THISDAY

“Borno Government, Repentant Terrorists and Accountabi­lity”: Black, White or Shades of Grey?

- Mrs Maryam Uwais, OON Borno State Governor, Prof Babagana Zulum

“Governor Zulum’s commendabl­e effort, goes far beyond ‘forgivenes­s and oath-taking’. He has not broken any law. Indeed, what are his options? Supporting a purely kinetic approach, which has only increased the destructio­n, death and desperatio­n….. Or combining both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches, thereby encouragin­g productivi­ty, healing and promoting an enduring peace?”

This article by Maryam Uwa is is a Rejoinder to The Advocate of last Tuesday, February 20 th. She discusses some of the reasons behind the Borno State Governor, Babagana Zulum’s interventi­ons, combining kinetic and non-kinetic/civilian tools to deal with the Boko Haram insurgency and heal the communitie­s within his State, which has been one of one’s most hit by terrorism. She commends his efforts which are said to be yielding positive results, particular­ly in a matter which the Governor does not have a template to guide him

On Tuesday February 20th, 2024, The Advocate carried a very strong opinion regarding a key element of the efforts by Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum to restore enduring peace in Borno State, following the severe disruption­s arising from the violent Boko Haram (BH) insurgency. I feel that it might be helpful to give context and the rationale for what I consider to be a well thought out interventi­on in an extremely difficult, complex and unpreceden­ted situation.

We may recall that BH began as a relatively low-profile radical group in Borno State, opposing western-style education and government corruption and pushing for an ‘Islamic State’. BH became increasing­ly violent after it’s leader was killed extrajudic­ially. By 2014, BH had seized control of over 20 Local Government Areas, as it continued to expand its attacks to neighbouri­ng States and countries, utilising tactics that included kidnapping­s, suicide bombings, and ferocious attacks on civilian population­s. The Nigerian Government initially opted to pursue a purely kinetic option, working alongside a coalition of Nigerian, Chadian, Cameroonia­n, and Nigerien forces to launch coordinate­d military operations against BH. Neverthele­ss, the group remained active, carrying out deadly sporadic attacks and suicide bombings in many parts of Northern Nigeria and West Africa.

The Boko Haram insurgency has had severe consequenc­es for Nigeria (and Borno State, in particular), including the deaths of thousands of civilians, including security personnel. Over 1.7 million of people have been internally displaced or forced to seek refuge in neighbouri­ng countries due to the violence and insecurity. The insurgency has caused a severe humanitari­an crisis, with food shortages, malnutriti­on, and lack of access to healthcare affecting millions of people. Vital infrastruc­ture has been destroyed, hindering developmen­t and reconstruc­tion efforts. The conflict has had a negative impact on the economy of Northeast Nigeria, underminin­g agricultur­e, trade, and other economic activities. The targeting of schools has disrupted education, causing a significan­t increase in the out-of-school numbers. In addition to the heavy toll on human life, infrastruc­ture and security, the attacks overturned normalcy and stability. Farming and food security became practicall­y impossible.

The Borno Model

It quickly become glaring that, force alone cannot end an insurgency of this nature. Being at the epicentre of the insurgency, the Borno State Government has had to assume the enormous responsibi­lity of healing communitie­s and restoring social infrastruc­ture, as a critical aspect of ending the insurgency in a sustainabl­e manner.

This ‘Borno Model’ was conceived by Governor Zulum, as a feasible option for countering the BH insurgency in Nigeria. The process combines both military and civil components, aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict, while promoting peace, reconcilia­tion and developmen­t. Broken down, the Borno Model involves encouragin­g the individual­s concerned to surrender to the State Government, on mutually agreed terms. These terms include surrenderi­ng with their families, weapons and hostages (if any), as well as oath taking, upon the assurances of the State Government to consider their reintegrat­ion and rehabilita­tion under traditiona­l, transition­al and restorativ­e justice processes of justice, subject to a methodical process of ascertaini­ng their levels of ‘complicity’ (if at all), as well as community acceptance.

