WHY ISRAEL AND THE ARAB NATIONS ARE SLOWLY DRAWING CLOSER TOGETHER

The West’s alliances in the Middle East are in a sorry state. Turkey is flirting with Moscow and shelling our main Kurdish allies against Islamic State. European diplomats fume at Israel’s destruction of EU-funded Palestinian homes. President Obama has publicly criticised his Arab allies as “free riders”, while one of his senior officials memorably called prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “chickenshit”.

At the same time, one rivalry is softening. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has raged since 1948, shows signs of a modest, but significant, thaw. To be sure, Israel remains isolated. Only 18 of 21 members of the Arab League recognise the Jewish state. Many Arab states fund, shelter and celebrate Hamas, whose charter promises the obliteration of “the warmongering Jews”. And Israel still bristles when the US and Europe sell sophisticated arms to the Gulf. But under the surface, plates are shifting.

Last month, a retired Saudi general met Israel’s hawkish acting foreign minister, Dore Gold, at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, their second meeting in a year. Last summer, Israel’s former ambassador to Washington boasted of his meetings with Arab counterparts, praising them as “exceptional people”. And in January, Israel’s energy minister quietly visited the United Arab Emirates, after announcing the opening of an Israeli office in Abu Dhabi.

Meanwhile, spooks from each side have plotted in secret. The relationship is that of a mistress to a married man: one party eager for public acknowledgment, in hope of legitimising her questionable social status, the other desperate to keep it in the shadows for fear of the domestic consequences. Most Arab states risk popular fury if they were to normalise relations with Israel in the absence of a just settlement to the Palestinian issue.

There is no question about what has prompted this rapprochement. Over the past decade, Iran’s proxies and allies have grown more active and powerful. For instance, the Lebanese militant group Hizbollah, fostered by Iran in the 1980s, points its vast missile stockpile across the border to Israel – but also fights against Gulf-backed forces in Syria and Yemen. Meanwhile, the US and Europe have chosen to avoid a major confrontation with Iran. They struck a nuclear deal with Tehran last year, and even welcomed Iran’s President Rouhani to Paris and Rome. Naturally, the Arabs and the Israelis have acted on the dictum that the enemy of your enemy is your friend. “The Gulf Arabs believe… that they can count on Israel against Iran,” as one senior Israeli official told US diplomats in a leaked cable from 2010. “They believe Israel can work magic.”

This is a fragile process that could evaporate in the heat of another Palestinian uprising; but if it survives, there are upsides for the West. We’ve long urged Arab states to tone down their hostility to Israel. While the Netanyahu government will not move on the peace process, a less hawkish successor may be more inclined to do so if relations with Arabs are on an even keel. Moreover, we have demanded that Arab allies take on more responsibility for their security rather than calling on us to intervene. Why should we complain if they seek others’ help in doing so?

There are two points for Boris Johnson and the next US secretary of state to grasp. Our partnerships with Israel and the Gulf states will remain crucial to fighting terrorism and remaining in a position to intervene in the Middle East when our interests demand it. Iran is not a realistic substitute: its regime remains divided between the pragmatic leadership and hardliners who seek to sabotage it. Iranian forces continue to support the Syrian regime in its brutal war. British and Arab spies swap intelligence daily; Tehran would not dream of doing so.

And yet, we should reject the view that being good allies to the Gulf and Israel means distancing ourselves from Iran. The nuclear deal emboldened Iran, but also averted a war that would have been ruinous to us, Israel and Arabs alike. Post-Brexit Britain cannot let France, Italy and others dominate Europe’s economic relations with an emerging Iran; and we should not fear upgrading our diplomatic relationship with Iran to ambassadorial level.

Arab-Israeli contacts are a symptom of a region in extraordinary flux. Our diplomacy must be nimble enough to adapt.