Coup and Counter-coups: Pressure Mounts On Ironsi To Act
The fate of the country was in the balance and pressures were mounting on Ironsi to act against the mutineers
The pressure to take action against the coup plotters was amplified by sections of the media through public condemnation in the daily newspapers especially The New Nigerian, published in Kaduna. In its publication of 3 June 1966, under-the caption: ‘Bring the guilty ones to book,’ the highly respected Sultan of Sokoto, His Eminence, Sir Abubakar 111, had to appeal to the public for calm. That exemplified the level to which the situation in the country had deteriorated. Feeling very uneasy with the situation in the country, General Ironsi, on a day visit to Kano on 22 July was quoted as saying:
It is a shame if we cannot live together in peace.
The pressure against the Government was high and from then on, it was only a matter of time. Then came July 28 when he summoned twenty-four traditional rulers to assemble in Ibadan to discuss burning issues on national unity and the way forward. He appealed to the traditional rulers for support to help calm their subjects for the country to move forward. But the burning issue, which was the fate of the coup plotters, had not been resolved. He could not get the cooperation needed without attending positively to the injustices of the January coup. Sadly, coups beget coups and his presence in Ibadan presented a golden opportunity to topple his government. All officers of northern origin saw it as a retaliation of the 15 January 1966 Coup which was unfortunately perceived as an Igbo affair. Unfortunately, General Ironsi lost his life for what he probably did not initiate.
It was the counter-coup that put the nation’s fate on balance - to remain one or break up. The issue of who would takeover from Ironsi was not relevant at that moment as some officers like Murtala Muhammed had suggested a break-up of the federation. This was in line with c1amour by demonstrators in the North chanting “Araba,” the Hausa word for “Let’s part or separte.” But soon after Iron’s Government had been decisively overthrown, pressure was mounted on the leaders not to allow the country to break up.
I recall what happened that night in the Federal Guards. Our task was to seize all key installations on the Island including Carter Bridge, the only link between the Island and the Mainland. There was no order to kill any officer or soldier except for those who might appear hostile to us. There was no primary intention as far as I know, to make the coup bloody. However, as the H-hour approached, I did not see Captain Garba, as we had planned. (H-hour simply means the time to start the operation). I rang him to find out what was holding him back and he replied in a shaky voice that we had to be careful. He said,
You know we are the only two officers on the Island and if anything goes wrong, they will come and kill us here.
I was surprised at hearing that and replied,
You are a coward, we have been told what to do. We are not going to kill.
I dropped the telephone on him and picked up my submachine gun and drove out in my small car to go and meet him in his residence. An Igbo officer, Captain Asoya was next door to me but of course he was not a target. It was possible he was aware when I drove out.
Halfway there, I was stopped by Lt-Col. Murtala Mohammed, the coup strongman, coming from the direction I was going, in a Landrover with armed soldiers behind him. He was surprised to see me alone in my small car and asked where I was going. He thought I was trying to run away and hide somewhere. He appeared to be in a hurry. I told him that I had not seen my colleague and I was going to get him out so that we could get on with our assignment. On hearing that Garba was still in his house, Murtala became furious and shouted, Tell him I will break his neck if he is afraid.
He continued in the direction of the barracks.
I got to the house and found my friend nervously preparing to come out.
We got to the barracks a little later than planned. However, when we got to the barracks, Joe lost his nervousness and took control of the operation with an unexpected degree of precision. The soldiers were absolutely loyal to us and were ready to do what we told them. In order not to create panic and anxiety that night, we appointed a tough Sgt. called Bonlap to lead a section of soldiers to visit and invite all Igbo soldiers one after the other to the office. Our aim was to prevent any possible shoot-out by some estranged soldiers who might do something that could aggravate the situation. When they realised that they were the only group being assembled, they became jittery. We calmed them by assuring them that nothing would happen to any of them. It was not a pleasant task but the situation demands that it should be done that way. The soldiers involved numbered about twentyone altogether. We completed our task successfully without a single shot fired. Most importantly, no Igbo soldier was killed in Dodan Barracks throughout the period. It was a delicate operation that required that we give due respect to our Igbo or minority group soldiers who though felt restless, remained calm and orderly; they accepted our assurances. The situation was quite delicate and could have turned nasty had any one reacted otherwise. The army was going through a difficult time because we had lost the esprit de corps. The Igbo soldiers, though restless, remained calm and took our advice. Our handling of the situation in the Federal Guards paid off but elsewhere in Lagos, things did not go as well.
