Coups and counter-coups
By the early hours of daybreak, 15 January 1966, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) started broadcasting that there had been a sectional mutiny in Nigeria and that the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh had been killed in Lagos. They also reported that the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Samuel Akintola the Premier of Western Nigeria had been killed by the coup plotters. The army on that night, lost its best officers through the coup and the list included Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, the Commander 2 Brigade; Col. Kur Mohammed, the Army Chief of Staff; Lt-Col. Abogo Largema, Commanding Officer 4 Battalion; Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, Commander 1 Brigade; Col. Shodeinde,
Deputy Commandant of the NDA, Col. James Pam, Adjutant-General of the Army, and Col. Unegbe, QuartermasterGeneral of the Nigerian Army. The news of the killings shocked all officers and men of the Nigerian Army except those who were secretly sympathetic to the coup. How could fellow officers murder their own in cold blood in the guise of taking over from a legitimate government by force? By what justification did any of the officers named as targets fit into the category of people whom they described as swindlers and obstacles to peace and progress in the country? THE DOUBTS ABOUT GENERAL IRONSI
One issue that has agitated the minds of many people was the whereabouts of General Ironsi that night and what role he played, if any, towards suppressing the coup. At about the time Major Okafor and Lt. Igweze were at the gate of Brigadier Maimalari’s house, Mrs Elizabeth Pam, (wife of Lt-Col. James Pam, the Adjutant-General) was frantically telling General Ironsi on telephone that some soldiers led by Major Chukwuka and 2/Lt. Onyefuru were at their house at No. 8 Ikoyi Crescent, knocking on their door trying to get in to kill her husband. She also told Ironsi that there were gunshots at Maimalari’s house which was nearby. Mrs Elizabeth Pam told me that she was amazed at Ironsi’s rather cool reaction to her frantic call. She said Ironsi kept saying, “I see, I see,” and the telephone went silent.
Apologists alleged that General Ironsi was also a target but that he escaped assassination from Major Okafor and found his way to the 2 Battalion, Ikeja to mobilise troops to suppress the coup. However, his alleged escape to Ikeja must be a miracle because at the time in question, the route between Ikoyi and Ikeja was virtually dominated by the coup operators. The authenticity of his “escape” was questionable because soldiers were deployed on both sides of Carter Bridge, the only link between the Island and the Mainland. The soldiers were under instruction to arrest and kill any of the targets on their list. How then did the General materialise in Ikeja? Some claimed that he simply brushed his way through the troops. But it was a fact that there were no skirmishes between the Flagstaff House, No 1 Glover Street, Ikoyi,. his official residence, and Ikeja, that fateful night. Hence, the latter claim could not be credible. One can, therefore, conclude that in all likelihood, the General was not on their list of targets. The very negative reaction of Nzeogwu in Kaduna to news of Ironsi’s “escape” in Lagos confirms this opinion.
At the 2 Battalion Headquarters, the General met with Lt-Col. Hilary Njoku, the former Battalion Commander, who on that day should have been in Kaduna on posting to the NMTC. It was alleged they were mobilising troops to move to Ikoyi to confront the operators of the coup. Martin Adamu who was the Adjutant of the unit got wind of the General Officer Commanding’s presence in the barracks through the troops’ movement and alerted Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon who had moved to Ikeja that night. Gowon’s whereabouts before then was not known to the coup plotters. He too, would have been a target for elimination had they known where he was. Gowon had just returned to the country from the United Kingdom the night before, and he was due to take over command of the 2 Battalion from Lt-Col. Hilary Njoku. He had attended the party in Brigadier Maimalari’s house the previous night but left a little earlier for Ikeja to rest.
Before leaving the party, Gowon paid courtesy to the GOC( General Ironsi, who humorously said, Make sure you enjoy yourself very well tonight because you cannot be sure of what tomorrow will bring.
While General Ironsi’s comment could have been a mere coincidence, Gowon was naturally surprised to hear from Major Adamu, the Adjutant that Ironsi was in the barracks in the early hours of the morning. His immediate reaction was ‘why the General and NOT the Brigadier.’ He joined the General and the officers of the battalion, among who were Lt-Co1. Hilary Njoku, Majors Osuji and Igboba who were said to be mobilising troops to move to Lagos Island to counter the coup. Gowon was yet to take over from Njoku but it turned out that he was the one who eventually moved the troops from Ikeja to Ikoyi after some hours of indecision among the officers.
At last, before 6.00 a.m. on that day 15 January 1966, Nigeria’s first sectional coup had come and gone - a very sad day for Nigeria and a landmark in the course of ethnic discord. It was a day that will be remembered for ever as the longest and darkest in the history of the nation; the day which sowed the seed of tribal sentiments and separatist movements, contrary to what the perpetrators claimed they set out to eradicate.
By the time Gowon got to the Island with the troops, shootings had ceased and all the targets had been eliminated. He was, however, able to link up with Malam Ahmadu Kurfi, Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. Together with Gowon, they went round seeing the families of the victims and later, troops of the Federal Guards, Ikoyi, and Apapa. Kurfi stood out against the coup and fearlessly went with Gowon to all places that early morning. Gowon was also able to coordinate the arrest of some of the officers and men who took part in the coup, especially in the Signals and Transport units in Apapa, through the efforts of Major Murtala Mohammed and others.
