The Need for National Resilience Policy and Standard
We live in a VUCA world—vulnerable, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. And it takes little reflection for anyone to see how this is immediately so. While the idea of a VUCA world was introduced into the lexicon by reflection on strategy and leadership, the COVID-19 pandemic has added an aggravated dimension to how vulnerable, uncertain, complex and ambiguous the world is. Everything that constitutes axioms that define our normality has been upturned and shattered. Each region of the world is then left to come to terms with the uncertainty and to address it in its own way.
While wrapping my head again around the idea of VUCA, I could not but be drawn into the philosophical idea of existentialism, and the historical exigencies that brought it into existence. The Second World War contributed in no small measure into shaping the philosophical framework of existentialism. Contrary to the rationalist’s perception of the world as being grounded on the infallibility of reason, the existentialists learnt from historical circumstances to adumbrate a view of reality founded on instability. To borrow Heidegger’s graphic statement, we are “thrown into the world” where our fundamental freedom is curtailed by meaninglessness and uncertainty. Existence—in the throes of frustration, dread, anxiety, sickness, and finally death—therefore defeats our most optimistic human aspirations. COVID-19 could only happen in such a VUCA world the existentialists foresaw.
And nowhere is this VUCA reality more distinct and brutal than in the third world—Latin America, Asia, Africa. One of the fundamental ideas behind the concept of “development” and “underdevelopment” is the extent to which the developed countries, compared with the underdeveloped ones, have been able to reduce the VUCA reality in their institutional and governance dynamics. A country could be considered underdeveloped because it has no structural and procedural means by which it could preempt adverse circumstances and disasters, like the COVID-19. I can immediately anticipate the spate of objections that will point at the relative ease with which the pandemic undermined the stable institutions and developmental assurances of Europe and North America. This is demonstrated fact. And I agree. But something is still off about underdevelopment.
This is where I bring in the subject matter of this piece—the idea of resilience as a governance and development concept. This is a concept that has made its way from self-help discourse to national characterization. For instance, the resilience of Nigerians has been widely celebrated. In 2018, the World Happiness Report (WHR) ranked Nigeria as the 5th happiest country in Africa, and the 91st in the world. The 2020 Report drops Nigeria to 115th place in the world, and the 17th in Africa. Despite falling in the ranking, one still wonders what about Nigeria’s postcolonial and post-independence development predicament could make Nigerians one of the happiest people in the world. Fela Anikulapo Kuti’s famous song, “Shuffering and Shmiling,” best captures the situation in which Nigerians resiliently keep moving forward beyond every development obstacle that make their lives a living hell.
But the plunge in the WHR tells more than a statistical story. It speaks to something more fundamental about our state of existence as a nation, as well as our governance dynamics, and its capacity to achieve well-being. The rate at which otherwise successful people have been committing suicide suggests that the famed resilience of Nigerians has been overstretched and their legendary coping mechanisms are beginning to wane. And this is precisely a tragic example that teaches a significant development lesson—the need for a national resilience benchmarking in Nigeria. One brutal fact of Nigeria’s underdevelopment is that it is missing out on many significant institutional correlates of development and good governance. For instance, there is no national integrity system, just as there is no national resilience policy and standard.
What is resilience, in developmental and governance terms? The Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters, in Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, defines resilience as “the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events. Enhanced resilience allows better anticipation of disasters and better planning to reduce disaster losses—rather than waiting for an event to occur and paying for it afterward.” This definition makes resilience the existentialist idea par excellence! Resilience enables a state to build into her development framework institutions, dynamics and structures that both anticipate and preempt disasters. And it is the presence of these resilience standards and systems that defines the difference, for instance, in the way the COVID-19 pandemic has been handled in, say, the United States and Nigeria. In this context, it will be too trite to complacently point at how the pandemic has ravaged Europe and North America, or how Nigeria—as well as many other African countries—have been able to fare better than the so-called developed countries. First, no one has an explanation yet as to why the virus has not been as devastating as it was projected to be, given Nigeria’s poor healthcare and socioeconomic realities. But second, and more fundamentally, Europe and North America have in place anticipatory institutional and governance mechanisms that kicked in to alleviate even the enormous weight of the pandemic on their citizens. Long and short: Nigeria, like most other African countries, do not have systemic strategies in place to confront and alleviate the consequences of systemic threats.
