moment, certain manoeuvres and actions on the part of the senior army officers on duty at the Police Headquarters gave one the impression that the government of the federation was being highjacked by the military with the tacit connivance of some politicians and some top government officials. The game of duplicity was too much for people like me, so I decided to take no part in the “negotiations,” or to put it more correctly, in the extraction of consent for the surrender of power to the soldiers at the rump cabinet meeting at which the ministers were said to have “unanimously” agreed to handover power to the general officer commanding the Nigerian Army, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi.