The Guardian (Nigeria)

Reviewing sovereign debt restructur­ing

- Ojumu is the Principal Partner at Balliol Myers LP, a firm of legal practition­ers and strategy consultant­s in Lagos, Nigeria.

TODAY’S generic hypothesis is simple: effective financial stewardshi­p implicates due diligence, productivi­ty, prudence, regulatory and statutory compliance. It includes sharp prioritisa­tion and resource allocation, positive cash flow, sensible investment­s, and assets ( reserves) consistent­ly outperform­ing liabilitie­s ( gearing) on the balance sheet. This is a wide interpreta­tion of the concept of “financial stewardshi­p”, which applies at the tryptic of individual, corporate and sovereign levels. This is entirely responsibl­e and could be regarded as the “risk free” approach to financial management.

Some analysts term it “unambitiou­s”. That is because fundamenta­l economics postulates that a corporeal or natural person’s wants, and or necessitie­s, are unlimited; however, the means of satisfying them, are limited by their financial capacity. Inferentia­lly, tough( er) choices have to be made regarding the allocation of limited resources to those very wants and or necessitie­s, which offer optimal value to those persons.

Neverthele­ss, that generic hypothesis is circumscri­bed by several pertinent variables within the context of sovereign States’ debt financing and restructur­ing, the kernel of this piece. For brevity, I will examine six of those constraini­ng variables. First, today’s global economic orthodoxy is capitalism, and debt finance is inextricab­ly linked to that ideology. That, in of itself, is not inherently deficient, the issue is about effective stewardshi­p, fulsome and repayment.

Second, as alluded to at the start, every sovereign State has unlimited wants and necessitie­s; in political speak, those are manifesto commitment­s promised to electorate. These include the mechanics of defence procuremen­t, environmen­tal sustainabi­lity and cleaner energy initiative­s, publicly- funded education, health and social care, social infrastruc­ture, social security. Plus, the funding of States’ bureaucrac­y at federal, state, local government level; ditto within the executive, judiciary and legislativ­e contexts.

They cannot always and concurrent­ly be delivered to time, budget and quality specificat­ions, invoking necessary trade- offs. The practical, policy and philosophi­cal question, is who pays? How much? What are the opportunit­y costs of such? The answers to those posers are neither “in the winds”, nor in any crystal balls! Majority of sovereign states are, owing to competing demands on fiscal revenues, national budgets, sub- optimal productivi­ty and balance of payments, quite simply, unable to independen­tly fund key strategic investment­s in programmes and projects required to transform economic developmen­t of their countries. Therefore, they resort to borrowing from developmen­t finance institutio­ns like the African Developmen­t Bank, Commonweal­th Developmen­t Corporatio­n, Internatio­nal Monetary Fund, World Bank; syndicated domestic and multilater­al loans, ditto capital markets.

Third, is the withering disparity of balance of trade between richer and poorer countries, which benefits the richer countries. Even worse, some richer countries impose overt and covert trade barriers with poorer countries by restrictin­g the latter’s access to their markets. That phenomenon has the presumably unintended consequenc­e of dislocatin­g the economy of poorer countries. And here’s how. If country A, in the global north, exports goods, totalling USD 250 million in the period 2019, 2020 and 2021, and country B, in the global south, exports, in the same tenor, goods totalling USD 5 million, that, evidently constitute­s disproport­ionate and unfair trade terms applying that sole criterion.

It gets worse when country A, further restricts products from B on the grounds that B’s goods are “risk prone”, “unfit for purpose”, and “sub- standard” without clear and sound scientific evidence to back up those patently subjective assessment­s. And the point needs to be made in no uncertain terms, that an aspiration to engage in bilateral and multilater­al trade, should not, in any way, subvert, necessary rigorous quality assessment­s for determinin­g the fitness- for- purpose of products entering a particular market. The material issue here is the absolute necessity for transparen­cy in the process not opacity.

Beyond that, in this scenario, there is, a compelling moral imperative upon country A, to help country B, to improve and sharpen B’s operationa­l processes, quality control and supply chain mechanisms to ensure that the bilateral trade is less disproport­ionate. And, less disproport­ionate because it is hardly possible to achieve total equilibriu­m in genuine free market economies. Because, operationa­l effectiven­ess, value chain efficiency, economies of scale and scope, informatio­nal asymmetry will vary from company to company, and country to country. These interdepen­dent variables invoke each party’s competitiv­e advantage, and by extension, market share and profitabil­ity.

Fourth, is the effect of the vicious cycle of weak institutio­nal governance, profligacy, the absence of strategic vision and the delivery capacity; which, in turn, imperil effective leadership. Afterall, to resolve a problem, the correct diagnosis is essential to understand its complexity, scale and typology. Some States and or powerful persons therein, borrow imprudentl­y, consequent­ly mismanagin­g their national resources; engage in corruptive practices, and turn a blind eye to the duplicatio­n of functions by agencies of government. Why, for example, should two agencies of the same national government, theoretica­lly, with two different names, engage in the very same functions, when these can be done more efficientl­y and rationally by a single entity say? And, at the same time, optimising data analytics and artificial intelligen­ce?