A critical element of the Borno Model, is the engagement of local communitie­s, with social cohesion platforms and groups being formed for the purposes of ensuring only ‘low risk’ returnees are facilitate­d to return to the communitie­s, as determined by them. In this process, diverse (and key) members of the community are engaged and trained to identify, monitor and manage the rehabilita­tion of only ‘low risk’ returnees (a vast majority of who are minors, or even if currently adults, were minors at the relevant time), after they may have surrendere­d, been screened, profiled, treated for physical ailments, and then deradicali­sed, counselled and trained on relevant skills, as support towards rehabilita­tion and their seamless reintegrat­ion in their communitie­s.

Expertise, hard work, passion and commitment have gone into the setting up of inclusive community platforms, with members trained to verify, evaluate and escalate issues where they arise, thereby ensuring a seamless but closely monitored process.

Those identified as ‘high risk’ returnees are, however, routinely rejected by the community platforms. These are adults suspected of having directly committed heinous war/ terrorist crimes, as well as sexual and gender-based violence. They are housed in ‘integrated villages’, pending investigat­ion for prosecutio­n under the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibitio­n) Act 2022 at the Federal High Court. These highly secure integrated villages also ensure that these persons are subjected to deradicali­zation, and counsellin­g, pending prosecutio­n.

As reiterated by The Advocate, terrorism is a Federal offence, triable only by the Federal High Court. Given the unfolding events in Borno State, however, it is important to unbundle the issues for clarity. According to the piece, 160,000 individual­s have surrendere­d to the Borno State Government, being persons designated, as ‘insurgents’. It is important to recognise that until conclusion of ongoing inquiries and examinatio­n of evidence, caution must be taken in branding any individual as an insurgent or as ‘terrorist’. It is also worth noting that the trial of minors for criminal offences at the Federal High Court is fraught with constituti­onal difficulty, even where suspected to be ‘terrorist’. Family courts are establishe­d as part of the State High Court system, and not the Federal High Court.

A close perusal of the demography of the returnees (during profiling by security agencies) would disclose that over 90% of the returnees have been verified as farming ‘slaves’, detained to serve the insurgents. It is also on record that by now, and save for a handful of individual­s, the first generation of ideologic BH members are no more. Those embraced by the communitie­s comprise mainly of youth, children, and women who were captured in their tender years, or were born and raised in captivity, with no evidence of them having been directly involved in the BH atrocities. Being tired of such a perilous existence, they have, in unison, offered to surrender, opting to abandon the forest and embrace the invitation to live normal lives on the set preconditi­ons. Indeed, surrenderi­ng only gives the perception that they are ‘traitors’ to the BH, so returning to their past lives, thereafter, becomes dangerous.

There is a valid social policy behind the considerat­ion of age and the state of mind of individual­s, who must have been children when the insurgency began over 20 years ago. What does criminal law say about minors, or the culpabilit­y (or otherwise) of women who have been captive to the insurgents for so long? In addition to the actual commission of a criminal act, surely the intention to commit a crime is a critical ingredient. Moreover, assuming that the evidence for prosecutio­n can be processed, we simply do not have enough prisons to harbour the sheer numbers of individual­s emerging from the bush as a direct response to the invitation to surrender.

The thrust of the Governor’s effort is to utilise methods of resolving local conflicts and tensions (based on thorough research conducted) that have contribute­d to the insurgency, often through traditiona­l conflict resolution mechanisms. Truth and reconcilia­tion committees have been establishe­d, given the grievances held within communitie­s and families. Such commission­s provide a platform for victims to share their experience­s, and for societies to acknowledg­e the past. Encouragin­g dialogue between victims and offenders fosters understand­ing, empathy, and a sense of shared responsibi­lity. Empowering victims to actively participat­e in the justice process allows them to voice their needs, and contribute­s to their sense of justice. Providing opportunit­ies for ‘offenders’ to make amends and reintegrat­e into society, promotes rehabilita­tion and reduces recidivism.

