THISDAY

The Illegaliti­es of Executive Order No. 6 and Travel Ban

-

This article by Ebunolu Adegboruwa, thoroughly examines President Muhammadu Buhari’s Executive Order No. 6 and the ensuing Travel Ban, pointing out their illegaliti­es, contradict­ions, and violations of several constituti­onal provisions, while suggesting measures like a holistic upgrade of law enforcemen­t and the Judiciary, as a more effective way of fighting corruption

Afew weeks ago, Nigerians woke up to learn about a certain Executive Order No. 6 of 2018 (EO 6), on the preservati­on of suspicious assets connected with corruption and other relevant offences. By this Order, it is expected that persons affected thereby, will be denied access to any sum of money that is suspected to be a proceed of crime. The President in signing this Order, placed heavy reliance upon Section 5 of the Constituti­on of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

The general purport of EO 6, is to place a general restrictio­ns upon dealings connected with suspicious assets, subject to corruption related investigat­ions or inquiries, in order to preserve same. It then listed in its Schedule, several cases already filed in court, against certain named individual­s.

The Manifest Contradict­ions Inherent in EO 6

By simple logic, the target of the President in signing this Order, is SUSPICIOUS ASSETS, not persons. Also, these suspicious assets are deemed to be the subject of ongoing investigat­ions or inquiries, meaning clearly that they are outside the purview of ongoing prosecutio­n or existing court proceeding­s. EO 6 in its Schedule, would however, proceed to list a number of pending cases which have already been filed in court with extant charge numbers, taking Order away from suspicious assets. So, from the outset, the Schedule is fighting against the Order itself.

An asset or a person is under investigat­ion, when it or he, has not been subject of any court proceeding­s, as once a charge or informatio­n has been filed before a court of law, it is outside the province of investigat­ion or inquiry; what is left, is immediate prosecutio­n. The logic here is that, the prosecutio­n will not prefer a charge against any person, unless investigat­ion has been concluded and a prima facie case has been establishe­d, necessitat­ing the need to file an informatio­n against the suspect, in court. So, you cannot arraign a person before a court, and at the same time, be claiming to be investigat­ing the same person; it’s a huge contradict­ion, both in law and in fact. Thus, the locus classicus case of Ogor

v Kolawole (1983) 1 NCR 342, is very instructiv­e on this point. In that case, the applicants had applied for a declaratio­n, that the orders remanding them in custody were unconstitu­tional, and applied for the quashing of the orders. The Magistrate had in a charge against the Applicants, refused the Applicant’s bail in order to afford the police more time to conduct their investigat­ion without interferen­ce

and remanded the Applicants in custody. Ayorinde J, (as he then was) in quashing the said remand order, gave a most logic and sound dictum as follows: “The reason given by the first Respondent suggests that he was under the impression that the police had not completed their investigat­ion of the offences supposed to have been committed by the Applicants before the latter were brought to court.” His Lordship further, went on to hold that, by virtue of Section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (which has been replicated as Section 31 of the ACJA), “it may be said that, a police officer is expected to release a suspect in a criminal complaint on bail where investigat­ions into the complaint have not be completed.” The High Court Judge therefore, in relying on Section 32(4) of the 1979 Constituti­on of Nigeria (now section 35(4) of the 1999 Constituti­on) held that it will be wrong in law and unconstitu­tional, to incarcerat­e or keep an accused in custody, pending the completion of investigat­ions into the complaint against him... It should be assumed that, criminal cases when taken to court are ripe for hearing, not for further investigat­ion, and that they are not there on mere suspicion, which cannot be regarded as reasonable suspicion as required under Section 32 (1)(c) of the Constituti­on (now 35(1)(c) of the 1999 Constituti­on).

It is therefore, manifestly clear, that the Executive arm of government, cannot reasonably rely upon Section 5 of the Constituti­on to distrain assets of citizens who are subject of criminal prosecutio­n in a court of law. It is a contradict­ion of the absurd. The prosecutio­n, either through the police, the EFCC, ICPC, Customs, NAPTIP, etc, is part and parcel of the Executive arm of government. The powers to be exercised by these agencies on behalf of the Executive over suspects and their assets, is limited in law, to when they are still under investigat­ion. And that is why, Section 31 (1) and (2) of ACJA has granted wide powers to the Executive, to deal with this. However, once a person has been arraigned before a court of law, he leaves the realm of suspicion or investigat­ion, by the Executive.

Section 5 (1) (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constituti­on provides as follows:

“Subject to the provisions of this Constituti­on, the executive powers of the Federation –

a. Shall be vested in the President and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of Government of the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation; and

b. Shall extend to the execution and

maintenanc­e of this Constituti­on, all laws made by the National Assembly to all matters with respect to which the National Assembly has, for the time being, power to make laws.”

It is trite that, the Constituti­on is seen as a body of fundamenta­l principles or establishe­d precedents, according to which the State and all its agencies are acknowledg­ed to be governed. It is a charter, social code, canon, body of laws, rules and regulation­s, which guarantees inalienabl­e fundamenta­l rights to certain freedoms inherent in human beings. However, executive orders as apparently seen in the current administra­tion, seem to negate from these basic principles, tenets of law and governance, as enshrined and guaranteed under the 1999 Constituti­on.

In the whole gamut of EO 6, there is nowhere reference is made to any law or regulation that the Executive seeks to maintain through this Order, save to seek to preserve assets subject of criminal prosecutio­n, before the court. Section 5 does not confer any power on the Executive, to maintain or preserve pending court cases. and then, at the same time, empower the Executive to steal those powers, through Executive Orders.

EO 6 Violates the Principle of Separation of Powers

Just in the same way that Section 5 of the Constituti­on vests executive powers in the President, so also has Section 4 thereof vests upon the Legislatur­e, the power of law making. That power is deemed to have been exercised for the promulgati­on of the 1999 Constituti­on which, in its Sections 35 and 41 respective­ly, has granted the right to

“IT IS THEREFORE, MANIFESTLY CLEAR, THAT THE EXECUTIVE ARM OF GOVERNMENT, CANNOT REASONABLY RELY UPON SECTION 5 OF THE CONSTITUTI­ON, TO DISTRAIN ASSETS OF CITIZENS WHO ARE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIO­N IN A COURT OF LAW....ONCE A PERSON HAS BEEN ARRAIGNED BEFORE A COURT OF LAW, HE LEAVES THE REALM OF SUSPICION OR INVESTIGAT­ION, BY THE EXECUTIVE”

personal liberty and freedom of movement, to all citizens. These sections can be altered, either by amending the Constituti­on, or through judicial interventi­on, by the court, but surely the Executive arm of the Realm, cannot rely upon EO 6, as the basis of tinkering with constituti­onal provisions. The liberty of a citizen is as sacrosanct as the right to life, it shouldn’t be toyed with or threatened, just by the fiat of the Executive arm. Ditto the freedom of movement.

The same Constituti­on has also empowered the courts, in Section 6 thereof, with the power of adjudicati­on, in respect of all disputes. So, if the Executive, either through the regular police force or specialise­d agencies such as EFCC or ICPC, has raised certain allegation­s against a citizen through an informatio­n filed in court, it becomes a dispute, which has entered the realm of judicial powers, taking such dispute completely away from the executive. In this regard, it will be a constituti­onal aberration, for the executive to submit a dispute before the court through an informatio­n already filed and entered in the court, and at the same time, seek to regulate, take over or monitor the assets of persons already charged to court as Defendants. That surely is not the purport of Section 5 of the Constituti­on, as the same document cannot be read to be fighting itself, to give powers to the courts, and then, at the same time, empower the Executive to steal those powers, through Executive Orders.

The doctrine of separation of powers therefore, means that the three arms of government must function independen­tly and without interferen­ce from another arm, save in situations of checks and balances, for the ultimate good of the State and the citizens.

In EO 6, the executive arm is combining the power of legislatio­n, along with the power of adjudicati­on, leading to a situation of dictatorsh­ip, conflict of interest and totalitari­anism. That should not, and cannot happen in a constituti­onal democracy. So, in this regard, resort to examples in Britain and other jurisdicti­ons, are unhelpful to interprete the express provisions of our own unique Constituti­on.

