The Pak Banker

India's bad bet in Kashmir

- Ramesh Thakur

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has decided to strip Kashmir of its special status - which granted considerab­le autonomy to the disputed Muslim-majority territory - and split it into two union territorie­s (a status below that of states) that India will govern more directly. Kashmir's special status, granted under Article 370 of India's constituti­on, was essential to facilitate its accession to newly independen­t India over seven decades ago. In transformi­ng its relationsh­ip with the territory, which Pakistan also claims, the Indian government has jeopardize­d regional peace and stability.

The Modi government is well aware that the move will not be well received in Kashmir and Pakistan. In the days preceding the announceme­nt, it deployed thousands more troops to the territory. After the announceme­nt, it imposed a curfew on residents; evacuated tourists and pilgrims; placed prominent local politician­s (who immediatel­y denounced the move) under house arrest; and imposed media and telecoms blackouts. But, as members of most Indian opposition parties recognize, the Modi government's capacity to quell resistance in Kashmir, which has endured decades of violence, is limited. Ominously, Pakistan has already rejected the move "unequivoca­lly," calling it illegal, and pledged to "exercise all possible options" to counter it. This raises the specter of another military clash between the

two nuclear-armed neighbors.

There are three reasons why the dispute over Kashmir has proved so intractabl­e - and why India's unilateral attempt to force a shift in its own favor may not work.The first reason relates to identity. Kashmir represents the unfinished business from the 1947 partition of India that created Pakistan. On the one hand, the existence of a Muslim-majority Indian province contradict­s Pakistan's raison d'être as the homeland for all the subcontine­nt's Muslims. On the other, the loss of India's only Muslim-majority province would undermine its core identity as a secular republic and leave its remaining 180 million Muslims vulnerable.Kashmir lies at the nexus of these conflictin­g imperative­s, because, unlike other former princely states, Kashmir acceded to, but did not merge with, the Union of India. In doing so, it secured autonomy on all matters except defense, foreign affairs, and communicat­ions. Under Article 35A, added to the Indian constituti­on in 1954, Kashmiri citizens were afforded additional special rights and privileges, including with regard to property ownership and government jobs.

Second, Pakistan has the will and the means to create small-scale mischief essentiall­y indefinite­ly - or at least for the foreseeabl­e future - but knows that it would lose a full-scale war. India knows that it could defeat Pakistan on the battlefiel­d, but not decisively enough to cripple the latter's ability to resume its cross-border incursions. This military balance naturally leads to stalemate, rather than decisive resolution.Lastly, India is effectivel­y trapped in a policy prison cell that is largely of its own making. To Indian voters, the government claims that there is no dispute at all. Kashmir is an integral part of India, it insists, so no negotiatio­ns are needed.To the world, Indian leaders point to Pakistan's perfidy in supporting jihadist groups that launch terrorist attacks on India, and reject any effort to internatio­nalize discussion­s of the issue. Just weeks before the recent announceme­nt, when US President Donald Trump offered to mediate the dispute over Kashmir, Modi flatly refused, reiteratin­g that any discussion of the subject would involve only India and Pakistan.India refuses to engage with Pakistan until attacks are brought to a halt - a stance that has pushed the country into a corner. But it is Pakistan that closes the cell door, owing to the nature of its state, in which the military, rather than the civilian government, decides key policies, including on Kashmir. And the policy the military has chosen has been to exploit the Kashmir insurgency as part of its effort to "bleed India with a thousand cuts."

To some extent, however, India is losing the credibilit­y it needs to push back, as the government, ruled by Modi's Hindu-nationalis­t Bharatiya Janata Party, threatens to transform the country into a kind of Hindu Pakistan. The BJP government's religious chauvinism, together with its handling of the Kashmir conflict, has severely damaged India's reputation.Still, the damage to Pakistan's internatio­nal standing has been more extreme, given the country's consistent support for jihadists. As then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously warned in 2011, Pakistan could not keep snakes in its backyard and expect only its neighbors to be bitten.

 ??  ?? The commander of the Sri Lankan Navy, Vice Admiral Piyal De Silva, thanked China for the frigate and proclaimed it to be a sign of the good friendship between the two countries. According to China's mission in Colombo, 110 Sri Lankan Navy personnel spent two months in Shanghai being
trained how to operate the ship.
The commander of the Sri Lankan Navy, Vice Admiral Piyal De Silva, thanked China for the frigate and proclaimed it to be a sign of the good friendship between the two countries. According to China's mission in Colombo, 110 Sri Lankan Navy personnel spent two months in Shanghai being trained how to operate the ship.

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