War in the Taiwan Strait is not unthinkable
Whether anyone actually wins a war is a philosophical debate. The Germans and Japanese in 1945 might have thought wars do indeed have winners. But perhaps it’s better said that in most conflicts some parties lose more than others.
Such would be the case if Beijing attempted to militarily subjugate Taiwan. And Xi Jinping just might do so. He declared in a January 2019 speech that China did “not promise to renounce the use of force” but, rather, reserved “the option to use all necessary measures” to take Taiwan.
Taiwan voters on Saturday were conscious of Xi’s warning as they voted in their presidential election, but they decided to keep Tsai Ingwen in office for another four years – definitely not Xi’s desired outcome.
Much of the debate over a Taiwan Strait conflict focuses on preparation for and conduct of the PRC’s attack: whether Beijing will or won’t attack, what an attack might look like and Taiwan’s ability to defend itself, whether the US would or should get involved and whether it ought to sell Taiwan this or that weapon. Such discussion is useful, but the actual consequences and longer-term ripple effects of a fight over Taiwan deserve much more attention.
The Battle for Taiwan would have truly global consequences, akin to the invasion of Poland by the Soviets and Germans in 1939.
Examined here are key aspects of what happens once the shooting starts, and the follow-on global economic and political effects.
The envisioned scenario is a full-scale PLA assault against Taiwan, but it’s worth noting that even a “limited” assault – such as against one of Taiwan’s offshore islands – may not stay limited very long. Given Beijing’s oft-stated determination to take all of Taiwan, an offshore island assault would only constitute a tactical objective in the march on Taipei, and would also have serious and wide-ranging political and economic consequences.
Of course, Beijing hopes to defeat Taiwan without a military conflict: its immediate strategy is, through relentless political warfare, to scare and psychologically batter Taiwan into submission. But President Xi seems willing to use force. He increasingly sounds like a resentful drunk talking himself into a fight in a South Boston bar at 1 am. And People’s Liberation Army generals – flush with massive and increasingly sophisticated new weaponry – are eager to prove their allegiance to achieving Xi’s “China Dream” of “The Great Reunification.”
If it comes to a cross-strait shoot up, China’s powerful military with its arsenal of missiles, long-range rockets, ships, aircraft – and apparent ability to use them – can certainly hammer Taiwan, and just might seize the island. But such a victory would come at an immense cost in lives, money, and reputation. It would be a Pyrrhic victory that would result in the PRC’s isolation and genuine decoupling from the civilized world.
And an assault on Taiwan won’t be something started on Thursday and finished on Monday – won’t be a “short sharp war.” Nor will it be business as usual after a couple of weeks, with everything forgotten and USbound shipments of iPhones and plastic Santa Clauses resuming, and American soybeans going the other way.
For starters, Taiwan can resist an assault even though the military balance now heavily favors the People’s Republic. Taiwan’s military is competent and bolstered with so-called asymmetric weapons and operational concepts. Further, it is aided by formidable cyber-warfare capabilities. It can inflict heavy casualties on PLA forces, and there is the added morale heft Taipei can leverage: these are free people fighting for their lives.
However, even if fighting tooth and nail, Taiwan will suffer immensely, regardless of whether the PLA actually manages to capture the island and eliminate organized opposition.
It requires little imagination to get a sense of the destruction and loss of life from a Chinese assault on Taiwan, particularly once civilian targets are hit. China will likely want to terrorize the civilian population into submission early with its initial missile and airstrikes, but it just might only target selected military and government capabilities at this point.
However, once fighting starts in urban areas casualties will be in the tens, if not hundreds, of thousands; infrastructure – transportation, power, computer networks – will be destroyed, and the society and economy will be brought to their knees.