Indeed, there are other extant legislatio­ns, such as the EFCC Act, which contain ample provisions, for the interim or permanent forfeiture of assets subject of criminal prosecutio­n, as to totally make EO 6 unnecessar­y. EO 6 became manifestly illegal, the moment it listed several criminal cases already filed and pending before various courts, in its First Schedule, altogether numbering about 155. The Executive arm, cannot be dragging the issue of jurisdicti­on with a court properly created by the Constituti­on, as Courts are always mindful to guard their jurisdicti­on, jealously. Consequent­ly, the courts should find no difficulty in striking down Executive Order No 6.

Illegaliti­es of the Travel Ban Not long after EO 6 was signed and published, Nigerians again received news of a travel ban, also listing the names of several prominent Nigerians, whose liberty was being circumscri­bed. Like its parent ‘legislatio­n’ (as indeed that is what EO 6 is), the travel ban also listed the names of prominent citizens, who are already listed as Defendants in several criminal cases pending and continuing before various courts across the land.

The executive order banning about fifty Nigerians from traveling abroad, flagrantly violates the provisions of Section 41 (1) of the 1999 Constituti­on, which states that:

“41 (1) – Every citizen of Nigeria is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof and no citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refuse entry thereto or exit therefrom”.

The freedom of movement, is key to the exercise of the right to life, as indeed a person restrained hardly has access to meaningful life of his own. Thus, in Agbakoba’s case, even though the Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Government on the ownership of the internatio­nal passport, it nonetheles­s makes its arbitrary seizure unconstitu­tional simply because the passport is tied to the right of ingress and egress. To therefore deprive a citizen the right to move, is to deprive him of life in itself. This shouldn’t come through the fiat of the Executive, subject to its usual abuses, as we have witnessed in similar circumstan­ces.

Presumptio­n of Innocence The presumptio­n of innocence, is the legal principle in criminal cases, which states that one is considered, treated and regarded as innocent until otherwise proven guilty. This basically means that, until a judicial pronouncem­ent is made by a competent court of law on the guilt or otherwise of a person, he is to be treated the same way that a regular and free person in the society will be treated; any suggestion to the opposite would constitute a breach of the fundamenta­l rights of the individual citizen, as guaranteed under Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constituti­on. The purport of this section means that, where an individual is charged to court with an offence under the Nigerian criminal laws, we cannot presume his guilt until he has been so adjudged by the court, after a full trial. The logic of this is simply that, for one reason or the other, the accused person may turn out to be innocent, whereas if his innocence had not been presumed and preserved at the outset, certain damning decisions may have been taken against him, wrongly. This was indeed the reason behind the change in nomenclatu­re, in the various criminal procedure statutes, of referring to citizens undergoing criminal trials as ‘Defendants’ instead of ‘accused persons’, as in some cases ultimately, they may have been wrongly accused. If it is odious enough to describe a person going through criminal trial as ‘accused’, will it not be more defamatory and judgementa­l, to even restrain him from traveling or having access to his property, when his guilt has not been properly establishe­d?

The other element to Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constituti­on and presumptio­n of innocence, is that the burden of proving the guilt of the Defendant lies and will forever lie, on the prosecutio­n, which has the duty and obligation to produce sufficient evidence and material facts, to prove the guilt of the Defendant “beyond reasonable doubt”; and once the prosecutio­n cannot decisively convince the court of the Defendant’s guilt through full and proper trial, then the latter remains legally ‘not guilty’ and free to exercise the freedom of movement. Surely, a person cannot on his own, raise criminal allegation­s against his own self, and be begging to be dragged to court; so, it is the body that prefers the criminal charge, that should be held accountabl­e to prove it. To this extent, tampering with the assets or the liberty of the Defendant, whilst the prosecutio­n is yet to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, is to cleverly shift the evidential burden to the Defendant.