In the United Kingdom, the National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) was crafted in consonance with the Civil Contingencies Act to achieve a high level of success in “emergency preparedness, response and recovery,” as well as establish the capacity readiness of the LRFs to preempt and handle such extreme contingencies. The UK National Resilience Standards has fifteen items: (i) LRF Governance and Support Arrangements, (ii) Local Risk Assessment, (iii) communicating risks to the public, (iv) emergency planning, (v) community resilience development, (vi) interoperability, (vii) training, (viii) exercising, (ix) business continuity management, (x) business continuity promotion, (xi) strategic coordination center (SCC): preparation and operation, (xii) strategic coordination groups (SCG): preparation and activation, (xiii) local recovery management, (xiv) cyber incident preparedness, and (xv) pandemic influenza preparedness.
Establishing a national resilience system in Nigeria is a singular development imperative that must be facilitated if the development vision and strategies of the Nigerian state would no longer be subject to occasional and regular disasters over which we have no immunity. However, the emergence of such a resilience system will be conditional on so many other variables defined by Nigeria’s national integration dynamics. In other words, to be able to achieve resilience as a state, we need to first learn, unlearn and relearn so many other things that will enable us to live and develop together. In my little book, The Joy of Learning (2009), I outlined a learning imperative that I consider to be critical to both a national value reorientation and cultural adjustment programme that will assist Nigerians in coming to terms with our plural situation, and learn from it. One critical pillar in learning throughout life is what has been called “learning to live together.” This requires not only developing an understanding of other people and their differences, but also coming to a deep knowledge and appreciation of how these different people are also so much like us, and how we can only function by being interdependent. Thus, to be able to stand together in the face of disaster and other systemic threats to our development, we need to first stand together and appreciate our plural relationship.
This is where the Nigerian educational system becomes a critical component in the need for a national value reorientation and cultural adjustment programmes, two fundamental prerequisites to achieving the institution of a national resilience system. Nigeria’s educational system must be capable of generating curricula, syllabuses and other orientation schemes that will not only educate on the imperative of the reevaluation of values that have weaken our unity and those that can sustain it. They also can be imbued with contents that speaks to resilience as an alternative philosophical and methodological framework that can complement conventional risk assessment methodologies to enable us develop an adaptive mentality and systems that can combat systemic threats. And one will be surprised at some of the academic texts that can generate insights about resilience.
An instance will suffice. As a literature student in those days, reading Jane Austen’s novels, and especially the most famous one, Pride and Prejudice, was no joy for me. And that could have been because her context did not resonate so much as, say, Things Fall Apart. But I have come to realize what I had missed in not taking the time to be patient with Jane Austen. Her novels offer precious insights on resilience. In Jane Austen’s novels, her life trajectory blurs into those of her heroines as a study in perseverance and resilience against the instability of a society that hardly thinks the woman is human. And yet she survived and became sturdy. Reading any of Jane Austen’s novel, together with, say Chinua Achebe’s or Wole Soyinka, could serve a syllabus meant to transform our mentality about resilience and its fundamental role in injecting strength into Nigeria’s governance and developmental framework and dynamics.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was initially established as a sub-regional economic cooperation outfit in 1975. Seven complementary factors were considered in establishing the economic community: need for economic and social development of all the Member States; that economico-social development requires cooperation through concerted policy of self-reliance; that sub-regional economic integration progress requires assessment of economic interests of Member States; the need for a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits of cooperation; that bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation will enable wider cooperation; that efforts at sub-regional cooperation should not conflict with similar efforts at wider level of cooperation in Africa; and most importantly, the need to eliminate all types of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons.
The Treaty establishing the ECOWAS was done in Lagos, Nigeria on May 28,1975.It was revised and signed in Cotonou on 24th July,1993. It entered into force on 23rd August, 1995. Three types of agreement are done within the framework of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty as Revised: Conventions, Protocols, and Acts. Although there are nuances in their conception, they all create obligations for all the Member Signatories. We are more concerned here with protocols. Cognitively put, a protocol is either a summary of a treaty, or an agreement itself, or a treaty that amends or supplements another treaty. It is a procès-verbal, that is, a formal record of proceedings of a conference or of a congress.