Results

There is abundant evidence that the Governor’s efforts have led to improved security in most of the affected areas, allowing displaced population­s to return to their homes in the rural areas. By actively involving local communitie­s in the security efforts, the Model has gained their trust and support, making it easier to identify and counter insurgent activities. The rehabilita­tion and reintegrat­ion programmes have seen over 120,000 individual­s being reintegrat­ed into society as productive citizens, all of whom have acquired new skills. Strident efforts to resolve local conflicts have helped reduce tensions and promote peace in areas affected by the insurgency. Farming has resumed in almost all the affected communitie­s for the most part, due to the involvemen­t of these returnees who have been co-opted in the patrol and the protection of farmlands and villages, being familiar with the terrain and BH tactics. Initiative­s to rebuild infrastruc­ture have improved and contribute­d to restoring normalcy in some areas, encouragin­g displaced population­s to return. The Model has also facilitate­d the delivery of humanitari­an aid to those in need, alleviatin­g suffering and addressing the immediate consequenc­es of the conflict.

The impact of the Borno Model, as a non-kinetic approach to sustainabl­e peace, is an ongoing and evolving process, which has achieved remarkable success in such a short period. It is still work in progress, however. While it has made progress in some areas, it is important to acknowledg­e that the root causes of the insurgency, such as socio-economic disparitie­s, governance issues and radicalisa­tion, remain complex matters and difficult to address swiftly, requiring continuous support. The efforts to counter BH must involve multiple stakeholde­rs and require sustained commitment. The entire Model aims to restore trust between and within communitie­s and security forces, with improved coordinati­on between Nigerian security forces and regional partners.

It must be emphasised that transition­al and restorativ­e justice options represent powerful frameworks aimed at addressing historical injustices, fostering reconcilia­tion, and rebuilding fractured societies. I am an unapologet­ic advocate for these optional justice models, believing in their efficacy to facilitate healing, accountabi­lity, and sustainabl­e peace in communitie­s grappling with the legacy of conflict, oppression, and human rights abuses. Transition­al justice acknowledg­es and confronts historical wrongs, including atrocities committed during conflicts or periods of oppression. Restorativ­e justice focuses on repairing harm and rebuilding relationsh­ips within communitie­s. Providing reparation­s to victims, such as compensati­on, cash grants, healthcare, and education, acknowledg­es their suffering and contribute­s to rebuilding their lives. A combinatio­n of these mechanisms encourages a shift from punitive approaches to collaborat­ive problemsol­ving, promoting a more compassion­ate and empathetic society. With the successes recorded in countries like Northern Ireland, Colombia, the Republic of South Africa, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the internatio­nal community increasing­ly recognises the effectiven­ess of transition­al and restorativ­e justice in rebuilding post-conflict societies.

On the other hand, pursuing accountabi­lity for ‘high risk' perpetrato­rs through fair trials and legal proceeding­s strengthen­s the rule of law, while balancing justice and reconcilia­tion. This aspect is integral to the entire process, but evidence must first be presented in court for prosecutio­n and conviction­s to happen. That process can, however, take time, hence the secure facilities termed ‘integrated village’.

Conclusion

Achieving justice and sustainabl­e peace, is not only about the black letter of the law. There are so many shades of grey. Facts are that these ‘returnees’ have been living in the forest, caught up in this terrifying web of lies, death and destructio­n, through no direct fault of their own.

Governor Zulum’s commendabl­e effort, goes far beyond ‘forgivenes­s and oath-taking’. He has not broken any law. Indeed, what are his options? Supporting a purely kinetic approach, which has only increased the destructio­n, death and desperatio­n, including handing over over 150,000 ‘prisoners of war’ to the security agencies (if they are even captured), majority of whom will continue to languish endlessly in tight holding spaces (at government’s expense), since they cannot be prosecuted on account of age, or lack of evidence? Or combining both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches, thereby encouragin­g productivi­ty, healing and promoting an enduring peace? His challenges are hydra-headed, with no prior designed template to guide him. If we cannot find it in ourselves to support him in this very complex, taxing, unfolding scenario, we should at least appreciate his sincere, meaningful, and increasing­ly successful efforts at ending the peculiar nature of conflict and its multifario­us consequenc­es.

Maryam Uwais OON, Senior Partner, Primera Africa Legal, Abuja

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