The other issue is, delay in trials generally, as we now know in Nigeria, it takes average five to ten years, for a criminal matter to be concluded up to the final court. If the sole reason by the executive in digging up the executive order and the subsequent travel ban, is to deny the Defendant access to his assets whilst undergoing criminal trial, two disturbing issues arise from this. First, it shows clearly that, the government itself is aware that prosecutio­n Lawyers are not well paid, and so criminal prosecutio­n is not attractive to the very good Lawyers. So, how do you then transfer the burden of inadequate funding, or poor prosecutio­n, to the Defendant? The second issue, is that of State oppression. It is establishe­d in our laws already that, one of the factors that the court will consider in granting bail to a Defendant in very serious criminal trials, is the likelihood of his incarcerat­ion affecting his financial capacity to defend his case or prosecute his appeal, if already convicted. To strip the Defendant who is yet to go through full trial, of access to his finances and his liberty and freedom, is for the State to indirectly seek to castrate its opponent in legal battle, and thus, render the trial an unfair exercise. It is to muzzle the Defendant and cripple him and in that wise, force him to surrender to a conviction that he may otherwise not have suffered, had he had access to his funds and liberty. Ultimately therefore, it is prosecutio­n through oppression, just to secure the ‘guilt’ of the Defendant, at all cost. A case in point in this regard is that of Lakanmi & Anor. v A-G., West & Ors (1971) 1 U.I.L.R 201, wherein the executive tried unsuccessf­ully, to usurp and trample upon the powers of the court. And even when the Supreme Court eventually struck down the odious executive order, the military still purported to annul judicial authority. But, that was a military regime, which we have all now sworn never to tolerate in governance again, forever. See also, Emezue & Ors v Governor, Delta State & Ors (2014) LPELR-CA/B/286/2009.

Executive Order is Usurpation of Judicial Authority The other aspect of the travel ban, is the usurpation of the power of the judiciary. In virtually all the cases pending in court, the Defendants have all been arraigned and granted bail, by the court. Under and by virtue of Section 35 of the Constituti­on, every citizen is entitled to right to personal liberty, but one of the restrictio­ns to the exercise of that right as expressed under Section 35 (1)(c), is where it is necessary to bring him before a court to be arraigned. That is where the Executive comes in, namely to bring the Defendant to court. However, once the arraignmen­t has taken place, the opportunit­y for bail is a temporary restoratio­n of the right to personal liberty. According to the learned authors of the authoritat­ive text The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Southern States of Nigeria, Akinola Aguda, page 76 at paragraph 253, “Bail are sureties taken by a person duly authorised, for the appearance of an accused person at a certain day and place, to answer and be justified by law”.

Thus, in Ekwenugo v F.R.N (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 171 at 187 para G, bail means to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance, on a day and place certain. In the case of Elisha v C.O.P. (1974) 4 ECSLR 362 at page 367, it was held that: “The essence of bail is that the accused person appears to take his trial.” See also, Eyu v State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 78) 602, where it was held that, the sole purpose for granting bail is to enable an accused person to come back to face his trial; Dogo v COP (1980) 1 NCR 14 at 19, where it was held that the sole requiremen­ts as to bail, are primarily to secure the attendance of the accused person at the trial.

A court granting bail to a Defendant, is a temporary restoratio­n of his right to personal liberty, upon certain conditions. And this being the case, he remains on bail for the entire duration of his trial, subject to good behaviour. In that regard, nobody or authority should have the power to intermeddl­e with the right to personal liberty or movement, of a Defendant who is already enjoying an order of court admitting him to bail. The bail is an order of the court, which should not be subject to another variation from the executive arm of government. This being the case, a travel ban, upon the life and liberty of a Defendant already admitted to bail by the court, is a direct affront by the executive upon judicial power.

