South China Sea dispute
Vietnam is trying to defend itself in its maritime disputes with its much more powerful neighbor China in the South China Sea by naming and shaming it for its transgressions there. Some of the criticism is deserved.
But much of it is hypocritical in that it ignores Vietnam's own similar transgressions. Indeed, it is like the pot calling the kettle black.
Vietnam and its supporters accuse China of violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), building on and militarizing low-tide features, using its maritime militia to intimidate others and allowing its fishermen to operate illegally in others' exclusive economic Zones (EEZs). But Vietnam is guilty of all these, and in its zeal to criticize China, the government and its supporters neglect acknowledging this.
Some accuse China of playing politics particularly in the negotiations for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and this may be so. But they do not acknowledge that Vietnam is using the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations to delay the conclusion of the Code of Conduct negotiations to advance its position against China.
Although the sovereignty dispute over the Chinese-occupied Paracels is only between Vietnam and China (including Taiwan), Hanoi selfishly insists that the geographic coverage of the Code of Conduct that is under negotiation include those islands and their attendant waters. This has been one of the main obstacles to agreement on a code.
Vietnamese government "scholars" have even tried to use Western think-tanks against China. A July 11, 2017, Rushford Report titled "How Hanoi's Hidden Hand Helps Shape a Think Tank's Agenda in Washington" implied sub rosa bias in the organization of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' South China Sea conferences.
Carlyle Thayer, a well-known expert on Vietnam and the South China Sea, said that "the issue Greg Rushford raises is why CSIS is so coy about not revealing the financial details of what the DAV [the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam] contributes and this might affect the selection of speakers."
This caused Thayer - and relevant others - to lose "confidence in both the CSIS and DAV." This incident may be just the tip of an iceberg of Vietnam's attempts to influence think-tanks in its favor in its disputes with China.
Vietnam claims to support freedom of navigation, the core tenet of the US rubric of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" that many see as an incipient anti-China coalition. Indeed, the US appears to be trying to entice Vietnam to join this effort.
But the reality is that Vietnam does not support unfettered freedom of navigation for warships. Indeed, it has long had restrictions regarding entry of foreign warships to its territorial waters, similar to those of China.
Vietnam's prior-notification regime and a territorial sea baseline that the US believes violate UNCLOS have been challenged by US freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the recent past. Moreover, US challenges of prior permission for warships to undertake innocent passage in territorial waters around the Paracels are directed not only at China but also at Vietnam.
Further, the US does not recognize Vietnam's claims to Spratly features that are not above water at high tide and presumably opposes their militarization just as it does those occupied by China.
These analysts continue to beat the dying horse of China's nine-dashline claim that has been formally adjudged by an international arbitration panel to be a violation of UNCLOS. But they fail to acknowledge that China may have an UNCLOScompatible claim to part of Vietnam's continental shelf and EEZ.
Beijing could argue that the Paracels belong to China, that they are legal islands, and that they generate an EEZ and a continental shelf extending out to 350 nautical miles. Those claims could encompass some of the northern part of the area in contention and necessitate the establishment of boundaries.
A previous arbitration result suggests that the Paracels may not generate EEZs or continental shelves - that is unknown - and at least some of the area is legitimately disputed until an arbitration or an agreement determines otherwise.
According to the GuyanaSuriname precedent, until a boundary is determined neither country should unilaterally proceed with exploitation there. Also there could be oil or gas deposits that straddle potential boundaries.