The Pak Banker

India's piecemeal Act East policy

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NDelhi indicated that its Act East policy is not directed at containing, let alone matching, Chinese influence when it dragged its feet on joining the Regional Comprehens­ive Economic Partnershi­p (RCEP). A flurry of reports followed, analyzing and commenting on the pros and cons of joining RCEP. Many experts pointed to such reasons as lack of competitiv­eness, economic slowdown, priority of short-term interests over long-term objectives, and lack of economic prudence for India's decision not to join the free-trade arrangemen­ts within RCEP. Many reports also suggested that a trade deficit with China would carry serious financial repercussi­ons for India and several domestic sectors of its economy such as farming and dairy would be adversely impacted, while India's existing free-trade agreements with Southeast Asian countries imply that RCEP would not be helpful for India.

Amid the avalanche of commentari­es on the economic side of the RCEP, India's decision also points to the fact that its Act East policy cannot be as proactive as China's moves according to grand designs in the region because of resource gaps, and therefore efforts must be limited to building as much influence as necessary to defend India's security interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

While China is in a hurry to expand its strategic as well as economic footprint across the Indo-Pacific region through connectivi­ty projects under the Belt and Road Initiative and free-trade arrangemen­ts such as RCEP, India is confident in its Act East policy as well as its Indo-Pacific strategy, which according to External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar would not be adversely impacted by all these evolving circumstan­ces. He said: "Our cooperatio­n spans so many domains that this one decision does not really undermine the basics. Even in trade, India already has FTAs with 12 out of the 15 RCEP partners. Nor is there really a connection with our Indo-Pacific approach, as that goes well beyond the RCEP membership."

New Delhi's belief seems to be driven by the geo-strategic considerat­ion that China would not be able to forge strategic ties with major Indo-Pacific players that are also members of RCEP, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia. These states are within the US sphere of geopolitic­al influence. Therefore, China would not be able derive much strategic benefit from RCEP that could contribute to India's security concerns.

Second, India's piecemeal approach also seems to rest on a belief that China would not be able to build close strategic ties with Associatio­n of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members only through connectivi­ty and free-trade arrangemen­ts. India must have been assured by the fact that China's territoria­l claims, coercion and violation of internatio­nal laws in the South China Sea that adversely impacted its relations with most of the countries in the Southeast Asian region including Vietnam, the Philippine­s, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia would not allow China a strategic presence that would pose serious security challenges for India.

While China refused to accept the verdict of the Internatio­nal Tribunal on the Law of the Sea over the claim of an island belonging to the Philippine­s, it deployed warships on the southern shores of Vietnam. Indian Prime Minister

Narendra Modi made references to the disputes in the South China Sea in appropriat­e platforms and upheld the view that all the maritime claims must be settled according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which in turn strengthen­ed the position of Southeast Asian countries on maritime questions. For instance, during the ASEAN-India summit in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015, he said: "India hopes that all parties to the disputes in the South China Sea will abide by the guidelines on the implementa­tion of the Declaratio­n on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and redouble efforts for early adoption of a Code of Conduct on the basis of consensus." He expressed similar concerns during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018, regarding "freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with internatio­nal law."

For this reason, even while the countries of the region could not ignore the military and economic prominence of China and decline to engage, India's engagement has been sought, at the same time, in diplomatic, economic and military domains to balance their interests and concerns. However, former Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakuma­r observes a strategic failure on India's part in its decision not to join RCEP. He notes how China is making strategic inroads into the Southeast Asian region under the China-ASEAN cooperatio­n framework, which is proposed to be upgraded from the current "2+7" to a "3+X" framework.

 ??  ?? Many reports also suggested that a trade deficit with China would carry serious financial repercussi­ons for India and several domestic sectors of its economy such as farming and dairy
would be adversely impacted, while India's existing free-trade agreements with Southeast Asian countries imply that RCEP would not be helpful for
India.
Many reports also suggested that a trade deficit with China would carry serious financial repercussi­ons for India and several domestic sectors of its economy such as farming and dairy would be adversely impacted, while India's existing free-trade agreements with Southeast Asian countries imply that RCEP would not be helpful for India.

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