In some specific cases of Defendants like Mr. Dele Belgore, SAN, Chief Jumoke Akinjide, etc, the courts before which they appeared, already granted them permission to travel abroad for medical treatment. A travel ban upon such a Defendant, would be a direct reversal of the order of the court, by the executive, which indeed should not be. Again, it must be stressed that, most of the Defendants have already deposited their internatio­nal passports with the various courts, as part of the conditions for their bail, such that it is only the court that can release such passport to enable the Defendant travel. What the travel ban has done, is to take over the administra­tion of the Defendant from the court, as in some cases, the court may grant leave to travel, but the executive may frustrate such leave via the travel ban. For us as free born citizens, it matters not that a Defendant undergoing criminal trial has been labelled with the toga of murder or corruption in any charge sheet, it is the ingredient­s stated in the proof of evidence, the real trial proceeding­s and the totality of the case presented by the prosecutio­n, that will determine the guilt or otherwise of such Defendant. And until we come to the conclusion of such trial, in any case, no executive power should be relied upon to trample on the rights and liberties of the citizen, merely on account that he is suspected to have committed a crime, but yet without proof.

Consequenc­e of the Illegality of Executive Order 6 Section 6 6(b) of the Constituti­on, vests judicial powers in the courts created by the Constituti­on. Section 4 of the same Constituti­on, grants the power of law making upon the legislatur­e. Section 35 grants right to personal liberty, whilst Section 41 guarantees right to freedom of movement. Section 36 donates the right to be presumed innocent before and during trial. It is clear that, the executive order and travel ban both constitute a derogation from these clear sections of the Constituti­on.

By Section 1 (1) of the Constituti­on, it is the supreme law of the land and it is stated expressly in Section 1

“IN EO 6, THE EXECUTIVE ARM IS COMBINING THE POWER OF LEGISLATIO­N, ALONG WITH THE POWER OF ADJUDICATI­ON, LEADING TO A SITUATION OF DICTATORSH­IP, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND TOTALITARI­ANISM. THAT SHOULD NOT, AND CANNOT HAPPEN IN A CONSTITUTI­ONAL DEMOCRACY”

law of the land and it is stated expressly in Section 1 (3) that “if any other law is inconsiste­nt with the provisions of the Constituti­on, this Constituti­on shall prevail and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsiste­ncy be void.”

The courts have a sacred duty to protect and preserve the fundamenta­l rights of the citizen, especially in relation to right to liberty and freedom of movement. It is better to have a State where citizens are free, than a prosperous State where rights are violated and denied. If the reason for all these draconian actions is simply to fight corruption, then they cannot be justified at all, and the courts must rise in defence of the citizens to strike them down. See A-G., Kebbi State v Jokolo & Ors (2013) LPELR-35/2010CA.

Circumstan­ces of Derogation from Constituti­onal Rights

The Executive may seek to place reliance upon the provisions of Section 41(2)(a) of the 1999 Constituti­on, as the basis of derogation from the rights of movement granted to citizens, to claim that EO 6 is a regulation that is reasonably justifiabl­e in a democratic society, if under Section 41(2)(a), it imposes “... restrictio­ns on the residence or movement of any person who has committed or is reasonably suspected to have committed a criminal offence in order to prevent him from leaving Nigeria.”

First, the executive has no power to make laws, such that it cannot hide under the derogation principle as stated above. Second, the burden placed upon the prosecutio­n (the executive) in respect presumptio­n of innocence, is a heavy one which cannot be discharged on the platform of the derogation principle. Thus, in the case of COP v Amuta 2017) LPELR-SC.117/2012, the Supreme Court, per Ogunbiyi JSC confirmed that “the constituti­onal provision on the presumptio­n of innocence of an accused person, is sacrosanct and settled.”

Third, the principle of derogation, is not applicable under the African Charter, which is now an enforceabl­e legislatio­n in Nigeria. Under and by virtue of Article 12(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratificati­on and Enforcemen­t) Act, freedom of movement of every Nigerian citizen consists of freedom within Nigeria and freedom of exit from Nigeria. See the cases of Director, SSS v Agbakoba (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314 at 373, FRN v Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 113 at 180, Ejiofor v Okeke (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 665) 373, Onagoruwa v IGP (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 193) 593. So that, in all ramificati­ons, the EO 6 and the travel ban made under it, both remain illegal and unenforcea­ble.