The 2 Battalion at Ikeja exploded and many soldiers were killed in the barracks. Many Igbo officers and men who felt unsafe escaped and some of them took refuge with us in the Federal Guards on learning that there was no killing in Dodan Barracks. There were as many as 30 soldiers from the 2 Battalion and other units in Lagos who came over into the Federal Guards and we accommodated them. Even some of the soldiers who were most vocal for retaliation before July 29 became friendly to their Igbo colleagues in the barracks throughout the trying time. Major Ochei, the Officer Commanding Federal Guards, was safe and no attempt was made against his life. Garba and I visited him at his No. 5 George Street, Ikoyi residence the following morning and assured him of his safety.
The coups of January and July 1966 heightened ethnic difference and mistrust, especially between the East and the North. While the Igbos cried for mass killings of their kinsmen in the North and Lagos, the Northern people claimed there was mass slaughter of their people in the East and accused the Igbos of starting the trouble by the murder of their political and military leaders in cold blood. The coup of July 29 led to a mass exodus of officers and men of Igbo origin from the Nigerian Army to Enugu to form what was called the Eastern Area Command of the Nigerian Army. No wonder then that those soldiers who left us and eventually metamorphosed into Biafran soldiers continued to hold us in high regard after the civil war for our maturity in saving their lives during the July 29, 1966 countercoup.
JOE GARBA, OC FEDERAL GUARDS
After Major Ochei left for the East, Capt. Joe Garba took over command of the unit with me as second-in-command. We had developed excellent understanding between ourselves and together we set out to make the Federal Guards a better unit. We later received new officers posted in from other units to bring the Federal Guards to battalion strength. Among them were Samson Tomoye, Oladayo Popoola, Alexander Panox, Akpokabayen and Bassey. They were all lieutenants.
BLACK SCORPION AS A MASCOT OF THE FEDERAL GUARDS
One morning, Garba and I discussed the events that took place when he was in Kashmir and how we in the Federal Guards managed to go through the difficult days of the coup without a senior officer giving us direction. We talked about the way and manner the coup leaders planned to use the Federal Guards as a rendezvous after the night killings and how our alertness and prompt action thwarted their plan. We talked about our courage in the face of the unknown and the successes we achieved before the situation returned to normal. We then decided to adopt a mascot for the Federal Guards to commemorate the bravery of the officers and men for being resolute against the 15 January 1966 coup and subsequently before taking decision, we invited RSM Tayo to join us in the discussion. Tayo and I worked hand in hand from the time he led soldiers to my residence, early that morning of 15 January 1966 to the time the situation returned to normal. He spoke about the inspirations which he said I gave them in the face of uncertainty and described me as a scorpion against an elephant, sighting a few examples of my actions. Tayo said my decision to take charge of the situation that night, in the absence of the Officer Commanding the Federal Guards and giving authority to soldiers to resist the coup, saved the situation. This in the long run led to the collapse of the coup in Lagos. He spoke appreciatively about my encounter with Lt-Cols. Njoku and Kurubo on the officers that were arrested, disarmed and locked up in the guardroom, as well as the detention’ of Lt. Walbe and his men despite their superior weaponry. Finally, Tayo spoke about how I saved his life from Sgt. Adeyongo Nor and Cpl. Yupu Gboko after the shooting of Cpl. Sarwuan who was shot because he forgot the password on the night of January 16, 1966. After thorough review of the events, Garba agreed that our conduct of the operations exemplified bravery and self-sacrifice in defiance of the coup. Garba was a very innovative officer who had great ideas for the future of the Federal Guards in the Nigerian Army.
We talked about risks, guts, loyalty, wisdom and heroism, all in relation to what we wanted the Federal Guards to be known for. “We acted manfully”, we thought, and thus finally decided that it was most appropriate to adopt a black scorpion as a mascot. That was how the scorpion came about as a mascot for the Federal Guards which metamorphosed into Brigade of Guards till date.
In order to actualise our thoughts, we decided that I should proceed to London along with a sample drawing of a Black Scorpion. I went to the military uniform designers, Hobson and Sons Ltd, with instructions that it be inscribed on stable belts which we had also designed to be ‘Green, Red, Green’ in striped colours. I met Mr. Christopher Brown, the Chief Executive, who welcomed me warmly and was happy to satisfy my needs as quickly as possible. We asked the Hobson and Sons Limited, to produce 3000\webbelts, a few thousand shoulder flashes and plumes, all in the new colour, Green Red Green, for the soldiers of the Federal Guards. We took into account possible future increases in strength of the unit, hence the number 3000. The belts, shoulder flashes and plumes arrived in good time and every soldier felt a sense of pride to be seen in the new outfit. It was colourful and distinct. Subsequent commanders who came after us embraced the fine tradition which has lived on till date. It is also good to note that the legacy of loyalty, courage and heroism of the author and men of the Federal Guards on that fateful day of the 15 January 1966 Coup has lived on to date and in the annals of the history of the Brigade of Guards, Nigerian Army.
To be continued next week