THE MORNING OF 15 JANUARY 1966
After completion of assignments by the various groups, they agreed that all parties would rendezvous in the Federal Guards to plan the next action. The first of the dissidents to swagger into the barracks after 9.00 a.m. that morning looking scruffy but confident of himself was 2/Lieutenant Nweke, from a Signal Unit, Apapa. He walked in alone and headed straight to the office of Major Okafor, probably to send back some messages and wait for others to join him. We were surprised at seeing him because he was not an officer of the unit and neither was he accompanied by any of our officers like Ezedigbo or Igweze. I was naturally inclined to talk to him but his countenance surprised me. From then on, I could see that we were heading for a possible showdown. He was left to walk into the office before I ordered for his arrest and confiscation of his rifle. He offered little resistance when being disarmed but he kept looking back as if others were coming behind. We sent him to the guardroom at once and waited for a possible reaction. When I tried to find out about the Federal Guards officers, he told me to wait and see., Soon after, five other junior officers including two captains walked into the barracks, one after the other and we overpowered and disarmed them. What surprised me was the logic of their entering into the barracks in singles and at regular intervals. It was probably because we did not fire to alert anyone so they thought all was as they had anticipated. However, that was to our advantage, as they were unable to offer joint resistance.
The unexpected arrest must have caused communication problem when they were stopped from sending back any situation report from the Federal Guards. At about 9.30 a.m., Lt-Col. Hilary Njoku the former Commanding Officer of the. 2 Battalion and Lt-Col. George Kurubo from the 3 Battalion in Kaduna walked into -the barracks. They had no armed escorts behind them. They were the first senior officers to come into the barracks that morning. I felt happy initially when I. saw them and gave full compliments as expected. I had known Col. Njoku as Commanding Officer, 2 Battalion during a Brigade Exercise in the field code named Belly Ache, near Abeokuta in mid1965. I did not know Col. Kurubo before then. He was actually based in Kaduna but had suddenly and unexpectedly left Kaduna for Lagos in the evening of Friday January 14. I expected to get information from them about what was going on and what to do. They did not tell me their mission or even ask for the Officer Commanding the unit, but I could see they appeared disappointed at seeing the situation in the barracks. The soldiers all looked battle ready as if they had received orders from a different source. Njoku asked me if some officers had been there and I told him that six junior officers had come in but I had disarmed and put them in the guardroom. He asked me if he could see them and I took him to the guardroom. He became upset with what he saw but he did not tell me to release them. The officers looked miserable.
I thought I was going to be commended for my action but I got the opposite. It was as if I had committed a serious offence by disarming and detaining the officers in the guardroom. Obviously disappointed with the situation, they did not waste time in the barracks. But as they started to drive out, they reversed suddenly and Kurubo called me to see him. He then told me to go to Number 2 Park Lane, Apapa, the residence of Col. Kur Mohammed, to offload a double barrel gun which was dangerously lying on the floor. According to him, Mrs Mohammed was weeping and could not listen to them when they visited her. It was clear to me that I did not impress them so I became hesitant to carry out that strange order, which was meant, in all likelihood, to peel me away from my troops. That further complicated my position about the situation, being ignorant about the extent of their involvement in the plot. But that did not put any fear in me. It was obvious to me that they were sympathetic to the coup and having heard that officers like Zakariya Maimalari had been killed, I lost the fear of death as well. Here I was as a subaltern. By 10.00 a.m., I was still on my own without any instruction from any senior officer. I became increasingly curious about their mission but maintained my respect for them as senior officers.
While we wondered what next to expect, we saw a section of soldiers in two Landrovers fully armed approaching the barracks. One of the Land-rovers had of 106mm gun mounted on it. We had no idea who they were and what their mission would be. But I was not moved. I had surrendered my life, come what may. The issue of distributing arms and ammunition to the soldiers at my initiative, and ordering them to shoot to kill if challenged would be enough crime before the coup planners. RSJ Tayo, S/Sgt Daniel Langtang, Sgt. Ali Maiduguri and CI Sani Dabai were the strong men in whom I had a lot confidence. We all resolved to fight if the visitors behaved in a suspicious manner regardless of their 106mm gun. But when we stopped them at the gate to find out who they were, the officer leading the group, a Lieutenant William Godang Walbe, told us that they were there to wait for Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon who was coming behind. I immediately suspected him as he was not wearing any rank on his shoulders. When I challenged him to that effect, he said he forgot to put on his rank on the shirt because he was in a hurry to come out. I asked him why Gowon did not come with them since he was fully armed with a 106mm gun mounted on the Landrover. He replied that Gowon was on his way coming from Ikoyi, where he had gone visiting the families of the officers killed during the night. I listened carefully to his response but I did not know Walbe well enough to trust him. To be sure he was not taking me for a ride, I disarmed him and his men and forced them to squat on the ground with their hands up till Gowon came.