Coups and Counter-coups: General Gowon Visits Dodan Barracks
Gowon came in about twenty minutes later, heavily escorted with troops to link up with Walbe and to see what was happening at Dodan Barracks. When he drove into the barracks, he was surprised to see Walbe and his men under arrest, completely disarmed. He asked me why I disarmed them and I told him that I could not trust the officer because I had not received any orders from my superior officers since morning. I also told him that all the officers of the unit had participated in the coup and that we had arrested and locked up six dissidents in the guardroom but that Lt-Col. Njoku and Lt-Col. Kurubo had come in earlier and left without giving me any instruction. He did not comment about them but simply commended us for our action and wondered how we were able to remain calm and orderly in the face of all the confusion. He too asked me to show him the officers in the guardroom and I took him there. He addressed them briefly saying, Gentlemen, I believe you know why you are here. I am afraid you will remain here until the situation becomes clearer.
Before he left, he told me not to take orders from any officer except those who had clearance from him.
Gowon’s visit boosted our morale since that was the first time we had received encouragement and clear instruction from a senior officer whose loyalty was not with the coup plotters. We were told that things would be better, but that we should remain cautious. For the rest of us from that day up to the 16 January 1966, the barracks remained closed to all officers and men from other units in Lagos except those who had clearance from Gowon. Later in the day, Gowon brought in Chief Fani Kayode, Deputy Premier of Western Region and told me to ensure his safety and comfort as much as I could. He said I should not disclose his presence in the mess to anyone. I did as I was told until the 17th when he was collected by Lt-Col. Banjo who claimed that it was instruction from by Lt-Col Gowon. The Deputy Premier was shaken but he was full of appreciation for his safety in the mess.
THE PASSWORD “BLACK BOY”
The night of January 16 and the early hours of the 17th was a long time for us in the barracks. All through the night, we were under the threat of a possible counter attack by the coup plotters. All this time, I remained the only officer in command of the troops in the barracks. Together with the senior NCOs we planned how to defend ourselves in the barracks in case of an attack. We covered all likely approaches with machine guns, roadblocks and sentries. As the atmosphere of uncertainty even among the soldiers intensified, we tried to restrict the movement and issued a password - “Black Boy”. I thought the response “Boy” was easy enough to remember by all when challenged. Unfortunately, that was to lead to the death of one of our best riflemen, Corporal Sarwuan, an illiterate soldier.
It was about 1.00 a.m. on that fateful morning of 17 January when Corporal Sarwuan was returning from where he had gone to ease himself that he was challenged by RSM Tayo. Seeing a soldier”coming in the dark, Tayo challenged, “Halt. Who goes there?;’ “Friend,” the Corporal replied. “Advance to be recognised.” As Sarwuan advanced forward, Tayo for the third and last time said, “Black.” But Sarwuan kept advancing forward towards him without replying. He had forgotten the password “Boy.” Under the cover of darkness, Tayo could not identify him and concluded the man was an enemy. Without further challenge, Tayo fired a short burst of sub-machine gun at him and he collapsed and died on the spot. The sound of the sub machine gun sent shock waves throughout the barracks that night. We thought we were being attacked by the dissidents and automatically everybody had his rifle cocked ready to fight back. The atmosphere became so charged as we tried to figure out what went wrong. Realising that it was one of our soldiers, Tayo pleaded, “It was a big mistake. It was a mistake.” Indeed, it was a tragedy that night. Cpl. Sarwuan was Tiv by tribe and a good rifleman. The reaction of other Tiv soldiers to Sarwuan’s death became a big problem for me to contend with. They could not believe it was a mistake and threatened to kill Tayo in retaliation. It was indeed one of the most difficult nights for me as I tried all alone to convince difficult characters like Sgts. Adeyongo Nor, Tsav and Yupu Gboko that Tayo’s action was not deliberate but a mistake. I made a passionate appeal to them on behalf of Tayo, telling them that it could have been anyone. I had to keep Tayo in hiding for the rest of the night for tempers to cool down. The situation could have exploded into a free-forall shoot-out that night but it was miraculously averted. We buried Corporal Sarwuan the following morning as the first accidental casualty of the coup from the Federal Guards.
During the tense period of uncertainty from the 15 to 17 January 1966, there was no government in the country and General AguiyiIronsi, the General Officer Commanding the army had not addressed the army, so tension remained high. Although the coup had collapsed, the feeling that the situation could still get worse was on the minds of soldiers throughout the country. In the interim, the only credible voice was that of the Deputy Permanent Secretary, Malam Ahmadu Kurfi. Even the Permanent Secretary, Alhaji Sule Kolo was outside the country. Ironsi meanwhile was in touch with Nzeogwu in Kaduna through telephone conversations over the matter. Nzeogwu was said to have dictated his conditions of surrender to Ironsi before the collapse of the coup. But surely, his authority over the troops he deceived in his Exercise Damisa had eroded. He had no fighting troops under his command to threaten anyone. Therefore what he must have said as a condition for surrender to General Ironsi was an empty threat.