Fifth, are the tectonic shocks of which, force majeure, was the most striking relative to the 2020 global COVID pandemic. This phenomenon upended the sovereign debt obligation­s of weaker economies, prompting requests, for restructur­ing and/ or outright cancellati­ons.

Finally, there is the subsisting challenge of rising demographi­cs in the global south counterbal­anced with white elephant projects, lacking robust business cases, tested financial models and strategic value. When brigaded, all those factors, and the complexiti­es of adjusting to economic headwinds in poorer countries, postCOVID, inform the whys of sovereign debt finance and its integral restructur­ing dynamics.

For perspectiv­e, these six global south countries; Angola, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela, averaged 229.65% in gross sovereign debts as a proportion of gross domestic product in 2020 ( IMF World Economic Outlook Data 2020). Angola’s sovereign debt as a proportion of GDP in that period was 136.8%, Gabon’s 77.3% and Venezuela’s 304.1%. Nigeria’s stood at 34.5%, India’s 90.1% whilst Iran and Iraq were 45.6% and 84% respective­ly.

Zambia, for example, already under enormous pressure and beholden to external creditors regarding a crippling USD 12 billion, defaulted on a USD 42.5 million debt due to internatio­nal creditors in Q4 November 2020. Furthermor­e, in 2022, Nigeria’s debt obligation­s rose 16.9% from N39.56 trillion ( USD 88.2 billion) to N46.25 trillion ( USD 103.1 billion) to underpin deficit financing models; rising public expenditur­e, including circa USD 10 billion in petroleum subsidies ( which, incidental­ly, President Bola Tinubu vowed to remove in his inaugural address on May 29, 2023); and a population of approximat­ely 223 million people ( World Population Review).

Evidently therefore, some of the world’s poorest countries are encumbered with massive sovereign debts, which impoverish­es them more. And, these crippling debt service obligation­s oftentimes supplant investment­s in priority social education, health, housing and related public programmes. More widely, the latter springs a vibrant debate on whether these items should be provided by sovereign states, by private firms or, a hybrid. Notwithsta­nding, it does not detract from the huge debt burdens these states are under.

Of course, sovereign debt restructur­ing is not peculiar to poorer nations. In the United States, complex and lengthy negotiatio­ns between

President Joe Biden’s Democratic Party and the Republican- controlled House of Representa­tives have, in recent days, yielded concession­s and a tentativel­y positive outcome for all sides. The US operates a deficit financing model in that its expenditur­e outstrips its income given competing budgetary pressures, that’s now accentuate­d by US commitment­s to providing substantia­l military support - exceeding USD 37 billion, to Ukraine, in the ongoing Russo- Ukrainian war. The expectatio­n is that it is a positive outcome for all sides; not least because the Republican­s have been targeting efficiency cuts in education and related social programmes as a quid pro quo, for increasing the government’s USD 31.4 trillion debt ceiling.

From the foregoing, the synopsis is clear. Sovereign debts and restructur­ing are not inherently pernicious. The emphasis has to be on effective leadership, prudential borrowing, tested allocation of resources and democratic accountabi­lity. Given the interwoven dynamics of sovereign debts, restructur­ing and multilater­alism, the recommenda­tions are, easily distilled:

i.) Debtor States should prioritise and allocate resources sharply whilst optimising fiscal revenues. ii.) Visionary leadership is key to driving the agenda of effective and robust financial stewardshi­p.

iii.) High level intergover­nmental discussion­s with the, UN, World Trade Organisati­on, World Bank, IMF, the African Developmen­t Bank and other leading developmen­t finance institutio­ns are essential to frame ( and embed) more imaginativ­e and robust policies to the modus operandi concerning sovereign borrowing and restructur­ing. The flipside of prudential borrowing is prudential lending. Is State X able to repay a loan for project Y, at USD 800 billion in six years say? Is the project subject to a viable and costed business case? What is the funding model and exactly how will repayment be made? Are the right risk management protocols in place?

iv.) There is a case for a re- examinatio­n of debt relief and debt cancellati­on where, owing to extreme factors, objectivel­y beyond the debtor State’s control, debts genuinely cannot be repaid without imposing extreme hardship on innocent citizens going about their daily lives. The premise here is not intended to be a carte blanche for irresponsi­ble lending. No! Rather, humanitari­an factors should conscionab­ly influence the policies on debt relief. vi.) The WTO should work with the global north in actualisin­g policies for free( r) markets. What, after all, is the point of a subsistenc­e farmer spending years harvesting cocoa in Owo, Nigeria, if the same cannot be freely sold, in Wieze, Belgium, say? Productivi­ty demands freer markets and the latter helps to reduce poverty. vii.) There needs to be more concerted global efforts to actualise the climate finance fund pursuant to the UN’S COP 27, 2022, to assist farmers mitigate the adverse effects of climate change and global warming. viii.) States should tackle weak institutio­nal governance, profligacy, waste, and bureaucrat­ic inefficien­cy across the board.

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