China’s a factor in India’s regional approach
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been a recurrent hostage to downturns in India-Pakistan relations, which has often led New Delhi to turn to subregional initiatives, as has been witnessed by the current prime minister’s invitation to the member countries of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to his swearing-in ceremony last year. BIMSTEC comprises five countries in South Asia – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka – and two in Southeast Asia, Myanmar and Thailand.
Going by the past records, India’s approach to subregional initiatives has been marred by a lack of leadership, resources and institutionalization. For instance, it took 17 years for BIMSTEC to establish a permanent secretariat in Dhaka, in 2014.
Similarly, the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) remained a Track II initiative for India until 2013 despite the rhetoric as to the perceived importance of subregional groupings.
However, India is poised to focus more on subregional initiatives considering that the possibility of a resurrection of SAARC seems remote. New Delhi’s endeavor in this direction, nonetheless, has met a powerful tide from the reverse direction in the shape of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Growing interest by most of the South Asian countries in Beijing’s infrastructure development and connectivity plans was visible well before India focused on BIMSTEC. The absence of China from that regional initiative also led some experts to take pessimistic note of India’s success in leading such initiatives. For instance, former Indian foreign secretary Krishnan Srinivasan remarked that members of BIMSTEC not only represented uneven economies with differing interests, the absence of China – the biggest Asian economy – would slow down the initiative because of a lack of investments.
Historically, India’s preference for bilateral rather than multilateral engagements and attempts at designing a regional security architecture according to its own interests helped create a domineering “big brother” image in the neighborhood. Its unilateral gestures and concessions aimed at augmenting a positive image often and ironically strengthened the big-brother syndrome. In contrast, China as a relatively new player resourcefully and with greater resolve was poised to take quick strides in the South Asian region.
India’s refusal to get involved in the BRI has not persuaded its small neighbors to keep away from collaborating with China. It is evident that India’s rejection of the BRI on the grounds that it violates its sovereign territorial claims has only helped China entrench its influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region and tightened China-Pakistan bonding further, making the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) a key part of the BRI.
Underlining the significance of the BRI, Subramanian Swamy, a member of India’s Parliament, recently suggested that China needs to consider diverting its BRI via Kolkata or Mumbai ports instead of passing through disputed India-Pakistan border areas. Clearly, India and China pursue competitive regional strategies that seek to reduce the influence of each other.
Competitive regional strategies
It is pertinent to underline that China has shown willingness to get involved in the SAARC process since it became an observer state in 2007. India was able in 2015 to persuade other South Asian countries to place a five-year moratorium on discussions on the issue of China’s inclusion as a dialogue partner, let alone a full member.
Logically, complementary regional strategies would have strengthened both countries’ power positions in the South Asian as well as the Indian Ocean region. Needless to say, however, realist politics defies reason.