Why a public policy might work in Nigeria

The median tenure of the 10 federal administrations we had in Nigeria between the first military rule in 1966 and the last in 1999 approximates to three years. That is significantly less than the four years for a single term for a government under our subsisting, U.S.styled constitutional democracy. The rapid successions of government was a recipe for failed policies. There was hardly enough time to implement good policies, and a new government always felt compelled to jettison existing policies.

But in those 33 years, General Yakubu Gowon was head of state for nine years. His administration remains the golden era of infrastructural development in Nigeria. He built roads, bridges, airports, hospitals, schools and so much more, like he was taking vengeance against the lack of these infrastructures. He had five years to implement his post-civil war policies including the “3R” (Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) programme. Despite the deep fissures at the end of the civil war in 1970, the programme remains the best efforts by any government at national integration.

The available time to implement is perhaps the strongest determinant of policy success. In 2001, the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo implemented a policy that auctioned mobile telecom licences for the provision of GSM network services. One might easily forget that the provision of mobile telephony and the liberalisation of the telecom industry started before Obasanjo's presidency. He came into office two years after General Sani Abacha introduced the CDMA in 1997. (In fact, Abacha died in office one year after the introduction of his telecom reform effort). Two years after General Ibrahim Babangida introduced the TACS (090 numbers) in 1991, he had to “step aside” from office. However, there was over six years' grace of time for President Obasanjo to govern his mobile policy. Like Gowon's bridges, it has been impossible to annul the mobile revolution in Nigeria that began in 2001; rather, the country has been building on the initial successes. There are now almost as many mobile phones in Nigeria as the population.

One of the most controversial market policies in Nigeria's history was the banking industry consolidation of the Professor Charles Soludo's Central Bank of Nigeria. It started in 2004, and by the time the first phase concluded in December 2005, not only was the number of Nigerian banks reduced from 89 to 25, only one of the surviving banks was “northern,” and it was the weakest. But the policy also ranks very high up amongst the most successful market reforms in the country. Twelve years since the policy, the capital base of any one of the country's tier 1 banks is larger than that of the entire banking industry in 2004, although the history of banking in Nigeria was over a century old at that time.

The banking industry consolidation, which has provided Nigerian banks the capital shield to withstand the ravages of two major crises to date, would have stood no chance of survival had President Obasanjo not remained in power long enough to preserve it. Three years of its implementation by the administration that started it prevented its derailment, with Soludo's tenure as CBN governor also outlasting Obasanjo's government by two years. The geopolitical imbalance of the 25 banks, though not pre-programmed, would have been a powerful reason to supplant it with political correctness. The Contributory Pension Scheme, which has produced outstanding successes industry stakeholders celebrate today, also started early enough in the second term of President Obasanjo in 2004. Probable disruption to the implementation of the reform before it could take root was thus forestalled.

Time is a precious commodity for a government as it is for an individual and a business. Obasanjo was not invincible. He took advantage of time to deliver three of the few outstanding public policy successes the country has known. Where he failed on timely implementation, his policies met a grievous disruption or end. The Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) of 2005 was an effort at repairing a vehicle where it broke down because of time pressure. Nevertheless, President Musa Yar'Adua suspended funding for the associated National Integrated Power Project for two years when he succeeded Obasanjo in 2007. The privatisation of the state-owned refineries at the 11th hour by Obasanjo was also reversed by Yar'Adua.

Time has practically ran out for President Muhammadu Buhari to make any great imprint on the policy landscape. Except he secures second term in 2019, his policies would soon be forgotten afterward. His trifling with time value made him dilly-dally on appointing his ministers and nit-pick on passing his own budget. Unfortunately, anti-corruption is not a policy. Even if argued to be, and President Buhari starts an unbiased anti-corruption now, the politics of 2019 – which has already kicked in – would soon have his hands tied to his back, except he takes a stand today that he will not seek a second term.

But the caution is this. Although time makes itself available to everyone, not all of us are able to avail ourselves of the opportunity to optimize it and achieve. Some just abuse time. “President” Ibrahim Babangida was head of state for a disproportionate eight out of the thirty-three years of our largely chequered military dictatorships. His genius in those years was that he ran the transition to a democratic system in circles, and while at it he named himself the “evil genius” and gladly accepted the moniker of “Maradona.”

In the context of the iron-clad maximum two presidential terms of four years each, it is important for a president to strategize on how to optimise his time in office. Eight years can be a twinkling of an eye. And it just doesn't work out in real life anywhere that government is a continuum. To overcome the limitation of time for presidential performance, two recommendations here can be helpful. One, a president should waste no time to enunciate the policies that are important to him or her and the country on assumption of office. Two, the first point is made possible only if such policies were advanced cogently during the campaign season.

One of the reasons I remain sceptical of President Goodluck Jonathan's national conference of 2014 is because he didn't convene it early enough in his administration in order to be able to implement its recommendations. The electorate didn't fall for the gambit that he will implement the recommendations when re-elected. Those who make sub-optimal use of time always ask for more time.