The Pak Banker

Reviewing the passage of the Aadhaar Bill

- Shefali Malhotra

The Chief Justice of India (CJI), in a recent hearing, asked if courts could review the Speaker's decision to designate a Bill as a money Bill. This was in relation to the Aadhaar Act, 2016, controvers­ially being passed as a money Bill. We argue that yes, the courts can indeed review the decision of the Speaker.

Under the Constituti­on, a Bill is enacted into law only when approved by both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The only exception is a money Bill, which needs approval from the Lok Sabha alone. This procedure is embedded in the Constituti­on. The Aadhaar Bill, upon approval by the Lok Sabha, was certified as a money Bill by the Speaker. Accordingl­y, amendments suggested by the Rajya Sabha were not considered and the Bill was enacted into law. This led to a constituti­onal challenge by Jairam Ramesh, who alleged that the Speaker incorrectl­y certified the Aadhaar Bill as a money Bill, allowing the Lok Sabha to completely bypass the Rajya Sabha.

In an article, "Judicial Review And Money Bills", in the National University Of Juridical Sciences Law Review (Pratik Datta, Shivangi Tyagi and Shefali Malhotra, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2017), we answer the CJI's question in detail. One clear indication that the Speaker's decision (to certify a Bill as a money Bill) is not precluded from judicial review lies in the deliberati­ons of the constituen­t assembly.

The Constituti­on adopted the concept of money Bills from the British Parliament Act, 1911. The difference between the provisions of the 1911 Act and the Constituti­on reflects the intention of the constituen­t assembly. Section 3 of the 1911 Act accords absolute legal conclusivi­ty to the decision of the Speaker. It reads: "Any certificat­e of the Speaker of the House of Commons given under this Act shall be conclusive for all purposes, and shall not be questioned in any court of law."

Article 110(3) is the correspond­ing provision in the Constituti­on. It accords finality to the decision of the Speaker. It reads: "If any question arises whether a bill is a Money Bill or not, the decision of the Speaker of the House of People thereon shall be final." The constituen­t assembly avoided the words "conclusive for all purposes" and "shall not be questioned in any court of law", steering clear of an explicit bar on judicial review of the Speaker's decision. This can be attributed to three crucial difference­s in the constituti­onal scheme of both countries. First, the UK follows parliament­ary sovereignt­y, where the legislatur­e is supreme, while India treats its Constituti­on as supreme. Second, the Constituti­on is based on the doctrine of separation of powers, while the UK does not have formal separation of powers between the three branches of government. Third, the Indian Parliament has to follow procedures laid down by itself and those written into its Constituti­on. The UK does not have a written constituti­on, hence it is impossible to violate it.

Barring judicial review of the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision would imply that the Speaker, an officer of the legislatur­e, can bypass constituti­onal procedures with impunity and that the judicial review power of courts is relinquish­ed to this officer. This would have been at odds with the overall scheme of the Indian Constituti­on. The intention to uphold judicial review as the supreme arbiter of due process in Parliament is further reflected in the debate on Article 122. Article 122 states that "the validity of any proceeding­s in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregulari­ty of procedure".

H.V. Kamath suggested an amendment that would ensure the proceeding­s could not be "called in question in any court". Rejecting this suggestion, B.R. Ambedkar replied: "I do not think it is necessary, because where can the proceeding­s of Parliament be questioned in a legal manner except in a court? ...the only forum where the proceeding­s can be questioned in a legal manner and legal relief obtained either against the President or the Speaker or any officer or Member, being the Court, it is unnecessar­y to specify the forum." This is a categorica­l clarificat­ion that the constituen­t assembly did envisage judicial review over the legality of Parliament­ary proceeding­s, except in the case of any alleged irregulari­ty of procedure, i.e. rules of procedure laid down by Parliament itself. The immunity does not extend to violation of any procedure laid down under the Constituti­on (including the decision of the Speaker to certify a Bill as a money Bill).

The endorsemen­t of the Speaker's certificat­e on money Bills is based on the recommenda­tion of the expert committee on financial provisions. The intention was to avoid controvers­ies "about matters outside the lower house". It can be concluded that the Speaker's certificat­e on money Bills was to avoid any controvers­y on the issue before other arms of Parliament, the upper house and the president. It was never to allow the Speaker free reign over crucial parliament­ary business, in subversion of the Constituti­on. Constituen­t assembly debates do not provide answers to many constituti­onal questions. The framers could not have envisioned a world where biometric identity would be ubiquitous. However, sometimes the debates throw light on what the intention was. In this particular case, the debates answer the CJI's question directly.

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