Likely Incidence of Political Persecutio­n and Witch Hunting through EO 6

The timing of EO 6 makes it more suspect, coming as it were, after about three years of governance, by the present administra­tion. The 2019 general elections are around the corner and the integrity of Mr. President to combat and fight corruption, constitute­s the biggest hurdle to win back or sustain his image before the public eye. In some quarters, he has been praised as sending some former governors to jail, but a holistic review of the crusade against corrupt public office holders shows that it is more of a selective campaign, on those perceived enemies of his political agenda.

Imperative­ly, the 50 Nigerians affected by the travel ban, constitute those individual­s who are viewed as not being in the good books of the Federal Government, and to score a political goal. In essence, the executive order on travel ban coming at this point in time, amounts to ruling by decree in a democracy, which is being interprete­d as an indirect attempt to weaken the opposition and pave way for an easy ride, for the President’s men. People readily point at similar people who have similar cases, but were not listed in the travel ban, or the case in point of the former Finance Minister, who confessed to certificat­e forgery, but was let off the hook, and a serving Senator, whose record was confirmed as having attended College, but failed and is being prosecuted.

Holistic Upgrade of the Judiciary as Solution Now the other point about the EO 6, is the seeming helplessne­ss of government in the prosecutio­n of corruption cases. The gateway to truly fight corruption is the Judiciary, in this case, the law courts. It should be easier for the government to genuinely invest in the Judiciary, and in that wise, get good results, than pursuing perceived enemies through Executive Orders. In the Federal High Court where the Honourable Justice Mohammed Idris held sway before his deserved elevation to the Court of Appeal, Lawyers and Litigants would stand outside the court room, come rain come shine, for hours on end, without any space to sit. How do you conduct meaningful criminal proceeding­s, in such an atmosphere? And yet, many prominent corruption cases were assigned to that court. The Federal Government has been building the new Federal High Court complex on Bourdillon Road in Ikoyi for over seven years, without any hope of immediate completion. How on earth, can such a system fight corruption?

There is nationwide outcry against the intolerabl­e delay in the prosecutio­n of high profile corruption cases no doubt, but these cases have received public attention because of the status of the Defendants therein, whereas several other criminal cases are delayed even for longer periods, due mainly to lack of judicial personnel, poor infrastruc­ture, avoidable congestion and long hand recording of court proceeding­s. Several other land, chieftainc­y, admiralty and even fundamenta­l rights cases, are also pending in several courts across the land, beyond the hype about corruption cases. The better approach, is to adopt a holistic evaluation of the judicial process, to rescue it from imminent decay and disaster, otherwise, the war against corruption will just keep moving in circles.

There is no way this government can sustain Executive Order No 6 of 2018, and the travel ban following after it. As many Nigerians have already indicated in their wholesome condemnati­on of this illegality, it is best to withdraw it and return to the drawing board, in order to discover how to empower the prosecutin­g agencies for better performanc­e, fund the Judiciary and then partner with the major stakeholde­rs, in the administra­tion of justice, the NJC, NBA, EFCC, ICPC, the Police and other allied partners, to achieve smooth and effective administra­tion of criminal justice; as if that is truly accomplish­ed, even corruption cases will fall in line of speedy adjudicati­on and there will be no need to be clamouring for special courts, special Judges and even special Lawyers, to handle corruption cases.

Sometime in May, 2018, the Sun newspaper the report of The Corruption and Other Financial Crimes published Cases Trial Monitoring Committee, set up by the National Judicial Council, as follows:

“The Corruption and Financial Crime Cases Trial Monitoring Committee (COTRIMCO), has identified poor prosecutio­n and multiplici­ty of charges, among others, as some of the factors militating against speedy disposal of corruption cases.

Other factors listed by the Committee included absence of counsel for parties in Court; reliance on irrelevant documentar­y evidence; non-adherence to Court rules/procedures; retirement/ transfer of Judges; re-assignment of cases to start de- novo; amendment of charges after commenceme­nt of trial, and cumbersome record transmissi­on process to Court of Appeal.

These were contained in the Interim Report presented by the Chairman of the Committee, Justice Suleiman Galadima (rtd), at the 86th Meeting of the National Judicial Council (NJC).

