Realpolitik in Caucasus
The clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh are a masterclass in hypocrisy couched as realpolitik. This is because they reveal the immensely schizophrenic nature of the actions of major regional players.
True, countries often behave in ways at odds with what they say. Still, Nagorno-Karabakh marks a unique inflection point. It has allowed regional countries brazenly to ignore existing multilateral mechanisms, such as the Minsk Group, and carry out actions that threaten to prolong the conflict.
What is particularly galling is that these actions are at cross-purposes with the nationalist narratives espoused by their political elites. Start with Turkey. Under the pretext that Azerbaijan and Turkey are "one nation, two states," President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has thrown his country's weight behind Azerbaijan. Yet if Azerbaijan and Turkey were one state, Azerbaijan's president, Ilham Aliyev, would have been part of the same secularist opposition whose demolition has been the cornerstone of Erdogan's political career.
The Aliyev regime in Azerbaijan is stridently secularist, to the extent that the regime frowns on overt displays of religion. Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, one of Erdogan's foreign-policy mainstays has been to undermine the Middle East's secular regimes.
Hypocrisy in the Turkish approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict stems from the need to achieve one of Erdogan's longerterm goals. This is to maintain domestic popularity by pursuing a neo-Ottoman foreign policy that ensures Turkish influence in the wider region.
Turkey's moves in the Caucasus have thrown down the gauntlet at Russia, which regards the former Soviet states in the region as falling within its sphere of influence. It could open yet another theater of conflict between Russia and Turkey, in addition to Libya and Syria.
For long, Turkey has attempted to undercut Russia in the region by supporting the construction of pipelines that carry oil and gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
That said, Russia's role in the Caucasus also has been incendiary. Even though it remains the ultimate guarantor of Armenia's security through a mutual defense pact, it has continued to sell arms to Azerbaijan. This is perhaps to ensure it remains critical to both countries.
Moreover, officials in Moscow have said Russia's security guarantees do not extend to NagornoKarabakh, since it is still officially a part of Azerbaijan. This Russian position is rich with irony, because Moscow has long set about supporting breakaway republics in troublesome neighbors like Georgia and Ukraine.
Similar schizophrenia marks Iran's approach to the issue. On the face of it, Iran's support for Azerbaijan would seem natural. The latter is Shia-majority like Iran, and Azeris make up a quarter of Iran's population. For this reason, representatives of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have spoken out in support of Azerbaijan in Iran's Azeri-majority provinces.
Yet this is a double-edged sword for the regime. Ethnic Azeris long have complained of domination by Iran's Persian establishment. And from time to time, politicians in Azerbaijan have referred to Azeri-dominated provinces in Iran as "south Azerbaijan," meaning these provinces ought to be part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
In addition, the regime in Baku has good relations with Israel, with which it shares energy and military links. Iran has long suspected Israel of using Azerbaijan as a surveillance base or perhaps future launchpad for an attack.
Azeri gains in NagornoKarabakh, or the surrounding territory currently occupied by Armenia, would extend Azerbaijan's border with Iran, thereby strengthening Israel and Turkey. For this reason, Iran, even while professing to support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, continues to maintain close ties with Armenia. Tehran continues to deny vociferously that military supplies to Armenia are passing through Iranian territory.