On my part, the decision to authorise the soldiers to take arms and ammunition because all the senior officers of northern origin as well as some from the West had been killed, hardened their resolve to fight whoever were responsible. That too, apparently became a measure of my defence as well as my personal security because I was the only officer available who they could rely on. When they learned that our Officer Commanding was one of the coup leaders that masterminded the killings in Lagos and the other places, their loyalty to Okafor was totally lost and I became the ‘only’ office to rely on. They were ready to fight to protect me.
The other factors that contributed to the frustration and collapse of the coup was the arrest and detention of the young officers early that morning. The 2 Battalion in Ikeja and the Federal Guards in Ikoyi were the only two fighting units in Lagos. They avoided recruiting troops from these units for obvious reasons. Okafor and Ifeajuna knew that no northern soldier would agree under any circumstance to kill the Prime Minister or any of the officers mentioned as targets. It was obvious that they had no contingency plan to sustain their action, judging from their selection of ‘soldiers, being mainly from signals, workshop and transport units in Lagos. As a result, their position was weak immediately after the murders of the night. The 4 Battalion in Ibadan became a no-go area to the perpetrators and suspects when the news of the murder of their Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. Largema, got to the ears of the loyal troops. The situation upcountry was similar. The troops of the 3 Battalion who had just finished the deceitful exercise damisa, immediately turned against Nzeogwu when they learnt of the true meaning of the coup. The principal actors were in disarray and no longer in control of any unit which they used for the operations in Kaduna, Lagos and Ibadan. Further North in Kano, Lt-Col. Ojukwu’s 5 Battalion was not involved, although accounts now publicly available from coup conspirators suggest that he knew more than he let on initially. Nevertheless, he successfully kept his battalion under control as he waited to see who would blink first in the confrontation between Ironsi and Nzeogwu.
In retrospect, with the vacuum in government leadership, the strong resolve of the soldiers of northern origin, and the absence of any contingency plan to sustain ‘ their action”. the loyal army could have reinstalled the government within days of the coup under any senior office from the North or the West or any legitimate civilian politician successor. Immediate action could then have been instituted against the perpetrators.
While the silence and uncertainty continued two days after the coup, manoeuvres were going on among the ministers and politicians under the Senate President, Chief Nwafor Orizu, in Lagos, to find a way forward. At the same time, General Ironsi was said to be in frequent telephone conversation with Major Nzeogwu in Kaduna. Nzeogwu had dictated to Ironsi his terms of surrender in which he demanded for total freedom for all those who took part in the coup and prohibition of all the politicians from returning to office. Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the President of the Federation was at the time of the coup out of the country, supposedly on a health cruise to the Caribbean, even though the State House physician, Dr Idehen, had returned to Nigeria unable to explain the reluctance of the President to return.
In the heat of confusion, a small group consisting of some members of the cabinet among whom were Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dippcharima, the second most senior cabinet minister, Dr. Kingsley Mbadiwe, Alhaji Tanko Galadima, Alhaji Maitama Sule, Dr. Elias, Kam Salem, Haman Maiduguri and Ahmadu of Kurfi met under the chairmanship of Senate Leader, Dr Nwafor Orizu to collect intelligence and plan counter action. General Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Army was also present and he was asked to give report about the situation. He told them that the majority of the army was loyal and that the military will be crushed, Kam Salem, the Inspector-General of Police, suggested that British troops should be invited to come and crush the mutiny but that was discountenanced. When the coup took place, all the federal ministers were in Lagos having attended Federal Budget Meeting. In that circumstance, the Government was intact and could on one hand, function under the control of Senate Leader despite the killing of the Prime Minister and absence of the president from the country. The cabinet, could on the other hand, nominate an acting Prime Minister before fresh elections could be held. There were moves from key members of the cabinet to appoint Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, being the most senior Cabinet member to act as Prime Minister but in a private meeting between the leader of the Senate, Chief Orizu and General Ironsi, they came out with the report that the control of the army could not be restored unless the government was handed over to the army. Orizu agreed and unconstitutionally handed over power to Major-General Ironsi, as Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. The decision was against the views of the Ministers except those who had prior knowledge of the coup. The opposing ministers held that view because General Ironsi had initially told them that what had occurred was only a mutiny. Indeed by 17 January 1966, the “mutiny” had practically collapsed in all the regional capitals and Lagos. There was no active resistance throughout the country except in Kaduna where Nzeogwu was still “bluffing” as if he was in control of troops. All the key coup leaders had either been arrested or gone into hiding. The General knew that all the loyal officers and men in Lagos and other places where the killings took place knew the state of the rebellion. The army therefore, did not have to seize power. But the ministers were presented with a fait accompi and General Aguiyi-Ironsi took over power and became the first Military Head of State of Nigeria.