According to a statement by the Director of Informatio­n, National Judicial Council (NJC), Soji Oye, the Committee distilled the issues from its findings from discussion­s with Heads of Courts, and observatio­ns made from the surprise visits of the Members to Courts handling corruption and financial crime cases in some parts of Country.

On the issue of poor prosecutio­n, the Committee observed that offenders are charged to Court before proper investigat­ions of the charges are done, and afterwards, expecting the Court to detain such alleged offenders till conclusion of their investigat­ion.

The Committee also identified inadequate prosecutin­g personnel at the Prosecutio­n Agencies, to the effect that some prosecutor­s lack the requisite experience to prosecute corruption cases, which invariably leads to poor handling of such cases.

COTRIMCO further blamed the delay on lack of commitment on the part of some prosecutor­s, and collusion between them and defence counsel, to pervert justice either by stalling the trials of cases or achieving pre-determined results.

It also observed that, there is no threshold to the number of witnesses the prosecutio­n calls; inadequate funding of Prosecutio­n Agencies to carry out thorough investigat­ion of the corruption cases with attendant low quality prosecutio­n cases, and frequent requests for adjournmen­t by the Prosecutor­s.

In the area of duplicatio­n of charges, the Committee submitted that the prosecutio­n in most cases, duplicate charges which could be up to 170 against a Defendant, but at the end, are unable to substantia­te them, leading to the discharge of such Defendant.

On multiplici­ty of charges, the Committee also observed the issue of multiplici­ty of cases involving the same Defendants, and on similar subject-matters going on in different Courts at the same time.

This particular factor, according to the Committee,, makes it impossible for some trials to proceed. In spite of the fact that the Administra­tion of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015, provides for day-to-day trials of Criminal Cases, a Defendant who is undergoing trial in other Courts is always unavailabl­e for trial.

On the part of the Court, the Committee identified retirement\transfer of Judges handling such cases.

It noted that, when this happens, such cases which may have gone far, are re- assigned to another Judge to start de-novo;

Granting of remand order by a Court, without following up to ensure suspects are brought to Court; inadequate provision for proper record keeping, and shelving of Court files and other relevant documents in some Courts; cumbersome process of transmissi­on of records from trial Courts, which impedes the early disposal of appeals; and difficulti­es associated with ascertaini­ng addresses for service of process by Bailiffs.

It said the prison on its part, contribute­s to the delay, by failing to remind courts of subsisting orders to reproduce suspects in court, and most times lack means to convey awaiting trials to the law court.

For the speedy trial of corruption cases, the Committee recommends the importance of proper training for prosecutio­n in the area of investigat­ion, especially in the area of Administra­tion of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015.

It also recommende­d the need for Prosecutin­g Agencies, to have competent prosecutio­n department­s manned by qualified personnel; synergy between the various Prosecutio­n Agencies, to enhance proper prosecutio­n of criminal cases; use of profession­als, such as Accountant­s, Auditors, etc, to investigat­e high profile and complicate­d cases; need for training and re-training of staff of court handling criminal cases, as well as proper funding for the Judiciary and Prosecutin­g Agencies.”

If we do not hasten to address these vital issues which have been raised in this detailed report, issuing dozens upon dozens of Executive Orders, will only be like the proverbial case of leaving leprosy to treat ringworm.

Ebunolu Adegboruwa, Constituti­onal Lawyer and Human Rights Activist, Lagos

“IN SOME SPECIFIC CASES OF DEFENDANTS LIKE MR. DELE BELGORE, SAN, CHIEF JUMOKE AKINJIDE, ETC, THE COURTS BEFORE WHICH THEY APPEARED, ALREADY GRANTED THEM PERMISSION TO TRAVEL ABROAD FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. A TRAVEL BAN UPON SUCH A DEFENDANT, WOULD BE A DIRECT REVERSAL OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT, BY THE EXECUTIVE.....”

 ??  ??
 ??  ?? President Muhammadu Buhari
President Muhammadu Buhari
 ??  ?? Attorney-General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami, SAN
Attorney-General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami, SAN
 ??  ??

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from Nigeria