The notion of a conference refers to the outcome of serious intellectual meetings while that of a congress refers to outcomes of political meetings. In the context of ECOWAS, the Protocols are largely a resultant from political meetings. Commitment to the obligations created by the Protocols cannot be said to be total: in the period from 1978 through October 2010, the number of Protocols and Conventions signed was 53 (fifty-three). Ghana and Togo topped the list with 43 ratifications each, followed by Sierra Leone, Mali and Senegal with 42 ratifications each. The Gambia had 41 ratifications while Nigeria and Burkina Faso were placed in the fourth group with 40.
What is noteworthy again is that the Lusophone countries had the least number of ratifications. Guinea Bissau, for instance, ratified 24 out of 51 agreements which it had signed or to which it had acceded. Guinea Bissau did not sign or accede to the Conventions on Extradition. In the same vein, the Republic of Cape Verde ratified 24 agreements out of 50 of which it is part. It should be noted that Cape Verde neither signed nor acceded to the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence; the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security; and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. This lack of total commitment to the Protocols relating to national and sub-regional insecurity largely explains why armed banditry and insurgency is thriving in Nigeria and West Africa.
ECOWAS Protocols and Regional Insecurity
The lack of total commitment to ECOWAS Protocols can be explained by the factor of tardiness in ratifying them and by refusal to even accede to some of them. In terms of number of agreements yet to be ratified as at the end of March 2009, Ghana and Togo had 10 each. Senegal, Sierra Leone and Mali had 11 each. Nigeria had 13, Liberia and Guinea Bissau had 28 while Cape Verde had 26. The implications of non-entry into force and lack of total commitment include non-creation of obligations, especially in the context of conflict prevention and management, as well as the need for mutual assistance. Apart from intra-Community assistance, some of the protocols constitute a major source of political instability as it is in Nigeria with Boko Haramism and armed banditry. Vie Internationale strongly believes that the relevant Protocols relating to regional insecurity should be revisited in order to contain the deepening level of insecurity in the ECOWAS region.
Of the many Protocols done, two categories of them deal directly and indirectly with regional security (African Union’s definition of a region as per AEC Treaty, Article 1(d) and (e). The direct Protocols
are the Protocols on Non-aggression, the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, and the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The issues of Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, from which complaints about armed banditry and insurgency, as well as terrorism are derived from in Nigeria, are the indirect agreements.
They include the Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment; Supplementary Protocol on the Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment; Supplementary Protocol on the Second Phase (Right of Residence) of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment; Supplementary Protocol on the Implementation of the Third Phase (Right of Establishment of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment; and Supplementary Act A/SA.3/07/10 Defining the Role of Permanent Representatives of Member States to ECOWAS.
Explained differently, ECOWAS Protocols encourage free movement of persons, goods, their right to settle down and reside in any Member State, and more importantly, what the roles of the Permanent Representatives should be. In Nigeria, the situation of insecurity has become very critical and embarrassing to the extent that questions are now being raised on the aforementioned protocols. What have the Protocols provided for? In which way do they constitute public threats to regional and sub-regional security? What role has the ECOWAS been playing in Nigeria’s crisis of insecurity?
In the strong belief that the ECOWAS could not ‘attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member States of the Community and in compliance with Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or independence of any State, as well as in compliance with Article 3(3)of the OAU Charter, which required the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State, the ECOWAS
Authority signed the Protocol on Non-aggression in Lagos on 22nd April, 1978.
Even though the Protocol is, in design, meant to prevent any threat or use of force against one another, or encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, the provisions of Article 2 and 3 are quite relevant and interesting to the Nigerian situation. Article 2 says that ‘each Member State shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility, or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other Member States.’ In this regard, how do we interpret ‘shall refrain from... condoning acts of subversion...? An act of condoning is necessarily an act of acquiescence. Not condoning simply implies coming into the open to condemn, to join hands with the victim states to fight all manifestations of subversion. It is a truism to say that the Boko Haram insurrection has the objective of subversion of the Government of Nigeria, and in fact, an objective to create an Islamic State in Nigeria. And where an Islamic State is impossible, to have Nigeria partitioned into Muslim North and Christian South.
