How Tsai has disappointed Taiwan's voters
TTaiwan presidential election is less than two months away, but the chances of incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen and the governing Democratic Progressive Party staying in power are far from assured. As the election approaches, the stakes for the DPP and the opposition Kuomintang party are extremely high. It may be premature to predict how the election will play out, as Tsai is garnering consistent double-digit leads over KMT presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu in the polls. Whether Tsai's strength in the polls is more a reflection of an actual resurgence in the DPP's popularity or the weakness of her KMT opponent is hard to tell.
While Tsai was on cloud nine, complacent with her strong poll ratings, at her rallies, supporters have appeared rather cold. There are three possible reasons for this.
First, DDP supporters may feel that Tsai's electoral prospects are already very stable, so they needn't show special enthusiasm for her. Second, they are no longer passionate about the DPP's perennial tactics of shouting "defending sovereignty." Third, Tsai's governance for the past three years probably caused harm to longterm, diehard supporters' livelihoods, while she has been unable to offer new hopes to younger generations.
Although the KMT's presidential candidate is currently behind remains in a strong in the polls, the party
position to take back
Taiwan's parliament. In the last general elections, the DPP won power in the central government and secured a majority of seats in parliament, fulfilling the goal of "complete control of government." But after more than three years in power, why has the performance of the Tsai administration and DPP legislators so disappointed the public?
It may be explained by the fact that the DPP caucus forfeited functions of parliamentary checks and balances, making Tsai an autocrat, while the national development policy has gradually gone further down a slanting and risky path.
The stunning defeat of the DPP at the end of last year in local elections was a warning from the voters. Tsai is sacrificing the people's welfare and the legitimacy of DPP legislators to consolidate her own power and authority. However, she has not been able to earn the overwhelming support of the people, nor could she elevate the people's trust or liking for DPP legislators.
Looking at the trends of current opinion polls, the DPP's complete control of government will most likely come to a full stop in January. The DPP not only won't keep a parliamentary majority, it will most likely lose its status as the largest party. At that time, even if Tsai wins the presidential election, she will be relegated to lame-duck status. What is unfortunate for the party is that while it originally had such an excellent opportunity for complete control of government, it has totally squandered it in the self-degradation of DPP legislators, only making an autocratic president out of someone who constantly spoke of humility.
The Tsai government's cross-Strait and diplomatic operations rely on three strategies. One is to oppose China, the second is relying on the US to bicker with China, and the third is selling "a sense of losing one's country." The focus of the Tsai government's thinking is, by utilizing the escalation of cross-Strait tensions, it can shift questions about maladministration and suppressing internal dissent into votes.
Since its stunning defeat in the nine-inone local elections last November, the DPP has been bickering with China, which in combination with the US-China confrontation, cross-Strait relations have rapidly deteriorated. President Tsai prides herself on being a "daredevil"; however, bickering with China in a high pitch is not the best way to defend Taiwan's democracy, because eliciting the oppression of the other side of the Strait will imperil Taiwan's security environment. Without security, and without opportunities for development, can the institutions of democracy endure and remain stable.