Factors that can alter Iran's protest movement
Iran's five-month protest is more serious than any since 1979, and one that's against not only economic suffering and government corruption but also the very nature of the country's Islamic regime.
Could Iran's Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an arm of the Iranian Armed Forces, believe that a strike by Israel on Iran's nuclear facilities would galvanize the population to unify against an external foe? After all, sometimes it takes a war to get people to rally behind their leaders.
So, would the mullahs' regime be more or less likely to survive if Israel struck Iranian facilities? Or, although it appears to be off the table for now, could an eventual rejoining of the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) defuse the protests?
On the one hand, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC may calculate that they are just a stone's throw away from producing a nuclear weapon. Their goal may be to let their neighbors and the world know that, when they choose, they can take the final steps to complete a nuclear bomb, which they have the means to deliver with their advanced ballistic missiles. That may be enough to intimidate their Sunni Gulf neighbors, who would be forced to accommodate Iran's role as the regional hegemon.
A nuclear umbrella could make them immune to attack and be another route to earning the allegiance of their people.
Although the logic of the Twelver Shi?ah regime may not comport with the Western mindset, the Iranian leadership is intelligent, rational and, above all, wants to survive. They might look at the hawkish nature of the new Israeli government's security council and conclude that the Israelis, with or without American help, will fulfill the nation's Begin Doctrine and not let an enemy nation who repeatedly calls for its destruction possess a nuclear weapon.
Following in the path of an Israeli strike on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981 and the attack in Deir ez-Zor in 2007 on the Syrian reactor, Israel could - with significantly more risk - attack Iran's nuclear program with the aim of setting back its progress for a decade. In addition, Israel could attack more than once, and there is no guarantee Iran would immediately restart its nuclear program.
Remember, the U.S. "red line" regarding an Iranian nuclear weapon - if a "red line" even exists - was not allowing Iran to have a complete nuclear weapon. In contrast, Israel does not have the luxury of waiting until Iran's weapon is ready to fire.
Alternatively, Khamenei and his minions could decide that an Israeli strike would destabilize their regime, giving protestors a window of opportunity for a true revolution. If that's the case, the mullahs may be better off placating American and European nuclear negotiators and restoring the JCPOA. Right now, some believe that although the protests are serious and persistent, those involved are not unified enough to threaten the regime's hold on power.
Khamenei and his heir apparent, President Ebrahim Raisi, may think that if they only have to give minor concessions to rejoin the nuclear agreement, they will still be able to have an industrial atomic program with the acceptance of the international community. The JCPOA amazingly does not allow inspections of Iran's military facilities, so the Iranians could continue to work clandestinely on the compartmentalization of atomic material for placement on a warhead.
The international community is fixated on weapons-grade uranium - that is, at least 90 percent enrichment. The Iranians know that the 60 percent level of enrichment they have achieved is not far away from that. So, even if they restart the nuclear agreement, mothball some centrifuges, and ship out some enriched uranium, they can resume their enrichment program and likely get to the 90percent level quickly.
If Iran agrees to a new nuclear deal, they could receive $1 trillion in sanctions relief over the next decade, legitimize the regime with the international community, and make the Israelis social lepers if they unilaterally strike. The Biden administration would not take kindly to a preemptive strike by Israel if a deal were in place.
More importantly, a nuclear deal would provide an economic lifeline to Iran, easing the Iranian people's financial burden and perhaps sapping enough strength from the protest movement to bolster the regime's stability.
"If Iran agrees to a new nuclear deal, they could receive $1 trillion in sanctions relief over the next decade, legitimize the regime with the international community, and make the Israelis social lepers if they unilaterally strike.”