The apparent inadequate silence or inaction of the ECOWAS Member States on the matter of subversion is a breach of Article 2 of the Non-aggression Protocol. Perhaps more interestingly, according to Article 3 of the Protocol, ‘each Member State shall undertake to prevent Foreigners resident on its territory from committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other Member States.’ The immediate implication of this Article is that, while the Protocols on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment are there for Community Citizens to take advantage of, it is still the responsibility of their host States to control and prevent the resident Foreigners from engaging in any act of subversion. Thus whether the Fulani herders creating problems in different parts of Nigeria are Nigerians or foreigners, President Muhammadu Buhari cannot have any good excuse for his inability to ensure national security in Nigeria. He is internationally liable for his inability.
Again, from the perspective of Protocol A/SP.3/5/81 Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, done on the 29th May, 1981 the ECOWAS Authority considered that Member States belong to the same geographical area and that there were ‘serious continuous threats of aggression on the African continent’ that may ‘constitute support forces to external aggression,’ and therefore resolved to ‘safeguard and consolidate the independence and the sovereignty of Member States against foreign intervention.’ It is against this background that the Protocol on the need for mutual assistance was done.
Article 2 of the Protocol provides that ‘Member States declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community. And more interestingly, Article 3 of the same Protocol stipulates that ‘Member States resolve to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression.’ Additionally, Article 4 requires all Member States to also take appropriate measures in the event of an armed conflict between or among Member States in which peaceful means of settlement becomes difficult, and particularly ‘in case of internal armed conflict within any Member State, engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire community. In this case, the Authority shall appreciate and decide on this situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member State or states concerned.’
Acursory look at the foregoing protocolar provisions clearly shows that the Boko Haram insurgency is not simply an insurgency against the Government and People of Nigeria but also against the entire peoples in the ECOWAS region. Consequently, all the Member States of the ECOWAS have the responsibility to provide assistance to the Government of Nigeria by obligation. The insurgency has a foreign support element. Both the United Nations and the African Union also frown at domestic insurrection. And most unfortunately too, it is precisely these ECOWAS Protocols that are aimed to promote regional unity and economic integration that have been a major dynamic of insecurity in Nigeria, hence Government has been fraught with challenges that Member States have not been able to contain. In this regard, what are the relevant ECOWAS Protocols on the matter?
Right of Establishment versus Armed Banditry
Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, in consonance with paragraph 1 of Article 27 of ECOWAS Treaty that confers the status of Community citizenship on the citizens of Member States and which also enjoins Member States to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence within the Community, has it in its Article 2 that ‘the Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States.’
For the purposes of this right, a maximum transitional period of 15 years from the definitive date of entry into force was provided for in the Protocol, which entered into force on April 8, 1980, meaning that the transitional period should end in the first week of April 1995. More important, whatever may be the obstacles to the enablement of the Right of Entry, Residence and Establishment, the obligation is that the obstacles must have been removed within the 15-year period of transition provided for in Article 3. The article delineated a 3-phase period for the attainment of the objective.
In fact, President Buhari, rather than raise questions on foreigners living irregularly in Nigeria, simply gave six months to them to regularise their stay. For not applying for extension of stay, the illegal residents committed a criminal offence. Such regularisation completely ignored whether the visitor was eligible for admission into Nigeria in the first instance. On the basis of PMB’s directive, Nigeria undoubtedly attracted more bandits into Nigeria, a situation that now raises how to reconcile the contradiction between the Right of freedom to reside and establish in Nigeria, and preventing resident foreigners from engaging in armed banditry and insurrectional activities in Nigeria.Thus ECOWAS Protocols are not the problems per se, but the corruption-driven refusal of Government to truly control the inflow of bandits. ECOWAS Protocols can be revisited and strengthened. However, the Nigerian truth was already told by Babington Macaulay in a House of Commons speech in 1842:‘’Timid and interested politicians think much more about the security of their seats than about the security of their country.’’This is why Nigeria under PMB has become the terra cognita of armed banditry and boko haramism