Time and space

THERE isn’t a more vocal proponent of the ‘time and space’ dimension in politics than our very own, veritable Shaikh Rasheed of the Lal Haveli. He does, though, mix it up with some of the ‘line and length’ in seasonal accompaniment of cricket in the country, and tends to play the ‘time’ more than the ‘space’.

He has his concepts right since both ‘time’ and ‘space’ are changeable commodities. In the notional sense either can be defined in terms of duration. It may be complex in formulation but when you get the hang of it, it becomes easy to comprehend. Shaikh Rasheed has got the hang of it.

There is, however, another essence in the ‘time and space’ dimension when related to a geo-political or a simple political event as it plays itself out on a mosaic of continuous process – its transitory nature. ‘Time and space’ on a running mosaic of events is transient, never finite. This is where the Shaikh Rasheed doctrine of the emphasis on ‘time’ becomes important.

Since any such enactment of an event (read space since it enjoins opportunity) which may be of interest to a side will be transient, it will need to be so recognised and expeditiously exploited (time). A failure to recognise the ‘opportunity’ or miss the ‘moment’ will leave one with greater relative adversity since the potential of advantage would have been lost. If it also causes further real loss, that adds to the woes.

Why then this abstraction? One, it is meant to acknowledge the deep workman-like comprehension of Shaikh Rasheed of a complex decision-making phenomenon that is the key to success in applied strategy both in the field of war or politics; and two, to emphasise the intricate nature of making the right judgement of an act in play and seizing the moment to use it to advantage when an opportunity exists.

This brings me to why both these dimensions of time and space are likely to be the key to how Afghanistan and Pakistan fare, come the end of 2014. There are two hypotheses of conception as we run to the end of 2014 when most of the American/Nato/Isaf forces will vacate Afghanistan leaving behind only a residual force.

This too is dependent on whether Karzai will play ball and agree to a status of forces agreement (SOFA) in good time to permit an orderly transfer of responsibility to the Afghan forces enabling the residual forces the capacity to assist with the maintenance of order when major transformation in the security landscape is afoot. The failure to do so renders the entire process of exit and handover extremely vulnerable. Largely viewed, and typically from a Pakistani perspective, there is a best case scenario and a worst case scenario for Afghanistan and how it can impact Pakistan – the more abiding concern.

The best case first. Here on, the Taliban agree and engage with the US and Afghanistan to cease hostilities while both sides work towards political accommodation of the Taliban in the Afghan political process. The ultimate test of success to this rather hopeful aspiration is Taliban’s participation in the April 2014 Afghan elections.

If successfully enacted, and the signs of it must begin to emerge by the end of 2013 of the return of the large segment of the Afghan Taliban back to their homeland, it will leave sufficient space for the Pakistani politico-security apparatus to follow its own plan of action to return peace, writ of the state, and the law of the land to the restive Fata region and the larger Khyber Pakhtunkhwa adjunct.

In assuming such an outcome both time and space are available in luxurious quantities since the nexus between the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban will naturally stand severed with the Afghan Taliban focused on their own gains in Kabul. The Pakistani genre will stand denuded of their inherent cover of the larger conglomerate and forced to work with the Pakistani state apparatus either cooperatively or contentiously. Either way the focus of both the state and the Pakistani Taliban is largely inwards or on each other.

A few things must happen before reaching this state of comfort: someone must urge the Taliban to engage with all parties including the despised Karzai; an intra-Afghan dialogue should have been underway to forge an internal consensus to work with the Taliban and reintegrate them into the mainstream; Karzai should be open to multi-pronged approaches to negotiate with the Taliban; and finally, those Taliban who are released on the request of Afghanistan to enable interaction and dialogue are not let to waste back into the armed fold and are positively engaged by the Afghan authorities. Progress on most counts is abysmal. Karzai, after having reluctantly agreed to permit a Qatar office for the Taliban to engage primarily with the Americans – in a bizarre twist – insists on all engagement with the Taliban routing through his appointed High Peace Council.

There is simply no visible internal effort in Afghanistan to agree on reconciling with the Taliban. Personal or group agendas dominate. The looming election of a new president itself works as a major speed breaker to any serious intent or commitment in the direction of seeking an intra-Afghan consensus. The Americans are still without a peace plan and have even reversed the order of preconditions relegating the release of the identified Taliban from Guantanamo – the initiating precondition for the Taliban – as the last act stalling any possibility of an early dialogue.

All this relegates the possibility for a best case finish for Afghanistan to a pipedream. Events that should have already been put in place for their own good have not found favour with the Afghans, implicitly denying to the Pakistanis the much hoped for space to tie up their own loose ends.